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ABSTRACT 
 
It is generally agreed by policymakers and scholars alike that corruption is a form of 
misconduct which merits criminalisation. But definitions of corruption vary widely and there 
is no consensus on what constitutes corruption. 
 
Theorising about corruption is therefore a valuable exercise because it promotes greater 
understanding of this important concept. For example, it enables us to clarify the issues for 
debates about criminalisation, it assists with fair labelling of wrongdoing, and it helps in 
establishing coherent penalty regimes through accurate identification of the harms involved in 
corruption. 
 
But in order to theorise about corruption, we must have a complete picture of the harm which 
results from such conduct, and this in turn requires us to identify the interests being set back 
and their relationship to the wrongdoing involved. The scholarship on corruption is defective 
in this respect because it fails to provide a complete account of the harm which results from 
corruption. 
 
The dominant bodies of non-legal literature tend to argue that corruption results in remote 
harms to public interests. They assume but fail to provide a detailed account of the primary 
and indirect harms suffered by those innocent actors who are not engaged in corruption. By 
contrast, the legal literature has tended to focus almost exclusively on the wrongdoing in 
corruption. But this approach is incomplete because it not only fails to acknowledge that 
corruption harms innocent actors by setting back their interests, it also fails to emphasise the 
connection between such harming and the wrongdoing which also results from corruption. 
 
This thesis addresses these omissions by articulating a coherent theory of the harm in 
corruption. Using a three-part analytical framework, it analyses a number of core cases of 
corruption, and uncovers the harm and wrongdoing caused by such conduct (particularly to 
those innocent actors who are not engaged in corruption). 
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 1 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis seeks to articulate a coherent theory of the harm in corruption. The word “harm” 
consists of two distinct but overlapping elements.1 The first element refers to a simple sense of 
the word harm and describes a setback to a person’s interests. The second element refers to 
the wrong caused to a person by the indefensible violation of their rights. The articulation of a 
coherent theory is not straightforward and there is considerable uncertainty as to what the 
harm and wrongdoing in corruption is. 
 
As to harm, the general scholarship suggests that corruption is harmful because it results in 
remote harms. That is to say, it has long-term adverse effects on the proper functioning of 
government and the efficient operation of the economy. However, it is submitted that this 
view of harming underestimates the significance of the primary and indirect harms inflicted 
upon those innocent actors who are not engaged in corruption. This thesis does not seek to 
argue that primary, indirect, and remote harms are definitional features of corruption. Rather, 
it is submitted that these are descriptive features which are typically found in core cases of 
corruption. 
 
In terms of wrongdoing, there is very little in the way of scholarship on what makes 
corruption wrongful. But the literature that exists is defective in two important respects. First, 
by focusing almost exclusively on the nature of the wrongdoing in corruption, the literature 
fails to acknowledge that corruption is harmful insofar as it results in setbacks to the interests 
of innocent actors who are not engaged in corruption. Second, as a result of this focus, the 
literature fails to properly emphasise the connection between such harming and the 
wrongdoing inflicted upon these innocent actors by the corrupt acts of others. 
 
However, notwithstanding these deficiencies, there is some acknowledgement amongst 
policymakers that corruption can result in a range of different harms and wrongs. For 
example, in the foreword to the guidance on the Bribery Act 2010 (the 2010 Act), it states that: 
 
1 Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others (The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, 1984) 36. 
 2 
Bribery blights lives. Its immediate victims include firms that lose out unfairly. The 
wider victims are government and society, undermined by a weakened rule of law and 
damaged social and economic development.2 
 
We can see from this statement that there is a recognition that corruption has adverse 
consequences for both individuals and society. But despite this acknowledgement, there are 
no studies which provide a complete account of the harm and wrongdoing which results from 
corruption. 
 
When this thesis was first conceived in 2006, the criminal law of corruption consisted of an 
untidy collection of common law and statutory offences which were both overlapping and 
inconsistent.3 The common law dealt exclusively with bribery whereas the statutory offences 
were concerned with offences of corruption. This division was the result of piecemeal 
development rather than design (hence the overlap and inconsistency). 
 
It is important to note the distinction in the preceding paragraph between bribery and 
corruption as the two are not synonyms. It is clear from both ordinary usage and juristic 
consensus that bribery is essentially a large subset of corruption which consists of core cases of 
corrupt conduct (though not all forms of corrupt conduct).4 By contrast, corruption is much 
wider. It extends to all forms of abuse of position for personal gain and includes conduct such 
as money laundering and accounting offences which are not types of bribery.5 Despite this 
distinction, the two terms are often used interchangeably. This thesis will seek to introduce 
some precision to such talk by using the noun “corruption” to refer to corruption in the wider 
sense so as to include bribery. The terms “bribery” and “core cases of corruption” are 
interchangeable and will be used to refer to core cases of corrupt conduct which fall under the 
umbrella of bribery. By contrast, the adjective “corruptly” will be used to refer to behaviour 
which, depending on the context, may refer to either bribery or corruption. 
 
2 Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010: Guidance (March 2011) 2. 
3 David Lanham, ‘Bribery and Corruption’ in Peter Smith (ed), Criminal Law: Essays in Honour of JC Smith 
(Butterworths, 1987); Ian Dennis, ‘The Bribery Act 2010’ [2010] (6) Criminal Law Review 439. 
4 Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Michael Johnston (eds), Political Corruption: Concepts and Contexts (3rd edn, 
Transaction Publishers, 2002) 11. 
5 Home Office, Bribery: Reform of the Prevention of Corruption Acts and SFO Powers in Cases of Bribery of 
Foreign Officials: A Consultation Paper (December 2005) 10. 
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Returning to the position in 2006, it was difficult to locate a satisfactory definition of bribery 
at common law because the offence had evolved piecemeal over the centuries.6 Even when one 
could be found, there was disagreement as to whether bribery at common law was a general 
offence (applying to a range of different offices and functions) or whether it was comprised of 
a number of distinct offences (distinguished by office and function).7 Despite this confusion, 
most commentators regard Russell on Crime as providing the clearest definition of bribery:8 
 
Bribery is the receiving or offering [of] any undue reward by or to any person 
whatsoever, in a public office, in order to influence his behaviour in office, and incline 
him to act contrary to the known rules of honesty and integrity.9 
 
We can see from this definition that two harms are mentioned. The harm resulting from the 
conduct of the bribe payer is the improper influencing of a public official. By contrast, the 
harm arising from the conduct of the recipient of the bribe (the public official) is the failure to 
act with honesty and integrity. Although a definition need not account for all the harms and 
wrongs which may result from a given activity, it is instructive to note why this definition of 
bribery is incomplete. First, the most fundamental omission is the failure to recognise that 
there are other innocent actors who may be harmed and wronged by acts of bribery. That is, 
innocent third parties whose interests are set back by the corrupt acts of the bribe payer and 
the recipient of the bribe. Second, it is completely silent as to acts of bribery which are 
committed exclusively within the private sector. It is trite that those in the private sector may 
also engage in acts of bribery. Third, it is arguable that a public official who receives an undue 
reward may nonetheless act with honesty and integrity thereby falling outside the scope of the 
offence. For example, by remaining behind after working hours to process an application in 
accordance with proper procedures. 
 
 
6 David Lanham, ‘Bribery and Corruption’ in Peter Smith (ed), Criminal Law: Essays in Honour of JC Smith 
(Butterworths, 1987) 92-93. 
7 For example, bribery of a privy counsellor (R v Vaughan (1769) 4 Burr 2494) and bribery of a coroner (R v 
Harrison (1800) 1 East PC 382). 
8 Law Commission, Legislating the Criminal Code: Corruption (1998, Law Com Report No 248) 11; Law 
Commission, Reforming Bribery (2008, Law Com Report No 313) 5. 
9 J. W. Cecil Turner, Russell on Crime (12th edn, Stevens & Sons, 1964) 381. 
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Unlike the piecemeal development of the common law offence of bribery, the main statutory 
offences relating to corruption were hastily drafted responses to contemporary scandals. For 
example, the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889 (the 1889 Act) was introduced in the 
wake of revelations of corrupt practices made before a Royal Commission appointed to 
enquire into the affairs of the Metropolitan Board of Works.10 Similarly, the Prevention of 
Corruption Act 1916 was passed in the wake of scandals concerning the clothing department 
of the War Office which involved the taking of bribes by viewers and inspectors of 
merchandise.11 
 
This haste may account for the failure of the main statutes dealing with corruption to furnish 
any kind of meaningful definition of corruption (let alone offer any suggestion as to what the 
harm and wrongdoing in corruption is). Both the 1889 Act and the Prevention of Corruption 
Act 1906 (the 1906 Act) rely upon the word “corruptly” to describe the mens rea in corruption. 
In the leading case of Cooper v Slade,12 the House of Lords held that this meant “purposefully 
doing an act which the law forbids as tending to corrupt”13 (see chapter III for an alternative 
view). However, as Smith points out, this circular and unhelpful definition leaves the word 
“corruptly” devoid of any functional significance.14 In short, this definition tells us nothing 
about what corruption is or how it harms and wrongs those innocent actors whose rights and 
interests are set back by the corrupt acts of others. 
 
That being said, the 1906 Act (but not the 1889 Act) does make an attempt to proscribe the 
perceived wrongdoing in corruption. The offences of corruption proscribed by the 1906 Act 
are underpinned by the agency model. In its simplest form, the agency model requires three 
parties: the bribe payer, the agent of the principal (and recipient of the bribe), and the 
principal of the agent. When the agent accepts a bribe from the bribe payer, he betrays his 
duty of loyalty to his principal.15 According to this model, corruption is objectionable because 
 
10 Phil Fennell and Philip A. Thomas, ‘Corruption in England and Wales: An Historical Analysis’ (1983) 11 
International Journal of the Sociology of Law 167, 172. 
11 ibid 174. 
12 (1858) 6 HL Cas 746; 10 ER 1488. 
13 (1858) 6 HL Cas 746 at 773; 10 ER 1488 at 1499. 
14 A. T. H. Smith, Property Offences: The Protection of Property Through the Criminal Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 
1994) 792-793. 
15 Law Commission, Legislating the Criminal Code: Corruption (1997, Law Com Paper No 145) 4. 
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it causes an agent to betray his duty of loyalty to his principal. In other words, corruption is 
wrong because it results in the betrayal of trust. However, this narrow conception of wrong, 
which was no doubt based on pragmatic reasons, is defective in two important respects. 
 
First, the agency model regards the principal as the sole victim of a corrupt transaction. This 
means that the principal is the only person who is capable of being wronged by the agent’s 
corrupt conduct. But as we shall see, this is view is incomplete because it fails to recognise that 
there are other innocent actors whose rights and interests may be harmed and wronged by the 
corrupt behaviour of others. Second, the agency model is unduly narrow because it insists 
upon the presence of a principal-agent relationship in every corrupt transaction (there can be 
no corruption in the absence of such a relationship). However, there is no credible account as 
to why corruption may only be located in such relationships. 
 
These problems had been well documented since the mid-1970s by successive governments 
that had promised (but failed) to reform this out-dated area of the criminal law. By 2006, the 
question of reform had already been considered by a number of prestigious bodies.16 The 
government of the time sought to reform the law of corruption with the publication of a draft 
Corruption Bill.17 Somewhat surprisingly, the draft Corruption Bill relied upon the agency 
model to capture the harm in corruption. It was not well received and was heavily criticised 
for its reliance upon the agency model during pre-legislative scrutiny by the Joint Committee 
on the Draft Corruption Bill.18 Although the Home Office sought to defend the draft 
Corruption Bill,19 it was clear that an impasse had been reached. In March 2007, the 
 
16 The reform of the criminal law of corruption had been considered by: (1) the Prime Minister’s Committee on 
Local Government Rules of Conduct (Redcliffe-Maud Committee), Conduct in Local Government (1974, Cmnd 
5636); (2) the Royal Commission on Standards of Conduct in Public Life (Salmon Commission), Report of the 
Salmon Commission (1976, Cmnd 6524); (3) the Committee on Standards in Public Life (Nolan Committee), 
Standards in Public Life: First Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life (1995, Cm 2850-I); (4) the 
Law Commission, Legislating the Criminal Code: Corruption (1998, Law Com Report No 248), and; (5) the Joint 
Committee on the Draft Corruption Bill, Draft Corruption Bill: Report and Evidence (2002-03, HL Paper 157, 
HC Paper 705). 
17 Home Office, Corruption: Draft Legislation (2003, Cm 5777). 
18 Joint Committee on the Draft Corruption Bill, Draft Corruption Bill: Report and Evidence (2002-03, HL Paper 
157, HC Paper 705). 
19 Home Office, Draft Corruption Bill: The Government Reply to the Report from the Joint Committee on the 
Draft Corruption Bill (2003, Cm 6086). 
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government finally conceded defeat and stated that due to significant and influential 
opposition, the draft Corruption Bill was unsuitable for presentation to Parliament.20 
 
It was in the midst of this uncertainty that this thesis was conceived. The aim of the project 
then was to articulate a general theory of corruption supported by a coherent account of harm 
and wrongdoing. The need to construct a general theory (i.e. a model of what constitutes 
corrupt conduct) arose for two reasons. First, because there is no agreement on the types of 
conduct which constitute corruption. Second, because of the general dissatisfaction with the 
agency model. It was clear that if we had relied upon the agency model as a tool for identifying 
core cases of corruption that our project would have been too narrow and open to criticism. 
Although there were other models of corruption in circulation, these were also contentious. 
The first draft of this thesis sought to resolve this difficulty by constructing a new model 
which viewed corruption as a bilateral exchange. This bilateral exchange model was used to 
identify core cases of corruption for analysis. But our reliance upon the bilateral exchange 
model led to an unexpected difficulty. Although the bilateral exchange model was not 
intended to be determinative of what constitutes corrupt conduct, our reliance upon it meant 
that it had this stipulative effect. 
 
With the coming into force of the 2010 Act on 1 July 2011,21 the landscape is now radically 
different to that which existed in 2006. The 2010 Act has swept away the common law offence 
of bribery and the statutory offences of corruption (including the agency model contained in 
the 1906 Act). In short, it has replaced the law prior to the coming into force of the 2010 Act 
on 1 July 2011 (the old law) with four new streamlined offences of bribery based on a new 
model of corruption: the improper conduct model. As we shall see, the 2010 Act has been 
well-received. 
 
As a result of this seismic development, it is necessary to change direction. Accordingly, this 
thesis no longer seeks to defend the bilateral exchange model.22 Instead, our thesis will actively 
 
20 HC Deb, 5 March 2007, vol 457, cols 116WS-117WS. 
21 The 2010 Act received Royal Assent on 8 April 2010 and came into force on 1 July 2011. 
22 The first draft of this thesis gave rise to two published articles. In light of our change of direction, the views 
expressed in those articles are not relied upon; Abdul Gofur, ‘A Panoptic Study of Corruption’ (2006) 1 (1) 
Opticon1826 28; Abdul Gofur, ‘White Collar, Paper Tiger: Corruption in the UK’ (2007) 13 (4) Tilburg Foreign 
Law Review 317. 
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embrace the improper conduct offences contained in the 2010 Act. As a result of our change 
of direction, there is no need to construct a new model of corruption. Instead, we shall rely 
upon the improper conduct model to help identify core cases of corruption. 
 
Our focus on core cases of corruption follows an approach advocated by Hart. According to 
this view, sometimes the difference between the paradigm and the borderline is only a matter 
of degree. But other times, the division between the two lies in the fact that the core elements 
of the paradigm may be absent in the borderline. Such difficulties are instructive because they 
force us to make explicit our conception of the paradigm case. This in turn allows us to 
distinguish the borderline.23 
 
In short, by relying upon core cases of corruption, we can ensure that our account of the harm 
and wrongdoing in corruption is accurate and not distorted by focusing on borderline cases of 
corrupt conduct. It is important to stress that this thesis does not argue that the 2010 Act is 
determinative of the outer limits of what constitutes corrupt conduct. Rather, this thesis 
proceeds on the basis that the 2010 Act captures core cases of corruption. 
 
This new approach has two advantages. First, it avoids any objection about our model of 
corruption being stipulative. This will allows us to focus on articulating a complete account of 
the harm and wrongdoing which stems from core cases of corruption rather than engaging in 
a discussion about the bounds of corruption. Second, relying upon the improper conduct 
model gives our project a practical dimension which was lacking from the first draft of this 
thesis as the 2010 Act is the current law in England and Wales. 
 
However, our reliance upon the improper conduct model in the 2010 Act prompts a further 
question. The sceptical reader might ask why, given that bribery and corruption are not exact 
synonyms, we are relying upon a statute which is entitled the “Bribery Act 2010” to articulate 
the harm and wrongdoing in corruption? There are a number of reasons for this. First, as we 
have already mentioned, bribery is essentially a large subset of corruption. In other words, it 
encompasses core cases of corrupt conduct. Second, the ambit of the 2010 Act, 
notwithstanding its title, extends beyond cases of bribery to other forms of corrupt conduct. 
There is ample support for this proposition. The 2010 Act repealed the old law (which was 
 
23 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, 1997) 4-5. 
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concerned with both bribery and corruption) and replaced it with four new streamlined 
offences of bribery (two general offences and two discrete offences). Scholars in this area are 
agreed that the two general offences capture everything that the old law proscribed and do not 
criminalise any new forms of conduct.24 In other words, the 2010 Act captures not just 
instances of bribery but corruption as well. In addition, the 2010 Act fully complies fully with 
the United Kingdom’s (UK) international obligations under a number of anti-corruption (as 
opposed to anti-bribery) instruments.25 This lends further support to the proposition that the 
2010 Act criminalises both bribery and corruption. Interestingly, a close reading of the 2010 
Act shows that, aside from the use of the words “bribery” and “bribe” in the section headings 
of sections 1 to 4, neither word actually appears in the body of sections 1 to 4 (which contain 
the two general offences and the interpretation provisions). 
 
 
1. THE PURPOSE OF A COHERENT THEORY OF HARM 
 
Despite the voluminous literature on corruption, there are no systematic studies of the harm 
and wrongdoing which result from acts of corruption.26 The general scholarship is disparate 
and there are no studies which bring together the elements of harm and wrongdoing so as to 
create a coherent whole. 
 
Most of the literature on corruption underemphasises the primary and indirect harms which 
results from such conduct, and instead focuses on the remote harms. That is, the long-term 
 
24 G. R. Sullivan, ‘The Bribery Act 2010: Part 1: An Overview’ [2011] (2) Criminal Law Review 87, 94. 
25 For example: (1) the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (signed by the UK on 27 
January 1999, ratified on 9 December 2003, entered into force on 1 April 2004, ETS 173); (2) the United Nations’ 
Convention Against Corruption (signed by the UK on 9 December 2003, ratified on 9 February 2006, entered 
into force on 11 March 2006, Cm 6854). 
26 The Law Commission has conducted the most comprehensive analyses of bribery and corruption but these do 
not provide systematic accounts of harm and wrongdoing; Law Commission, Legislating the Criminal Code: 
Corruption (1997, Law Com Paper No 145); Law Commission, Legislating the Criminal Code: Corruption (1998, 
Law Com Report No 248); Law Commission, Reforming Bribery: A Consultation Paper (2007, Law Com Paper 
No 185); Law Commission, Reforming Bribery (2008, Law Com Report No 313). 
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adverse consequences for society27 (although there are a small number of scholars who argue 
the contrary and suggest that corruption may actually be beneficial). It is these remote harms 
which many policymakers rely upon to justify the criminalisation of corruption. 
 
There is a small but emerging body of literature which deals with the wrongdoing in 
corruption. The most prominent view in this context suggests that the offer of a bribe is 
wrong because it induces the recipient into committing an unlawful act. By contrast, the 
receipt of a bribe is said to be wrong because it causes the recipient to breach his duty of 
loyalty to his principal (or to a principle). 
 
Whilst neither the remote harms nor the wrongs caused by corruption are disputed, this thesis 
argues that the existing scholarship has underemphasised the primary and indirect harms 
caused by corruption. It is submitted that the existing literature fails to properly account for 
the primary and indirect harm to those innocent actors whose rights and interests are set back 
by the corrupt acts of others. The harm and wrongdoing suffered by these innocent actors can 
only be explained by undertaking a systematic study of the harm and wrongdoing in 
corruption. This is the principal reason for undertaking our project. 
 
We can demonstrate the primary and indirect harms to these innocent actors by reference to 
the case of Munir Patel (discussed in detail in chapter IV). Patel pleaded guilty to, inter alia, 
one count of accepting a financial advantage contrary to section 2 of the 2010 Act. In short, he 
accepted a bribe of £500 in return for not entering the details of a court summons into the 
court’s computer database. In passing sentence, HHJ McCreath made the following remarks:28 
 
Your position as a court clerk had at its heart a duty to uphold and protect the 
integrity of the criminal justice process. What you did was to undermine it in a 
fundamental way. 
 
 
27 Nick Kochan and Robin Goodyear, Corruption: The New Corporate Challenge (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) 19-
25. 
28 Judiciary of England and Wales, ‘R v Munir Patel (Southwark Crown Court): Sentencing Remarks of HHJ 
Alistair McCreath’ (Press Release, 18 November 2011) 
<http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Judgments/munir-patel-sentencing-remarks.pdf> 
accessed 19 November 2011. 
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By doing what you did, you created a danger not only to the integrity of the process 
but also to public confidence in it. The harm you did was not just to the process. It 
extended more widely because by your actions a number of people who should have 
been subject to monitoring and control by way of the imposition of penalty points 
avoided that. The penalty point system has two aspects. The obvious one is that it puts 
bad drivers off the road for a period of time. The other one is that it is a wake-up call 
to many. We all know of motorists whose driving habits are transformed when points 
are added to their licences through fear of the consequences of further offending. 
 
And it should not be forgotten that the imposition of penalty points is a relevant 
matter for insurance companies. Bad drivers pose a higher risk than good ones. One of 
the effects of your offending was that insurers were carrying risks at an inappropriate 
cost, insuring bad drivers as if they were good ones. 
 
We can see from HHJ McCreath’s sentencing remarks that Patel’s corruption not only set 
back the public interest (a remote harm) in a fair and impartial criminal justice system, it also 
resulted in primary harm to the financial interests of those innocent insurance companies 
who insured bad drivers at an inappropriate cost. 
 
However, a coherent theory of the harm and wrongdoing in corruption may also provide a 
number of subsidiary benefits. For example, articulating the harm and wrongdoing in 
corruption may assist with providing a robust account of what makes corruption 
objectionable. Although our project is not concerned with the justification for criminalising 
corruption, a coherent account of harm and wrongdoing is generally regarded as a good 
starting point for any such discussion.29 
 
Second, a coherent account may help with correct labelling because it allows us to explain why 
seemingly different types of conduct such as bribery, nepotism, and match-fixing all fall to be 
treated as types of corruption.30 For example, most observers would agree that a public official 
who accepts a bribe in order to process an application quickly is acting corruptly. But matters 
are less clear when the public official remains after working hours to process the application. 
 
29 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th edn, Oxford University Press, 2006) 22. 
30 Charlie Monteith, ‘The Bribery Act 2010: Part 3: Enforcement’ [2011] (2) Criminal Law Review 111, 111. 
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In this example, it is not immediately obvious whether the public official has engaged in an act 
of bribery or some other type of criminality such as misconduct in a public office. 
 
The scope for disagreement is brought into sharp focus in more extreme cases. For example, 
let us suppose that a Nazi officer accepts a bribe to let a prisoner escape from a concentration 
camp. In this example, there is considerable uncertainty (both conceptually and morally) as to 
whether the Nazi officer has acted corruptly by accepting the bribe and letting the prisoner 
escape.31 
 
Such difficulties have led some exasperated theorists to conclude that corruption is like an 
elephant. It is difficult to describe but is generally not difficult to recognise. It is said that in 
most cases, observers will have an intuitive sense of whether a particular activity constitutes an 
act of corruption.32 However, this claim is highly doubtful given that the word “corruption” is 
used by some scholars to describe an array of different, arguably non-corrupt conduct, such as 
desertion, treason, smuggling, larceny and stealing, forgery and embezzlement, deceit, and 
fraud.33 One reason for this confusion may be the fact that despite the near-universal 
condemnation of corruption, what is considered as falling within the scope of corruption may 
vary according to political, economic, and cultural conditions and tradition.34 
 
Third, a coherent account of harm and wrongdoing may be helpful in determining the 
appropriate sanctions for acts of corruption through the development of sentencing 
guidelines (there being no such guidelines at present). The sentencing guidelines for other 
types of white collar offences such as fraud are based on the financial gain or loss which results 
 
31 This example is borrowed from Stuart P. Green, Lying, Cheating, and Stealing: A Moral Theory of White-
Collar Crime (Oxford University Press, 2006) 205-207. 
32 Vito Tanzi, ‘Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures’ in George T Abed and 
Sanjeev Gupta (eds), Governance, Corruption, and Economic Performance (International Monetary Fund, 2002) 
24-25. 
33 Gerald E. Caiden, ‘Toward a General Theory of Official Corruption’ (1988) 10 (1) Asian Journal of Public 
Administration 3, 5; Jeremy Pope, TI Source Book 2000 (2nd edn, Transparency International, 2000) xviii. 
34 William Twining, ‘Have Concepts, Will Travel: Analytical Jurisprudence in a Global Context’ (2005) 1 (1) 
International Journal of Law in Context 5, 9. 
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from such offending.35 However, the problem with corruption is that it encompasses many 
different types of misconduct which cannot easily be translated into simple statements about 
financial gain or loss. 
 
We can better demonstrate this point by recalling the case of Munir Patel who was sentenced 
to three years’ imprisonment (with full credit for an early guilty plea) for accepting a bribe of 
£500.36 If we were to apply the most relevant sentencing guidelines for fraud (revenue fraud) 
to the facts of Patel’s case, we would end up with a surprising result. According to the revenue 
fraud guidelines, based on a gain of £500, the starting point for sentence is a fine, and the 
range is a fine to a low level community order. In order to pass a custodial sentence of three 
years’ imprisonment under the revenue fraud guidelines, the court would have to be satisfied 
that Patel had received a bribe of £300,000.37 Similarly, the sentencing guidelines for theft38 
(theft in breach of trust), also produce unexpected results. Based on a gain of £500, the 
starting point for sentence is a medium level community order, and the range is a fine to 26 
weeks’ imprisonment. Even a case involving breach of a high degree of trust (such as Patel’s 
case) only has, as a starting point, a sentence of 18 weeks’ imprisonment, and a range of a high 
level community order to 12 months’ imprisonment. 
 
Thus, we can see that the sentencing guidelines for fraud and theft, which are based on 
financial gain and loss, are not immediately applicable when it comes to sentencing cases of 
corruption. It may be that by focusing on harm and wrongdoing instead, sentencing 
 
35 Sentencing Guidelines Council, ‘Sentencing for Fraud - Statutory Offences: Definitive Guideline’ (October 
2009) <http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/web_sentencing_for_fraud_statutory_offences.pdf> 
accessed 13 October 2012. 
36 The sentence of three years’ imprisonment for bribery was left undisturbed following an appeal against 
sentence; R v Munir Patel [2012] EWCA Crim 1243. 
37 Sentencing Guidelines Council, ‘Sentencing for Fraud - Statutory Offences: Definitive Guideline’ (October 
2009) <http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/web_sentencing_for_fraud_statutory_offences.pdf> 
accessed 13 October 2012. 
38 Sentencing Guidelines Council, ‘Theft and Burglary in a Building other than a Dwelling: Definitive Guideline’ 
(December 2008) 
<http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/web_Theft_and_Burglary_of_a_building_other_than_a_dwellin
g.pdf> 13 October 2012. 
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guidelines could be devised based on categories of offending (much like the sentencing 
guidelines for robbery39 and theft).40 
 
Lastly, a coherent account of harm and wrongdoing may be useful insofar it provides a 
normative account of corruption. Although such an account may not map neatly on to the 
contours of the positive law of a given foreign jurisdiction, this does not detract from its 
philosophical value. 
 
For the sake of clarity, it is worth emphasising that this thesis does not seek to develop a full 
account of the subsidiary benefits mentioned above. The central aim of this thesis is to 
articulate a coherent theory of the harm and wrongdoing in corruption. 
 
 
2. THE SCOPE OF OUR PROJECT 
 
It is important at this stage to delineate the scope of our thesis. First, this thesis is not intended 
to be doctrinal or comparative. There is no dispute that corruption is a transnational 
phenomenon. Neither is it contentious to suggest that the ambit of corruption may vary from 
country to country.41 One only has to turn to the wide array of international anti-corruption 
instruments in circulation if further proof is required (the UK is a signatory to a large number 
of these). That being said, it would require a feat of Herculean proportions to undertake a 
detailed comparative study of every international anti-corruption instrument and the positive 
law of every major jurisdiction which proscribes corruption. 
 
 
39  Sentencing Guidelines Council, ‘Robbery: Definitive Guideline’ (July 2006) 
<http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/web_robbery-guidelines.pdf> 13 October 2012. 
40 Sentencing Guidelines Council, ‘Theft and Burglary in a Building other than a Dwelling: Definitive Guideline’ 
(December 2008) 
<http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/web_Theft_and_Burglary_of_a_building_other_than_a_dwellin
g.pdf> 13 October 2012. 
41 Section 5(2) of the 2010 Act recognises this and makes an exception where it can be shown that conduct, which 
would otherwise be regarded as corrupt under the 2010 Act’s extra-territorial provisions, is permitted by the 
written law of a given foreign jurisdiction. 
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However, although a detailed comparative analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis, there is 
value to be gained from looking at the positive law of a major foreign jurisdiction in order to 
assess the normative dimension of our project. After all, if we were to find on analysis that 
there are significant differences between what is considered corrupt in England and Wales 
and what is considered corrupt in a foreign jurisdiction, it might cause us to reassess our 
account of the harm and wrongdoing in corruption. For this reason, we shall consider some 
carefully selected anti-corruption statutes from the United States of America (USA). 
 
Second, this is not a thesis about the criminalisation of corruption. Although a coherent 
account of harm and wrongdoing may provide good justificatory reasons in support of 
criminalisation, it is not the only liberty-limiting principle available to the legislature. A 
project about criminalisation would, at the very least, need to consider other liberty-limiting 
principles, the costs of criminalisation, as well as possible non-criminal sanctions; all of which 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
 
3. ROAD MAP 
 
Now that we have introduced our project, let us set out a road map of the main arguments 
which will follow in this thesis together with a description of the contents of the remaining 
chapters. 
 
THE MAIN ARGUMENTS 
 
It is generally agreed by policymakers and scholars alike that corruption is a form of 
misconduct which merits criminalisation. However, notwithstanding this agreement, 
definitions of corruption vary widely and there is no consensus as to the types of conduct 
which constitute corruption (as opposed to some other form of misconduct such as 
misconduct in a public office, theft, and fraud, etc.). 
 
Theorising about corruption is therefore a valuable exercise because it promotes greater 
understanding of this internationally important concept. For example, it enables us to clarify 
the issues for debates about criminalisation, it assists with fair labelling of wrongdoing, and it 
helps in establishing coherent penalty regimes through accurate identification of the harms 
involved in corruption. 
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But before we can begin theorising about corruption, we must have an accurate and complete 
picture of the harm which results from corruption, and this in turn requires us to identify the 
interests being set back and their relationship to the wrongdoing resulting from such conduct. 
The scholarship in this area is defective because it fails to provide a complete account of all the 
harm which result from corruption. 
 
The dominant bodies of non-legal literature emphasise the remote harms which result from 
corruption. However, in so doing, they underestimate the harms inflicted upon those 
innocent actors whose rights and interests are set back by the corrupt acts of others. In other 
words, the literature assumes but omits to provide a detailed account of the primary and 
indirect harms caused to the interests of these innocent actors. By contrast, the legal literature 
has tended to focus almost exclusively on the wrongdoing in corruption. But this approach is 
incomplete because it not only fails to acknowledge that corruption harms the interests of 
innocent actors by setting back their interests, it also fails to make any connection between 
such harming and the wrongdoing which also results from corruption. 
 
This thesis seeks to address these omissions by articulating a coherent theory of the harm in 
corruption. Our use of the word “coherent” is intended to imply that the existing literature on 
corruption is incomplete for the reasons stated above. However, in order to articulate a 
coherent theory, it is necessary to set out a robust framework for study. 
 
To this end, this thesis relies upon a three-part analytical framework which allows us to: (1) 
identify core cases of corruption (as opposed to corruption in the wider sense), (2) assess 
whether core cases of corruption travel well by comparing and contrasting such conduct with 
the law in the USA, and (3) critically analyse core cases of corruption in order to uncover the 
harm and wrongdoing caused by such conduct (particularly to those innocent actors who are 
not engaged in corruption). 
 
By approaching the matter in a systematic way, this thesis plugs the lacuna in the literature 
and furnishes a complete account of the harm and wrongdoing in corruption. As we shall see, 
those who engage in core cases of corruption inflict a number of different harms on innocent 
actors who are not engaged in corruption. These harms (or setbacks to interests) can be 
divided into primary harms and indirect harms, and are distinct from the remote harms 
caused to public interests. The three harms (primary, indirect, and remote) are descriptive 
features which are typically found in core cases of corruption. In addition, it will be seen that 
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core cases of corruption also wrong innocent actors who are not engaged in corruption. 
Contrary to the existing legal literature on wrongdoing, it will be shown that there is a nexus 
between the primary harms suffered by these innocent actors and the wrongdoing resulting 
from corruption. 
 
Our thesis also confirms that core cases of corruption travel well in the sense that what is 
considered corrupt in England and Wales is largely regarded in the same way in the USA. This 
underlines the transnational nature of corruption and supports the normative aspects of this 
thesis. 
 
THE REMAINING CHAPTERS 
 
The remaining chapters of this thesis can be summarised thus: 
 
Chapter II 
 
We begin with a review of the literature on the harm and wrongdoing in corruption. It is 
submitted that the literature can broadly be divided into three distinct strands (although there 
is some overlap). The first two strands (political harm and economic harm) are concerned 
exclusively with the harm in corruption whereas the third strand (moral wrongdoing) is 
concerned solely with the wrongdoing in corruption. 
 
The first strand consists of contributions from political scientists. There is a dispute between 
political scientists as to whether corruption is harmful. The minority (the revisionists) argue 
that corruption is not harmful. On the contrary, they maintain that corruption is a necessary 
and inevitable part of the modernisation process of a country. According to the minority, 
corruption may make certain positive contributions to the political development of a country. 
This view fell out of vogue towards the end of the 1960s as a result of sustained attacks from 
the majority (the post-revisionists) who argue that corruption adversely affects the proper 
functioning of government and the rule of law. 
 
Whilst these claims about the remote harm consequences of corruption are not disputed, this 
thesis argues that the account advanced by the post-revisionists suffers from two weaknesses. 
First, it underemphasises the primary and indirect harms suffered by those innocent actors 
whose rights and interests are set back by the corrupt acts of others. It is submitted that 
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primary and indirect harms typically arise in core cases of corruption. This thesis maintains 
that the primary, indirect, and remote harms which arise from corruption are descriptive 
(rather than definitional) features of corruption. It is not our thesis that primary harms are by 
definition the most serious harms which flow from acts of corruption. In fact, the most 
serious harms could, depending on the circumstances, be any of the three harms which we 
have identified: primary, indirect, and remote. The phrase primary harm is intended to refer 
to the most direct harm which flows from corruption (this matter is discussed in further detail 
in chapter III). Second, the post-revisionists’ account fails to emphasise that nexus between 
such harming and the wrongdoing (the third strand) caused by corruption. 
 
The second strand of literature is concerned with economic harm. Like their political scientist 
counterparts, there is a disagreement between economic theorists as to the harmfulness of 
corruption. For the minority (the revisionists), corruption results in an efficient use of 
resources and is therefore productive. This argument is rejected as false by the majority (the 
post-revisionists) who argue that corruption is inefficient (in the sense of being unproductive) 
and has serious deleterious effects for society. This account, based on the remote harms 
caused by corruption, has come to be regarded as the superior account of economic harm.  
 
However, this macroeconomic view of corruption also underestimates the primary and 
indirect harms which typically arise in core cases of corruption; and which set back the rights 
and interests of those innocent actors who choose not to engage in corruption. Like the 
political scientists, the economic theorists also fail to account for the connection between such 
harming and the wrongdoing (the third strand) caused by corruption. 
 
The third strand, which consists of a small but emerging body of literature, is concerned with 
the moral wrongdoing in corruption. Whilst the theorists in this area are agreed that 
corruption is wrongful, there is no agreement between them as to what makes corruption 
wrongful. The most prominent theorist in this area looks at the wrongdoing in bribery from 
the perspective of both the briber payer and the recipient of the bribe. According to this view, 
the offer of a bribe is wrong because it causes another to commit an unlawful act. By contrast, 
the receipt of a bribe is wrong because it causes the recipient to act in breach of a duty of 
loyalty owed to a principal (or to a principle). 
 
This thesis argues that this view is defective in two respects. First, it is unduly narrow insofar 
as it fails to account for the fact that corruption also wrongs other innocent actors who are not 
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owed a duty (either as a principal or as a matter of principle). Second, it fails to make any 
connection between such wrongdoing and the primary harm caused to these innocent actors 
by the corruption of others. 
 
We conclude chapter II by arguing that there is a major gap in the literature. The omission, 
which we have identified above, consists of a failure by theorists to provide a detailed and 
complete account of the harm and wrongdoing suffered by those innocent actors whose rights 
and interests are wrongfully set back by the acts of those who engage in corruption. 
 
Chapter III 
 
Having identified that there is a gap in the literature which prompts theoretical consideration, 
chapter III sets out a three-part analytical framework for exploring that gap. It is important to 
note that this chapter is largely descriptive. Although there is some analysis, chapter III is not 
intended to be critical of the materials contained within it. 
 
The need for a framework is fairly obvious. We cannot begin to articulate a coherent account 
of the harm and wrongdoing in core cases of corruption (and in particular the harms and 
wrongs suffered by the innocent victims of corruption) until we have a mechanism for 
identifying core cases of corrupt conduct and a barometer for gauging harm (including 
primary harms, indirect harms, and remote harms) and wrongdoing. 
 
We begin by setting out a mechanism for identifying core cases of corrupt conduct. As 
previously mentioned, we shall do this by adopting the improper conduct model in the 2010 
Act. Thus, for the purposes of this thesis, a given type of conduct will be regarded as a core 
case of corruption if it falls within the ambit of the improper conduct offences contained in 
the 2010 Act. By adopting this approach, we can focus our attention on the harm and 
wrongdoing caused by core cases of corruption rather than trying to delineate the outer limits 
of corruption. Of course, it does not follow from this approach that conduct which is not 
caught by the 2010 Act is not a type of corruption. It may well be that such conduct is caught 
by the wider definition of corruption. Our reliance upon the 2010 Act is grounded in the fact 
that it is positive law which commands wide support. 
 
The second part of our framework consists of a summary of some carefully selected anti-
corruption statutes from the USA. By applying these US anti-corruption statutes to the core 
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cases of corruption identified by the first part of our analytical framework, we will be able to 
ascertain whether there are any major differences in terms of coverage between the law in 
England and Wales and the law in the USA. Assuming that there are no major differences in 
coverage, we will feel more secure in pressing the normative value of our theory of the harm 
and wrongdoing in corruption. 
 
In the third and final part of our framework, we will explain what we mean by the terms 
“harm” and “wrongdoing”. To this end, we shall furnish a streamlined and modified version 
of Feinberg’s seminal work on the harm principle. According to Feinberg, a person is harmed 
in the appropriate sense when his interests are set back (i.e. simple harm) and his rights are 
indefensibly violated (i.e. he is wronged).42 In this part, we shall discuss the meaning of these 
key concepts and explain in detail how the harm principle operates. 
 
However, as we shall see, although Feinberg’s version of the harm principle is both detailed 
and compelling, it suffers from two weaknesses. First, his account of harming does not tell us 
how to distinguish between the different types of harms which may arise from a given activity. 
Second, his account of wrongdoing tells us that one person wrongs another when his 
indefensible conduct violates the other’s rights (legal or moral). However, Feinberg does not 
provide us with a detailed account of what rights are and what they do for those who hold 
them. 
 
Both of these weaknesses are remedied by way of supplementation. The first issue is addressed 
by furnishing an account of primary harms, indirect harms, and remote harms. The second 
issue is addressed through the provision of an account of both the form (i.e. a description of 
the internal structure of rights) and the function (i.e. what rights do for those who hold them) 
of rights. 
 
Chapter IV 
 
Chapter IV lies at the heart of our project. In this chapter, we shall take the three-part 
analytical framework set out in chapter III and apply it to a range of different case studies. The 
aim of this exercise is twofold. First, we shall remedy the gap in the literature by identifying, in 
 
42 Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others (The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, 1984) 36. 
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each of our case studies, the primary, indirect, and remote harms, and the wrongdoing caused 
to those innocent actors whose rights and interests are wrongfully set back by the corrupt acts 
of others. This thesis argues that primary, indirect, and remote harms are descriptive (rather 
than definitional) features of core cases of corruption. The case studies selected for analysis 
are those forms of conduct which are commonly regarded as being core cases of corruption 
(e.g. bribery, nepotism, and match-fixing). So far as possible, we shall rely upon actual (as 
opposed to hypothetical) examples within each case study. Second, we shall conclude the 
chapter by bringing our findings together. This will allow us to answer our research question 
by advancing a coherent theory of the harm and wrongdoing in core cases of corruption. 
 
Chapter V 
 
We conclude our thesis in chapter V by reviewing the aims of our project, the methodology 
adopted, setting out our findings, and discussing our account of the harm and wrongdoing in 
core cases of corruption. 
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II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The principal aim of this chapter is to develop a context for our project. We shall do this by 
reviewing the literature on the harm and wrongdoing in corruption, identifying any gaps 
which exist, and explaining the contribution that our project will make to the field. 
 
There is a formidable body of literature on the harm and wrongdoing in corruption. Broadly 
speaking, the literature can be divided into three distinct strands (although there is some 
cross-fertilisation). The first two strands (political harm and economic harm) are solely 
concerned with the harm caused by acts of corruption. The third strand (moral wrongdoing) 
is concerned with the question of what makes corruption wrong. It is quite easy to divide the 
literature in this way since there are no studies which weave all three strands together into a 
coherent whole; something which this thesis will attempt to do. 
 
The first strand consists of contributions from political scientists. The dominant view 
amongst the political scientists is that corruption results in remote harms which can 
undermine the proper functioning of government and set back the rule of law. The existence 
of corruption is said to indicate a state of decay in the proper functioning of government. 
When this occurs, the state loses its capacity for rational behaviour and thereby its ability to 
serve the interests of the public.43 However, this account underemphasises the harm suffered 
by those innocent actors whose interests are set back by the corrupt acts of others. 
 
The second strand is concerned with the economic harm which results from corruption. The 
prevailing view amongst economic theorists is that corruption is inefficient because it is 
conduct which is unproductive. The majority of economic theorists argue that corruption 
results in remote harms which can stifle competition, distort the allocation of resources, and 
retard economic development. But this account also underestimates the harm suffered by 
those innocent actors whose interests are adversely affected by the corruption of others. 
 
 
43 Crawford Young, ‘Zaire: Is There A State?’ (1984) 18 (1) Canadian Journal of African Studies 80, 80. 
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The third and final strand consists of a small body of emerging literature from legal 
philosophers who are interested in trying to explain the wrongdoing in corruption. The 
theorists in this area, though few in number, are agreed that corruption is wrong. The distance 
between them is a difference of opinion as to what makes corruption wrongful. The leading 
theorist in this area, Green, argues that the offer of a bribe is wrong because it induces the 
recipient into committing an unlawful act. By contrast, the receipt of a bribe is wrong because 
it causes the recipient to act in breach of a duty of loyalty owed to a principal (or principle). 
However, this account suffers from two major shortcomings. First, it fails to provide an 
account of the setbacks to the interests of innocent actors (other than principals) who are not 
engaged in corruption. Second, it fails to make any connection between such harming and the 
wrongdoing inflicted upon these innocent actors by the corrupt acts of others. As we shall see 
in this thesis, harm and wrongdoing are interconnected concepts. 
 
In this thesis, the phrase “innocent actor” is used to refer to any person (natural or artificial) 
who is not engaged in corruption but whose interests are set back by the corrupt acts of 
another. These innocent actors are distinct from the general public in that their interests are 
directly affected by corruption. By contrast, the general public are harmed by corruption in a 
remote sense. Of course, there may be occasions when there is an overlap. For example, if a 
cabinet minister were to accept a bribe, his conduct would cause direct harm to the interests 
of his political party and remote harm to the general public (because the general public have 
an interest in a properly functioning government). 
 
Let us consider these three strands of literature in turn. 
 
 
1. POLITICAL HARM 
 
Before the 1990s, there was a perception amongst some western policymakers that corruption 
was mainly limited to developing countries.44 It was regarded by some as a problem which was 
prevalent in South American, African, and Asian cultures.45 It is not entirely clear why 
 
44 Alan Doig and Robin Theobald (eds), Corruption and Democratisation (Frank Cass, 2003) 135-136. 
45 David Nelken and Michael Levi, ‘The Corruption of Politics and the Politics of Corruption: An Overview’ 
(1996) 23 (1) Journal of Law and Society 1, 1. 
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corruption should have been viewed in this way. After all, corruption has been a feature in 
developed countries for many decades. Indeed, the fact that most, if not all, countries (both 
developing and developed) have some sort of anti-corruption legislation is strong evidence in 
support of this.46 Today, it is generally accepted that corruption can thrive and propagate itself 
in all types of governments.47 
 
But this was not always the case. For example, Bentham initially disagreed with this claim. He 
argued that corruption is not an aberration in the proper functioning of government. Rather, 
it is an essential feature of it. His ideas were based on a theory of human motivation which 
states that people generally act in ways which promote, as far as possible, their own self-
interest. Whilst this applies to every member of a community, those in power are best placed 
to promote their self-interest in that they not only possess the necessary desire but also the 
means. According to Bentham, this meant that a public official’s self-interest is diametrically 
opposed to the interests of the community. It is in this way that corruption offends the central 
tenet of utilitarianism insofar as it promotes the happiness of the few to the detriment of the 
many.48 
 
Bentham argued that corruption can only occur in those countries where the government is 
comprised of trustees (i.e. directly elected officials) of the people such as representative 
democracies49 and mixed monarchies. In these forms of government, when a public official 
accepts a bribe, they set aside the public trust for private advantage and, in so doing, harm the 
public interest. By contrast, there can be no corruption in a pure or absolute monarchy 
because the people have no trustees. That is, because public officials owe a duty of loyalty to 
the monarch and not to the people. However, Bentham did not maintain this position for long. 
He subsequently recognised that public officials in a pure monarchy are trustees of the 
 
46 In England, the earliest reference to corruption is in section 29 of Magna Carta which remains in force today. 
47 Jeremy Pope, TI Source Book 2000 (2nd edn, Transparency International, 2000) 1; Richard Alexander, 
‘Corruption as a Financial Crime’ (2009) 30 (4) Company Lawyer 98, 98. 
48 Jeremy Bentham, First Principles Preparatory to Constitutional Code (Philip Schofield (ed), The Collected 
Works of Jeremy Bentham, Clarendon Press, 1989) 232-237. 
49 Democratisation is seen by some as a cure to corruption; Alan Doig and Robin Theobald (eds), Corruption and 
Democratisation (Frank Cass, 2003) 13; Alan Doig and Heather Marquette, ‘Corruption and Democratisation: 
The Litmus Test of International Donor Agency Intentions?’ (2005) 37 (2-3) Futures 199, 202. 
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monarch and are therefore capable of breaching their duty of loyalty to the monarch by 
engaging in corruption.50 
 
Bentham was right to concede this point. One need only refer to the daily media for reports of 
corruption from around the world in order to realise that corruption is not exclusive to any 
particular type of government. It is equally clear from such reports that corruption can take a 
variety of different forms ranging from petty bureaucratic episodes to large-scale political 
scandals. 
 
But the issue which has given political scientists the most cause for debate over the years 
concerns the harm in corruption. Surprisingly, the debate is not about the types of harm that 
result from corruption. Rather, the dispute is more rudimentary in nature. The literature is 
divided between those who deny that corruption is harmful (the revisionists) and those who 
argue that corruption is harmful (the post-revisionists). 
 
The revisionists argue that corruption is a positive phenomenon. They view corruption as a 
normal part of the development process of a country. By contrast, the post-revisionists argue 
that corruption is both harmful and self-perpetuating. Let us consider the arguments of both 
schools in turn. 
 
THE REVISIONISTS 
 
Prior to the 1960s, there was very little in the way of serious scholarship on the harm in 
corruption (Bentham is a notable exception). The Victorians were largely concerned with the 
problem of corrupt treating and the undue influencing of voters, and how best to combat the 
problem.51 Others simply regarded corruption as a moral failing and a religious sin.52 It was in 
the early 1960s that the first serious scholarship on corruption started to emerge. At the time, 
corruption was seen by political scientists as a type of social decay in developing countries. 
 
 
50 Philip Schofield, ‘Jeremy Bentham on Political Corruption: A Critique of the First Report of the Nolan 
Committee’ (1996) 49 Current Legal Problems 395, 400. 
51 G. F. S. Elliot, Thoughts on the Subject of Bribery and Corruption at Elections (James Ridgway, 1853). 
52 Julius Muller, The Chrisitan Doctrine of Sin, Vol II (William Pulsford (tr), T&T Clark, 1853). 
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The revisionists proposed a radical thesis which moved away from this view. Led by Leff, they 
argued that corruption is an inherent aspect of the normal growth-decay cycle of a country.53 
In other words, it is a necessary and inevitable part of the process of modernisation.54 The 
revisionists make two main claims. First, they claim that corruption may make certain positive 
contributions to the political development of developing countries.55 For the revisionists, 
corruption is a type of functional dysfunction.56 The second claim is that corruption is 
doomed to self-destruct as a country makes the transition from developing to developed 
status.57 
 
As to the first claim, it is said that corruption assists with the integration of those groups in 
society who would otherwise not be able to participate in the political process. In other words, 
corruption not only allows the rich access to top-level decision making, it also allows ordinary 
citizens access to lower levels of government bureaucracy.58 In this way, corruption can play a 
useful and positive role in the development process because it lessens the chances of citizens 
challenging fledgling bureaucratic institutions; thus allowing them to survive and gain 
acceptance. When this occurs, the political structures of a developing country are better able 
to cope with change and preserve their legitimacy because the general populace share a sense 
of community.59 This shared sense of community arises because corruption ensures that no 
group in society is alienated from the political system. Such integration can contribute to the 
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building of new and stronger institutions in developing countries. This is said to be a better 
alternative to violence in times of change. 
 
Bayley develops this theory by arguing that corruption may also serve to increase the quality 
of public servants. He suggests that where government wages are low, talented officials may 
nonetheless opt for government employment if they know that they will be able to supplement 
their income through corruption (e.g. by soliciting bribes).60 
 
Some revisionists, who have turned to economic theory for support, argue that corruption 
may introduce efficiency into the political system. There are at least three ways in which 
corruption may have this effect. First, by allowing governments in developing countries to 
raise capital in circumstances where private equity is scarce and the government lacks the 
capacity to openly tax a surplus from the general populace. Second, by allowing members of a 
community to bypass red tape and other cumbersome checks which actually impede 
economic development.61 Third, by encouraging entrepreneurship which in turn stimulates 
economic growth. That is, by providing a route of entry for all members of society (regardless 
of class or ethnicity) to access the political decisions needed to set up in business.62 
 
As to the second claim, it is said that over time, as a country becomes more developed, the 
opportunities for corruption will be reduced as government institutions become stronger.63 
However, it is here that the revisionists encounter difficulties. Put simply, they are unable to 
offer a credible explanation as to why corruption persists in the developed world.64 After all, 
by their own account, there ought to be little or no corruption in developed countries. Yet we 
know that corruption continues to exist in the developed world. 
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THE POST-REVISIONISTS 
 
By the end of the 1960s, revisionism had come under attack. The post-revisionist movement 
grew out of a dissatisfaction with the theoretical claims made by the revisionists. The post-
revisionists make a two-pronged attack. First, they argue that corruption is dysfunctional in 
all countries (both developing and developed). However, the remote harms caused by 
corruption are most apparent in developing countries. As to these, the post-revisionists argue 
that corruption can strengthen the dominance of the ruling elite, weaken the economy, and 
foster national disintegration. Second, they reject as false the revisionists’ claim that 
corruption is a self-extinguishing phenomenon. Instead, they maintain that corruption is self-
perpetuating.65 
 
The first argument made by the post-revisionists is that corruption is dysfunctional and that it 
has no developmental benefits.66 They argue that corruption causes a number of different 
remote harms to the proper functioning of government. Let us consider some of these remote 
harms. 
 
First, corruption is said to be wasteful because it allows capital to be siphoned off from state 
resources (usually into foreign bank accounts). Such capital outflow constitutes a net loss and 
inhibits growth.67 In addition, it distorts investment because it allows for the channelling of 
funds into sectors such as construction which tend to be good vehicles for concealing corrupt 
payments. For example, in 2005, a British bridge building company was investigated for 
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allegedly paying large bribes to secure lucrative bridge building projects in the Philippines .68 
Corruption also wastes the skills of the top level political elite, and may discourage foreign aid 
because donors may be offended by the prevalence of corruption.69 
 
Second, corruption represents a rise in the price of administration which the public is forced 
to endure. In short, the public are made to pay a second time for goods and services which 
they have already paid for through taxation.70 
 
Third, contrary to the claims made by the revisionists, corruption creates instability by 
destroying the legitimacy of political structures in the minds of those who have the power to 
do something about it (such as the military or the general populace). This can lead to social 
revolutions and military coups. 71  The post-revisionists argue that such behaviour is 
unproductive and creates social disintegration rather than integration as the revisionists claim.  
 
A good example of the social disintegration caused by corruption is the recent revolution in 
Tunisia. In December 2010, a young fruit and vegetable seller in Tunisia was asked for bribes 
by three inspectors from the council. When he refused to pay, they seized his goods and beat 
him. The young fruit seller went to the governor’s office to ask for the return of his goods but 
the governor refused to see him. In an act of desperation, he poured petrol over his body and 
set himself alight (he died a few weeks later from his burns). His helplessness in the face of 
corruption, rising prices, and a lack of opportunities triggered a wave of sympathy which led 
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to riots across Tunisia. As a direct result, the president, Ben Ali, a military autocrat who had 
been in power for 23 years, fled the country.72 
 
Fourth, corruption leads to a reduction in the administrative capacity of government. That is, 
it reduces the legitimacy of government in the eyes of modern-orientated civil servants (a 
scarce resource in developing countries). The loss of legitimacy is likely to alienate some civil 
servants and cause them to leave the country or reduce their efforts.73 
 
The second argument made by the post-revisionists is to deny the revisionists’ claim that 
corruption withers away as a country makes the transition from developing to developed 
status. The post-revisionists argue that if this is correct, then it follows that there should be 
little or no corruption once developed status has been attained. It is here that the revisionists’ 
theory collapses. Put simply, they are unable to explain why corruption persists in developed 
countries.74 
 
Having shown that corruption is not bound to self-destruct, some post-revisionists have 
developed accounts of the self-perpetuating nature of corruption. For example, Werner argues 
that if left unchecked, corruption can grow and spillover into other institutional structures.75 
There are three ways in which this can happen: leader-follower spillover, rationalised spillover, 
and institutional spillover. 
 
Leader-follower spillover occurs when the ruler of a country plays a central role in shaping 
public opinion and societal behaviour. In such circumstances, if the ruler engages in 
corruption, his conduct will spillover and affect the trust, loyalty and personal integrity of his 
followers, and they in turn will also engage in corrupt conduct.76 
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Rationalised spillover occurs through the rationalisation of petty or borderline corruption 
which does not clearly violate the law. When an activity is regarded as being innocuous, that 
act is removed from previous definitions of corruption. The acceptance of such conduct as 
legitimate tends to contribute to the legitimisation of other (more serious) types of 
misconduct.77 Another unwanted side effect of such behaviour is that it erodes the boundaries 
of the law so that conscientious individuals are unable to regulate their conduct as the law 
itself is unclear.78 
 
The final way in which corruption can spread is through institutional spillover. In this 
scenario, corruption in one institution is mimicked by other institutions. For example, if 
manufacturer X consistently loses out on contracts to manufacturer Y, who secures contracts 
by offering bribes to influence government officials, then manufacturer X is likely to follow 
suit.79 
 
After deconstructing the revisionists’ claims, the post-revisionists turned to economic theory 
in an effort to explain the remote harms caused by corruption. This natural progression 
recognises that the way a government conducts its affairs has a direct impact on the growth of 
the economy (and vice versa).80 It is at this juncture that we see a degree of cross-fertilisation 
in the general scholarship on the harm in corruption (that is, between the ideas of the political 
scientists and the economic theorists). The post-revisionists tell us that corruption is best 
viewed as a transactional relationship between the state and the private sector. The key to 
understanding the remote harms which result from such corrupt relationships is to look at the 
relative bargaining power of the parties.81 According to Rose-Ackerman, the critical issue is 
whether the government or the private sector has the greater bargaining power when dealing 
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with the other. The term “bargaining power” is used here to describe the power of a seller of 
goods to set the price for those goods. In economics, the term bargaining power suggests some 
lack of equality between the buyers and sellers in a market.82 
 
According to the post-revisionists, depending on who has the bargaining power, corruption 
may manifest itself in one of four forms: kleptocracies, bilateral monopolies, mafia-dominated 
states, and competitive corruption.83 However, as bilateral monopolies and mafia-dominated 
states are similar in character, we can conflate these so as to leave three polar forms: 
kleptocracies, bilateral monopolies, and competitive corruption. Let us consider these in turn. 
 
Kleptocracies 
 
A kleptocracy can be described as a government which is characterised by rampant greed. In 
this scenario, the bargaining power is concentrated at the top-level. It is usually wielded by a 
kleptocrat such as a dictator. However, it is not uncommon for a kleptocrat to enlist the 
assistance of a selected few who will share in the rewards. In a kleptocracy, those at the top-
level exploit their positions by misusing the state machinery and misappropriating public 
resources for their own ends rather acting in the interests of the public. 
 
Of course, some instances of misuse and misappropriation will be outright cases of theft, 
fraud, and embezzlement. However, of more interest to us are examples of corrupt conduct. 
Such behaviour usually involves the misappropriation of pre-existing output or even wealth 
(which is not current output).84 
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One of the most notorious examples of kleptocracy was that of Mobutu in Zaire.85 According 
to a Transparency International press release,86 Mobutu siphoned off $5 billion (£3 billion) 
from Zaire’s output. He is said to have employed various methods such as skimming the 
profits from one of Zaire’s biggest cash cows, the state-run mining company, Gecamine. But 
this is not an isolated example. There are numerous others who have amassed astonishing 
personal fortunes by misusing the state apparatus. Mobutu was not even the worst offender. 
According to the same Transparency International press release, the most prolific offender 
was Indonesia’s Suharto, who allegedly misappropriated between $15 billion (£9 billion) and 
$35 billion (£21 billion). Another example was Marcos of the Philippines who is said to have 
misappropriated between $5 billion (£3 billion) and $10 billion (£6 billion). 
 
Of course, kleptocrats do not limit their misappropriation to national output. They also skim 
foreign aid and donations meant for development and the alleviation of suffering provoked by 
war or nature.87 They use their position to siphon off a proportion of such aid for their own 
financial enrichment. 
 
According to Rose-Ackerman, a kleptocrat wields his bargaining power and misappropriates 
resources by organising the state apparatus so as to maximise the possibilities for rent 
extraction. The rational kleptocrat does this by placing as much of the state apparatus as 
possible under his control. For example, a kleptocrat may use the regulatory system to create a 
bottleneck which individuals and companies will pay to avoid. However, to do this, he may 
need to buy the assistance of top-level officials (e.g. by conferring patronages or offering 
inducements). He may even offer them a share of the spoils. The rational kleptocrat will 
favour policies that transfer the most resources into his pocket whilst maintaining the 
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productivity of the economy. By the same token, he will oppose policies which distribute 
benefits widely throughout society with little opportunity to extract payoffs at the centre.88 
 
A kleptocrat will be aware that corruption is likely to spillover into other parts of the state 
machinery. Corruption at the top-level encourages low-level public officials to act in the same 
way because they too will want to share in the rewards. In cases where low-level officials are 
not paid their salaries or are paid low salaries, they may be forced to turn to corruption in 
order to supplement their incomes. They may seek to benefit from corruption by introducing 
bureaucratic inefficiencies in the form of delays, red tape, and cross-agency interference. 
Whilst low-level corruption can be kept in check by honest governments, it can become 
endemic in a kleptocracy. This will be of particular concern to a kleptocrat because low-level 
corruption will reduce the rent that he can generate from corruption. If the kleptocrat can 
retain an honest civil service and share the gains with only a small group of associates, he will 
be better-off. But in reality, this will often be impossible.89 
 
Returning to Zaire, Mobutu could not have functioned without the co-operation of corrupt 
top-level officials, the judiciary, and military generals who together constituted an 
interdependent and secretive power elite.90 Mobutu placed a third of the state budget under 
his control and siphoned off so much of the country’s revenue that the Zairian economy 
collapsed. But in order to facilitate this, he had to share his corrupt gains with a select group. 
Mobutu and his cronies used grandiose infrastructure projects to disguise the payment of 
bribes and kickbacks.91 Such white elephants provide the ideal vehicle for hiding corrupt 
transactions. 
 
Under Mobutu’s regime, the lives of the Zairian people deteriorated day after day. Many low-
level public officials did not receive their salaries for months or even years, and the army and 
the police, which were supposed to protect the public, harassed and terrorised them instead. 
To supplement their incomes, low-level public officials only performed public services on the 
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payment of bribes.92 In post-revisionist terminology, this is an example of corruption spilling 
over from Mobutu’s kleptocratic regime. Under Mobutu’s leadership, Zaire served the 
interests of those who wielded bargaining power rather than the public. As a consequence, 
economic growth and development were stunted and the country lost the capability to 
improve the living conditions of the population as a whole.93 
 
There are some revisionist theorists who argue that a kleptocrat may be beneficial in the sense 
of being the lesser of two evils. Olson offers an alternative account of kleptocrats or 
“stationary bandits” as he calls them.94 He argues that they monopolise and rationalise theft in 
the form of taxes. They seize a given domain, make themselves the ruler, and provide peace, 
order and other public goods for the inhabitants. This ensures that the bandit can continue to 
“tax” the public. Olson argues that if a bandit monopolises theft in his domain and steals only 
through regular taxation, his subjects will know what proportion of their output is left after 
they have paid their “taxes”. This in turn creates stability. According to this theory, a bandit 
who has control over a country will provide public goods to that country because he has an 
encompassing interest in it.95 He will ensure that rival bandits are deterred by maintaining a 
strong military. Olson argues that the bandit will choose the revenue-maximising tax rate so 
as to extract the maximum possible profit whilst leaving enough for the public.96 In simple 
terms, once a bandit is in power, he will seek to create a “taxation” system which maintains an 
equilibrium so that the general populace are not pushed to breaking point and so continue to 
pay “tax” even though a proportion of their tax is being misappropriated. For the general 
populace such theft is to be preferred over the alternative (irregular looting by multiple 
bandits). 
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But the theory of the stationary bandit is flawed in a number of important respects. First, most 
kleptocrats are not as all powerful as Olson’s stationary bandit. The tools at their disposal are 
imperfect and although they control the state, they seldom control the entire economy.97 
Second, Olson’s theory assumes that the bandit, once in power, will be able to achieve peace 
and stability and thereby maximise revenue, albeit for his own benefit. Third, it assumes that 
bandits have an interest in maintaining the economic status quo through taxing at the 
revenue-maximising tax rate. Lastly, Olson assumes that the general populace will be content 
for the bandit to siphon off state resources. It is clear from examples around the world that 
kleptocracies are not synonymous with long-term stability. Rather, they tend to be the subject 
of frequent military coups and revolutions (which demonstrate instability). 
 
According to Grossman, revolutions are manifestations of kleptocratic rivalry.98 In this theory, 
the protagonists are the incumbent kleptocratic ruler and the leader of a revolution, who is an 
alternative kleptocrat. These protagonists are engaged in a struggle for the authority to exploit 
the productive members of society. The former acts in self-interest and the latter wishes to 
replace him for the same purpose. As Grossman explains, the incumbent kleptocrat will 
deploy military force in order to protect his income by deterring the revolutionary leader from 
organising a revolution or suppressing one if it occurs. The struggle between these two actors 
means that the incumbent ruler diverts a large proportion of state resources into deterring 
revolutions that do not occur.99 But this is a necessary expense because in order to be a 
successful kleptocrat, one must be both a “fox in order to recognise traps, and a lion in order 
frighten off wolves.”100 
 
Grossman’s theory finds support in the real world. History has shown us that the fall of many 
kleptocracies, such as Mobutu’s Zaire, were driven by a public which had become 
disenchanted with the effects of kleptocracy. The recent revolution in Libya which began in 
February 2011 and ended with the death of Colonel Gaddafi in October 2011 is another 
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example. The Libyan uprising led to Gaddafi’s kleptocratic regime101 being overthrown after 
more than four decades in power.102 
 
We can see from the examples cited in this section that kleptocracies may result in a number 
of different remote harms for society.103 
 
Bilateral monopolies 
 
The second polar form mentioned by the post-revisionists is a bilateral monopoly. This 
describes a situation where there is a single seller and a single buyer of a given product in a 
market. When the supply of that product is restricted and there is no effective competition, 
the buyer and the seller may collude to form a bilateral monopoly in a joint profit 
maximisation scheme.104 
  
It is possible to find support for this view in other non-legal scholarship. For example, 
according to sociological theory, a monopoly is a form of social exclusion (the other forms of 
exclusion, which do not concern us, being solidarity and specialisation). Sociologists argue 
that a monopoly occurs when groups form in order to capture benefits for themselves at the 
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expense of others. The rent is shared by these groups at the expense of the other players in the 
monopoly system.105 
 
Regardless of whether one describes bilateral monopolies in economic or sociological terms, it 
is possible to reduce them to power sharing agreements. A bilateral monopoly promotes a 
horizontal network of exchanges. This is sometimes described as “integrative” corruption. 
That is, because it links people and groups into lasting networks of exchange and shared 
interests.106 These networks develop because the parties realise that by co-operating with one 
another, they will be able to extract the maximum rent from the state.107 So for example, a state 
may be dependent on the export of one or two minerals or agricultural products. It may 
establish long-term relationships with a few private multinational companies. The alliance 
which results may allow a seller (e.g. a ruler) to enter into an agreement to share the nation’s 
wealth at the expense of the ordinary people. Such misappropriation is bound to have a long-
term detrimental impact for society for the simple reason that it constitutes a loss in revenue 
which therefore reduces the amount of money that is available for public expenditure. In 
simple terms, the existence of a bilateral monopoly means that money which should be used 
for the benefit of the public is illicitly diverted for private gain. 
 
The size of each party’s slice will depend on their relative bargaining power. For example, if a 
company produces a raw material which is only available in a few places on earth, then the 
seller (i.e. the ruler) will be in a strong position to extract a large proportion of the benefits. If 
the company is unwilling to share the profits, the seller can negotiate with other interested 
parties. In this situation, the company has few alternatives given the scarcity of the raw 
material whilst the seller has a number of outside options. By contrast, if the company 
produces an agricultural product, such as bananas, and can easily go elsewhere, or if the raw 
material is ubiquitous, then it has the upper hand in the bargain. In this scenario, the seller 
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Organisation, 1995) 57-80. 
106 Michael Johnston, ‘The Political Consequences of Corruption: A Reassessment’ (1986) 18 (4) Comparative 
Politics 459, 464. 
107 Raul Carvajal, ‘Large-scale Corruption: Definition, Causes, and Cures’ (1999) 12 (4) Systemic Practice and 
Action Research 335, 336. 
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will be keen to retain the company as otherwise the seller’s ability to extract rent will be 
restricted. 
 
In contrast to simple kleptocracies (i.e. where there is no sharing of rent), it is fairly obvious 
that bilateral monopolies will always result in reduced rent. This is because the seller has to 
share the benefits with the buyer. However, in common with kleptocracies, bilateral 
monopolies only enrich those at the top-level and function to the detriment of the general 
public.108 
 
When a country is managed by a weak ruler and the state machinery is disorganised, a 
company may be able to dominate by buying the co-operation of other officials. However, the 
company must be wary because too much disruption and instability can have a negative effect. 
That is, it can reduce the company’s ability to purchase the co-operation of officials because 
when it buys the co-operation of one official, there is nothing to stop another from stepping 
forward and demanding the payment of an inducement. This is an undesirable scenario 
because it results in officials competing against one another for rent (thereby posing an 
additional financial burden on the company).109 For this reason, the company will usually try 
to support a weak ruler where it finds that collaboration is an effective means of acquiring 
rent.110 
 
However, Kang takes an alternative view. He argues that in bilateral monopolies, both the 
seller and buyer are in a strong position. This can lead to a situation of “mutual hostages”. 
That is, a situation where both actors benefit from their opportunism and exploitation but 
need the other in order to generate rent.111 
 
We can see from our analysis that a bilateral monopoly is essentially an agreement between 
two parties to misappropriate the wealth of a country. 
 
108  Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform (Cambridge 
University Press, 1999) 123. 
109 ibid 123. 
110 Edward Dommen, ‘Paradigms of Governance and Exclusion’ (1997) 35 (3) Journal of Modern African Studies 
485, 494. 
111 David C. Kang, Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines 
(Cambridge University Press, 2002) 9. 
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Competitive corruption 
 
The final polar form mentioned by the post-revisionists is competitive corruption. This 
describes a situation in which low-level public officials engage in self-serving conduct instead 
of promoting the public interest.112 There are three ways in which a public official may do this. 
First, a public official may demand an inducement for performing a function which he is 
required to perform without any additional reward. Second, a public official may demand an 
inducement for not performing a function which he is required to perform. Lastly, a public 
official may demand an inducement for committing an unlawful act.113 Public officials are able 
to act in these ways because they have bargaining power. 
 
Low-level officials act in these ways when there is little risk of detection or censure. This is 
more likely to be the case in developing countries where the systems for detecting corruption 
are often decentralised and there are few effective checks and balances. As a result there is 
likely to be little threat from those institutions which are entrusted with the task of detecting 
corruption (such as the police) because they are also likely to be corrupt. The long-term 
impact of such corruption is a free-for-all in which low-level officials compete with one other 
for rent, thus creating a market of low-level corruption. 
 
In the travelogue Maximum City, the author recounts the despair of trying to obtain a gas 
supply in Mumbai (Bombay). The bureaucrats at the local gas office tell him that they are 
unable to supply gas for several months because the city has exceeded its designated quota for 
domestic gas. When he mentions this to his friend’s mother, she takes him to another gas 
office. She appeals to the female bureaucrats: “Two small children! They don’t even have gas 
to boil milk! They are crying for milk!” The female bureaucrats duly oblige by pointing out 
that if the author were to order commercial gas cylinders instead of domestic ones, he could 
have immediate delivery. In order to do this, the bureaucrats pretend that his household is a 
business. But the author’s relief is short lived. He soon discovers that the cylinders, which are 
supposed to last three months, last only three weeks. Somewhere along the chain of supply, 
most of the gas had been siphoned off and sold on the black market. To ensure a continuous 
 
112 Dennis F. Thompson, Ethics in Congress: From Individual to Institutional Corruption (Brookings Institution 
Press, 1995) 30. 
113 Krushna Singh Padhy, Corruption in Politics (A Case Study) (BR Publishing, 1986) 3. 
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supply, everyone ran a scam whereby they had two cylinders in their name. They transferred 
one from an earlier address or bribed a bureaucrat to get a second one.114 
 
In another example, the author visits the slums of Jogeshwari where he learns that the 
municipal water tap is only turned on for a few hours every day. Upon enquiring why, he is 
told that the local plumbers have bribed the local bureaucrats into disconnecting the water 
connection for most of the day. By doing this, the plumbers were able to charge the slum 
dwellers a premium for installing domestic water connections.115 
 
As these two examples show, the corruption of some encourages the corruption of others until 
all but the most virtuous are participating in corruption.116 Even new recruits are likely to 
become corrupt when they discover that honest graft and good moral virtues do not help 
them to make a living.117 
 
*   *   * 
 
Even at the height of revisionism, there was considerable scepticism as to the alleged 
developmental benefits of corruption. The idea that corruption is beneficial has not only been 
proved as false by the post-revisionists, it has also been rejected by virtually every major 
jurisdiction around the world. The fact that most countries have some sort of anti-corruption 
legislation lends powerful support to this proposition. 
 
By contrast, the post-revisionists’ account is regarded as the superior account of the remote 
harm in corruption. Lawmakers from around the world rely upon the remote harms resulting 
 
114 Suketu Mehta, Maximum City: Bombay Lost and Found (Review, 2005) 27-28. 
115 ibid 59. 
116  Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform (Cambridge 
University Press, 1999) 124-125; Ajit Mishra, ‘Persistence of Corruption: Some Theoretical Perspectives’ (2006) 
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117 In India, official corruption is so widespread and pervasive that there have been protests by the general 
populace; Jim Yardley, ‘Leader of Corruption Protest Arrested in India’ The New York Times (New York, 17 
August 2011) A4 <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/17/world/asia/17india.html> accessed 22 February 2012; 
Jason Burke, ‘India corruption protesters dump snakes in busy tax office’ The Guardian (London, 1 December 
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from corruption in order to justify the criminalisation of corruption. However, as we have 
seen from our review of the literature on political harm, the post-revisionists’ account of 
harming assumes but omits to provide a detailed account of the harm and wrongdoing 
suffered by those innocent actors whose rights and interests are set back by the corrupt 
conduct of others. 
 
 
2. ECONOMIC HARM 
 
There is a formidable body of economic literature on the subject of corruption. However, a 
substantial proportion of this literature is not directly relevant to our project. For example, 
there are numerous game theoretical analyses which seek to predict the behaviour of the 
players in a variety of different corrupt games. There is, nonetheless, a large body of material 
which is concerned with the economic harm caused by acts of corruption. However, the same 
cannot be said for empirical research.118 In fact, there are very few case studies which place a 
precise value on the cost of corruption. There are a number of reasons for this. 
 
First, corruption is typically a clandestine activity and is therefore difficult to detect. It 
embraces the purchase and sale of an array of different benefits such as government contracts, 
lower taxes, licenses, time (e.g. by speeding-up applications), legal outcomes, etc.119 
 
Second, corruption is also very difficult to measure for the simple reason that it is not entirely 
clear what one should be measuring.120 For example, whilst it may be possible to place a value 
on instances of corruption involving tangible benefits, the same cannot be said of corruption 
 
118 Empirical research tends to take the form of questionnaires and interviews; Bertrand Venard and Mohamed 
Hanafi, ‘Organizational Isomorphism and Corruption in Financial Institutions: Empirical Research in Emerging 
Countries’ (2008) 81 (2) Journal of Business Ethics 481. However, such techniques are highly unlikely to uncover 
any kind of wrongdoing. 
119  World Bank, ‘Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank’ (1997) 
<http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/corrptn.pdf> accessed 30 May 2006. 
120 Vito Tanzi, ‘Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures’ in George T Abed and 
Sanjeev Gupta (eds), Governance, Corruption, and Economic Performance (International Monetary Fund, 2002) 
38; Pranab Bardhan, ‘The Economist’s Approach to the Problem of Corruption’ (2006) 34 (2) World 
Development 341. 
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involving intangible benefits. For example, in 2006 a senior immigration official was 
suspended from duty following claims that he had offered to speed up a Zimbabwean 
teenager’s asylum claim in return for sexual intercourse.121 Obviously, placing a value on 
inducements of this type is both undesirable and very difficult. To further complicate matters, 
the economic impact of corruption is dependent on a number of variables such as the amount 
of rent extracted from each corrupt transaction, the frequency of the transactions, and the 
number of actors involved.122 Thus, we can see that gauging the extent to which corruption 
has affected the economic framework is a difficult task.123 
 
Third, on a practical level, it is difficult to define a benchmark, or ex ante position, against 
which to compare the effects of corruption.124 
 
Despite these challenges, economic theorists have embraced the subject of economic harm 
with real enthusiasm. They have preferred to approach corruption as a study in efficiency. 
That is to say, they are interested in whether corrupt conduct yields the maximum quantity of 
a given product or whether it results in a given quantity of a product being obtained using the 
minimum resources (an efficient use of resources) or whether it results in unused or 
misallocated resources or both (an inefficient use of resources).125 
 
The literature on the economic harm in corruption follows the same path as the political 
scientists. That is to say that it can be divided into the same rival schools of thought: the 
revisionists and the post-revisionists. The former claim that corruption is efficient in the sense 
of being productive. The latter deny this claim and argue that corruption can never be 
efficient (in the sense of being productive). 
 
 
121 Sean O’Neill and Richard Ford, ‘Reid Faces Questions on Sex-for-Visas Scandal’ The Times (London, 22 May 
2006) 4. 
122 Raul Carvajal, ‘Large-scale Corruption: Definition, Causes, and Cures’ (1999) 12 (4) Systemic Practice and 
Action Research 335, 340. 
123 Paolo Mauro, ‘Why Worry About Corruption?’ (1997) 6 Economic Issues 1. 
124 Mushtaq H. Khan, ‘The Efficiency Implications of Corruption’ (1996) 8 (5) Journal of International 
Development 683, 685-686; Mushtaq H. Khan and Kazi A. Toufique, ‘Sand or Oil in the Machine?: A Comment 
on Corruption and Entrepreneurship’ (1995) 23 (1-2) Bangladesh Development Studies 129. 
125 Osvaldo H. Schenone and Samuel Gregg, A Theory of Corruption (Acton Institute, 2003) 21. 
 43 
Before we set out the battle lines, it is important to note the common ground between these 
two groups of economic theorists as they both rely upon the same tools to mount their 
arguments. 
 
First, the starting point for both sets of economists is the concept of self-interest (a person acts 
in self-interest when they make choices which they think are best for them).126 From an 
economic point of view, self-interest is regarded as a spectrum of efficiency. At one end of the 
spectrum is a competitive market where self-interest is translated into productive activities 
which constitute an efficient use of resources. At the other end of the spectrum is war, which 
is a destructive struggle over wealth that ends up destroying the very resource base which 
motivated the conflict in the first place.127 
 
Second, a rational actor may choose to promote his self-interest in any number of ways. 
However, the most common method of doing this is through the pursuit of economic rent. 
Such conduct is more commonly known as rent-seeking.128 In this context, the term rent129 
refers to the extra amount paid (over what would be paid for the best alternative use) for 
something useful which is limited either by nature or through human ingenuity. 130 In 
economic literature, rent-seeking can cover any pursuit of wealth through the capture of 
economic rent. This broad description includes both legal and illegal means such as corrupt 
conduct. 
 
 
126 Johan J. Graafland, ‘Self-interest’ in Jan Pell and Irene van Staveren (eds), Handbook of Economics and Ethics 
(Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2009) 477-483. 
127  Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform (Cambridge 
University Press, 1999) 2. 
128 Gordon Tullock, ‘The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft’ (1967) 5 (3) Western Economic 
Journal 224; Anne O. Krueger, ‘The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society’ (1974) 64 (3) American 
Economic Review 291; Jagdish N. Bhagwati, ‘Directly Unproductive Profit-Seeking (DUP) Activities’ (1982) 90 
(5) Journal of Political Economy 988. 
129 There are three types of economic rent: consumer surplus, producer surplus, and economic profit; Simon N. 
Patten, ‘Cost and Utility’ (1893) 3 (1) Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 17; J. Fred 
Weston, ‘A Generalized Uncertainty Theory of Profit’ (1950) 40 (1) The American Economic Review 40; 
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Third, economic theorists on both sides agree that rent may be obtained for goods and 
services which are limited either by nature or through human ingenuity. In the context of 
corruption, both sides accept that public officials are best placed to manipulate supply. This is 
because the government has a monopoly over the distribution of many goods and services and 
the imposition of onerous costs. The distribution of these benefits and costs is usually under 
the control of public officials who possess discretionary power, and are therefore best placed 
to manipulate supply.131 In this way, corrupt public officials (rent-seekers) are able to extract 
rents from those individuals and companies who are prepared to pay in order to bypass the 
shortage and obtain the goods and services required.132 
 
Fourth, although the ability to limit supply and earn rent is important, rent-seekers must also 
have an incentive to break the law by engaging in corruption. Economic theory tells us that a 
rational rent-seeker will only engage in corruption when the expected rent from engaging in 
corrupt conduct is greater than the expected cost of any potential punishment.133 However, it 
is submitted that this view is incomplete as the rational rent seeker may also choose to engage 
in corruption when the chances of detection are slim. 
 
That completes a summary of the common ground between the two rival groups of economic 
theorists. The battleground between them consists of a disagreement about where corruption 
lies on the spectrum of efficiency. For the revisionists, corruption is a productive activity 
which constitutes an efficient use of resources. For the post-revisionists, corruption lies at the 
 
131 Raul A. Barreto and James Alm, ‘Corruption, Optimal Taxation, and Growth’ (2003) 31 (3) Public Finance 
Review 207, 207; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform 
(Cambridge University Press, 1999) 9. 
132 There are three types of supply which may be manipulated: fixed supply, variable supply, and selective supply. 
A fixed supply describes a situation in which the amount of a good or service is fixed and the allocator has no 
discretion to alter the supply. In a variable supply market, those responsible for allocating a particular good or 
service are able to influence the quantity, the quality, and the identity of the beneficiaries. Selective supply 
describes a situation in which particular goods and services are available to all consumers who qualify; Susan 
Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform (Cambridge University 
Press, 1999) 12-15. 
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other end of the spectrum. They regard corruption as an unproductive use of resources and 
therefore inefficient.134 
 
Some of the literature in this area is of a highly technical nature. There are many analyses 
based on queuing models, game theory, and Bayes’ theorem. The vast majority of these 
analyses are not concerned with the economic harm resulting from corruption. However, 
even amongst the literature that is of interest to us, there are some studies which rely upon 
complex mathematical formulae which clearly fall outside the ambit of a legal thesis. 
Accordingly, what follows is a distilled account of the main economic arguments insofar as 
they relate to the economic harm resulting from acts of corruption. 
 
THE REVISIONISTS 
 
The early scholarship on the economic harm in corruption was led by the revisionists (in 
tandem with the political scientists who were concerned with political harm). This is generally 
regarded as the minority view and fell out of vogue towards the end of the 1960s.  
 
The revisionists argue that corruption may be efficient (productive) in certain circumstances. 
However, they are careful not to overstate their case. It is not their case that corruption is 
always efficient in the sense of being productive. According to the revisionists, there are a 
number of situations in which corruption may be efficient. It is sufficient to outline a selection 
of these. 
 
First, corruption may be productive where government policies are imperfect. In such cases, 
corruption may allow the private sector to perform more efficiently by bypassing cumbersome 
government regulations and red tape. According to the revisionists, such conduct is conducive 
to economic growth because it allows goods and services to be accessed by individuals who 
 
134 Paolo Mauro, ‘The Persistence of Corruption and Slow Economic Growth’ (2002) IMF Working Paper No. 
WP/02/213 <www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2002/wp02213.pdf> accessed 3 March 2008. 
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would otherwise be excluded. In other words, it allows entrepreneurs to enter the market 
when they would otherwise be excluded.135 
 
The revisionists argue that corrupt conduct can be as efficient as a legitimate market. We can 
demonstrate this proposition by using a simple example. Let us assume that the number of 
applicants who qualify for a particular benefit exceeds the available supply. In this situation, 
those who are unable to secure the said benefit through legitimate means (i.e. by satisfying the 
qualifying criteria) may resort to corruption in order to secure the benefit. Assuming that the 
corrupt market operates efficiently, the revisionists argue that the benefit will be awarded to 
the applicant who is willing to pay the highest bribe. If there is no price discrimination,136 the 
market equilibrium price137 will be equivalent to the price in an efficient market. In other 
words, the bribe will be the same as the price that could have been obtained if the benefit had 
been sold in a legitimate market. 
 
Second, corruption allows the government to reduce its tax burden by paying public officials 
low wages in the knowledge that they will be able to supplement their income by soliciting 
bribes from the public. In this scenario, public officials extract rent by artificially restricting 
the supply of goods and services, and then demanding an inducement for dispensing the same. 
The revisionists argue that lowering the tax burden in this way can actually stimulate 
 
135 Joseph S. Nye, ‘Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis’ (1967) 61 (2) American 
Political Science Review 417, 420; Gabriel Ben-Dor, ‘Corruption, Institutionalization, and Political Development: 
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Concise Encyclopedia of Economics (Library of Economics and Liberty, 2008) 
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growth.138 Moreover, such corruption may increase the quality of public servants as talented 
officials may opt for government employment in the knowledge that they will be able to 
supplement their income through corruption.139 It is said that this encourages public servants 
to be more productive. 
 
Third, the revisionists argue that corruption results in infrastructure projects being completed 
efficiently. They point to the fact that in countries where corruption is prevalent, roads, 
schools, hospitals, and the like still get built. If anything, they argue that corruption speeds up 
the development of such projects because the individuals involved work harder than they 
would otherwise do.140 The revisionists argue that this is proof of the fact that corruption can 
be efficient. They derive support for this proposition from traditional economic theory which 
holds that there is a direct relationship between capital spending (money spent on acquiring 
or upgrading physical assets such as buildings) and economic growth. In simple terms, the 
more a country engages in capital spending, the more likely it is to experience economic 
growth.141 
 
THE POST REVISIONISTS 
 
Not surprisingly, the post-revisionists reject revisionism as both out-dated and without 
empirical foundation.142 This view is also shared by policymakers around the world who 
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regard post-revisionism as providing the superior account of the economic harm in 
corruption.143 
 
For the post-revisionists, corruption is always inefficient (in the sense of being unproductive). 
But more than that, the post revisionists argue that corruption can, in the long-term, have 
serious deleterious effects for society.144 The post-revisionists respond to the revisionists’ 
claims (discussed above) in the following ways. 
 
First, they deny the revisionists’ claim that corruption allows the private sector to perform 
more efficiently by bypassing cumbersome government regulations and red tape.145 Instead, 
they argue that corruption encourages businesses to operate in the black market in violation 
of tax and regulatory laws. Such behaviour can retard foreign direct investment because 
investors are unlikely to be happy at the prospect of having to pay bribes in order to conduct 
business.146 We might also add that the violation of tax laws means that some businesses will 
not pay taxes at all (or will pay a reduced amount in taxes). Such conduct obviously results in 
a loss of revenue and thereby reduces the amount available for public expenditure. As a direct 
result, the government may have to rely upon other sources of revenue which may, in turn, 
lead to a rise in inflation (which has the effect of acting as a tax on both consumption and 
investment).147 
 
The post-revisionists do not accept that a corrupt market can function as efficiently as a 
legitimate market. To this end, they argue that the revisionists’ claims are flawed because they 
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fail to take account of the deadweight costs148 of engaging in a corrupt market. Such markets 
are inefficient for a number of reasons. First, the illegality of corruption means that the actors 
involved in a corrupt transaction will necessarily spend some resources on trying to conceal 
their behaviour.149 Second, the clandestine nature of corruption is such that information on 
the required level of bribe will not be readily available. The price (bribe) will therefore not 
respond to market forces as it would in a legitimate market. Third, some actors may refuse to 
engage in corrupt rent-seeking for fear of detection and prosecution. Others may refuse to 
engage in such conduct because it is morally offensive. Fourth, the cumulative effect of these 
costs means that allocators (rent-seekers) may restrict their corrupt dealings to a trusted circle 
of family, friends, and acquaintances.150 Lastly, and most importantly, the post-revisionists 
argue that a corrupt market is inefficient because it results in the misallocation of rent. This is 
because the rent in a corrupt market is received and retained by the allocator. By contrast, in a 
legitimate market the rent is received by the government as revenue.151 
 
Second, as to the revisionists’ claim that corruption is efficient because it allows the 
government to reduce its tax burden by paying public officials low wages, the post-revisionists 
advance some formidable counter-arguments. They argue that bribes solicited in this way 
increase transaction costs because they operate as a type of tax. The victims of such corruption 
tend to be members of the public who are required to make additional payments (bribes) in 
order to obtain goods and services.152 Such bribes are regressive because the general public in 
developing countries tend to be very poor.153 Moreover, this can discourage investment as 
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potential investors may be deterred by the burden of having to pay bribes.154 In addition, 
corrupt rent-seeking by public officials is inefficient because it misallocates resources (which 
is unproductive) and deprives the state of valuable revenue. 
 
Some commentators suggest that it may be possible to curb corrupt rent-seeking by public 
officials through the imposition of sanctions such as dismissal or heavy financial penalties.155 
However, such penalties are unlikely to have a deterrent effect unless they are properly 
enforced. It is here that the problem lies because governments in developing countries find it 
difficult to combat such corruption for the simple reason that public officials have little to lose 
if they are caught (because their wages are so low).156 
 
In short, the post-revisionists argue that the misallocation of rent deprives the state of valuable 
revenue which may, in turn, lead to a gradual decline in public services as the government has 
less revenue to spend. If revenue drops too much, the government may be forced to raise taxes 
in order fulfil election promises and maintain public services.157 
 
Third, the post-revisionists deny that corruption is efficient insofar as it encourages the 
development of infrastructure projects. They argue that corruption in public investment is 
likely to result in reduced growth because, even though the share of public investment in the 
gross domestic product (the total of all goods and services produced in a country in a given 
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Economic Development’ (2005) University of Manchester, Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research, 
Discussion Paper No. 2005/053 <http://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/cgbcr/dpcgbcr/dpcgbcr53.pdf> 
accessed 1 January 2008. 
157 Vito Tanzi, ‘Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures’ in George T Abed and 
Sanjeev Gupta (eds), Governance, Corruption, and Economic Performance (International Monetary Fund, 2002) 
44; Keith Blackburn and Jonathan Powell, ‘Corruption, Inflation and Growth’ (2011) 113 (3) Economics Letters 
225. 
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year) rises, the average productivity of that investment drops.158 According to the post-
revisionists, infrastructure projects are preferred not because of their intrinsic value to the 
economy but for the rather more prosaic reason that such projects provide ideal vehicles for 
concealing corrupt payments. For example, in 2007, a crackdown by the Office of Fair Trading 
(OFT) uncovered the existence of a multimillion pound price-fixing cartel (this is a type of bid 
rigging which, as we shall see, is regarded as a core case of corruption) in the UK construction 
industry. The Deputy Director of Cartel Investigations at the OFT told BBC Radio 4 that such 
conduct “distorts competition with the end result that the customer ends up paying a higher 
price”.159 
 
The post-revisionists identify a number of undesirable costs associated with corrupt 
infrastructure projects.160 For example, when corruption is the driving force behind such 
projects, the rate of return as calculated by a cost-benefit analysis (a method for determining 
how much each unit of currency invested will increase output) ceases to be the criterion for 
project selection. The result is that some projects are completed but never used whilst others 
are so poorly built that they require continuous maintenance. A good example of this is the 
Bataan nuclear power station in the Philippines. Despite being completed in the 1980s for $2 
billion (£1 billion), it has never produced a single unit of electricity although it provided $17 
million (£10 million) in kickbacks for friends of the dictator, Marcos.161 In cases like these, 
capital spending is unlikely to generate growth.162 
 
158 Vito Tanzi and Hamid Davoodi, ‘Corruption, Public Investment, and Growth’ (1997) IMF Working Paper 
No. WP/97/139 <www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/wp97139.pdf> accessed 3 March 2008; Vito Tanzi and 
Hamid Davoodi, ‘Roads to Nowhere: How Corruption in Public Investment Hurts Growth’ (1998) 12 Economic 
Issues 1, 1. 
159  Julian O'Halloran, ‘Builders' Bid-Rigging 'Endemic'’ BBC News (London, 16 July 2007) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/file_on_4/6284126.stm> accessed 20 July 2007. 
160 Vito Tanzi and Hamid Davoodi, ‘Roads to Nowhere: How Corruption in Public Investment Hurts Growth’ 
(1998) 12 Economic Issues 1. 
161 Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 2005 (Pluto Press, 2005) 20; David Nussbaum, ‘Money 
Versus Morality: Is Corruption Just a Matter of Misaligned Incentives?’ (18 October 2006) London School of 
Economics, Public Lecture <http://www2.lse.ac.uk/PublicEvents/pdf/20061018_Nussbaum.pdf> accessed 28 
January 2007. 
162 Vito Tanzi, ‘Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures’ in George T Abed and 
Sanjeev Gupta (eds), Governance, Corruption, and Economic Performance (International Monetary Fund, 2002) 
29-48. 
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In addition, new projects are often undertaken at the expense of the existing infrastructure 
which is left to deteriorate. The post-revisionists argue that this is because it is easier to extract 
rent from new construction projects rather than the existing infrastructure. For example, in 
2005, a British bridge building company was investigated by the Serious Fraud Office for 
allegedly paying large bribes to secure lucrative bridge building projects in the Philippines. 
The affair, dubbed “bridges to nowhere” by the press, revealed how bridges had been 
constructed in isolated locations without any connecting roads. The company was handed the 
supply contracts for the bridges despite being more expensive than its competitors.163 
 
Of course, expenditure on new infrastructure projects is likely to have the effect of lowering 
operation and maintenance on the existing infrastructure which may cause it to fall into 
disrepair. This in turn provides further opportunities for rent-seeking when the existing 
infrastructure needs to be rebuilt.164 
 
Companies which engage in corruption are usually able to recover their “costs”. If a company 
has been given prior indication that it will “win” a bidding competition, it can include the cost 
of the bribe in its bid. If it is unable to do this, it may seek to recover the cost of the bribe by 
compromising on the quality of the materials and the standard of the work performed. 
 
The post-revisionists maintain that corruption in the procurement process can result in severe 
remote harms to essential public services. An excellent example of the remote harms which 
flow from corruption is the case of Papua New Guinea. In 2002, the Government of Papua 
New Guinea was bribed into accepting an inflated bid for the construction of bridges. So 
much money was allocated to paying for the bridges that the country’s economy collapsed, 
schools were closed, and hospitals were unable to offer treatment to people. After the scandal 
came to light, Papua New Guinea’s finance director explained that the expenditure “blew out 
our budget [and was] something which we could not sustain. All our ... financial resources are 
 
163 David Leigh and Rob Evans, ‘British Family Firm Accused of Getting Rich by Building Bridges to Nowhere’ 
The Guardian (London, 20 December 2005) <http://politics.guardian.co.uk/foi/story/0,9061,1671092,00.html> 
accessed 12 January 2008; David Leigh and Rob Evans, ‘SFO Studies Corruption Claims Against UK Bridge 
Builders’ The Guardian (London, 21 December 2005) 
<http://politics.guardian.co.uk/foi/story/0,9061,1671721,00.html> accessed 12 January 2008. 
164 Vito Tanzi and Hamid Davoodi, ‘Roads to Nowhere: How Corruption in Public Investment Hurts Growth’ 
(1998) 12 Economic Issues 1, 6. 
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going into paying these debts which obviously denies any funding for our road maintenance, 
our health, [and] our education.”165 
 
It is clear from this example that the general public’s interests were set back in a remote sense 
insofar as the government was forced to suspend expenditure on vital public services such as 
maintenance of the infrastructure, the health service, and the provision of education. The 
strength of these counter-examples has allowed the post-revisionists to debunk the 
revisionists’ assertion that corruption is efficient insofar as it encourages the development of 
infrastructure projects. Rather, as the post-revisionists have shown, corruption in 
infrastructure projects is inefficient and therefore unproductive. 
 
*   *   * 
 
The economic harms which flow from corruption are plain to see, and the post-revisionists 
have helped to uncover some important truths about the remote harms which flow from such 
conduct. But as we have seen, the economic literature on the harm resulting from corruption 
is concerned solely with the question of efficiency. One reason for this preoccupation with 
efficiency may be the fact that economic theorists have tended to regard corruption as 
essentially a legal offence within the economic sphere.166 
 
Despite the focus on efficiency, it is clear from the literature that corruption results in remote 
harms to the efficient operation of the economy. But by concentrating on remote harms, the 
post-revisionist economic theorists have underemphasised the harm and wrongdoing caused 
to those innocent actors who have not engaged in corruption. In short, by treating corruption 
as a study in efficiency, the post-revisionists have omitted to explore the full reach of 
corruption. It is submitted that the failure of the post-revisionists to provide a detailed 
account of the harm and wrongdoing to these innocent actors renders the scholarship in this 
area incomplete. 
 
 
165 Fran Abrams, ‘Export Credits Guarantee Department’ (BBC Radio 4 Programme, Broadcast 30 November 
2004) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/30_11_04_export_credit.pdf> accessed 12 January 2008. 
166 Seumas Miller, ‘Corruption’ in Edward N Zalta (ed), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 edn) 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/corruption/> accessed 19 March 2012. 
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3. MORAL WRONGDOING 
 
Most observers would agree that corruption is a morally loaded notion. It is not a value 
neutral concept and is regarded by most as having negative connotations.167 An allegation of 
corrupt conduct carries with it the suggestion of wrongdoing. However, despite this obvious 
observation, it is somewhat surprising to find that there is very little in the way of scholarship 
which systematically addresses the moral wrongdoing in corruption. This omission is all the 
more remarkable given the international interest in combatting corruption. 
 
One reason for this omission may be historical. Prior to the 1960s, there was very little in the 
way of serious scholarship on the harm in corruption. As we have seen, during the 1960s, the 
scholarship consisted of a running battle between the revisionists and the post-revisionists; 
with the latter generally regarded as having triumphed. The decades thereafter were used by 
post-revisionist scholars to highlight the remote harm consequences of corruption. As a result, 
very little attention has been paid to the moral wrongdoing in corruption, and the subject has 
not received the kind of academic attention that we might otherwise have expected. Even 
when corruption has been identified as a moral issue (as opposed to an exclusively legal issue), 
scholars have still failed to provide an account of the moral wrongdoing.168 
 
Although the scholarship on corruption has largely ignored the question of moral wrongdoing 
(including the connection between harm and wrongdoing), the last decade has seen a small 
number of theorists taking up the challenge and exploring this issue in more detail. These 
theorists, though somewhat disparate, are concerned with understanding what makes 
corruption wrong. Let us consider their contributions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
167 Michael S. Pritchard, ‘Bribery: the Concept’ (1998) 4 (3) Science and Engineering Ethics 281. 
168 Seumas Miller, ‘Corruption’ in Edward N Zalta (ed), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 edn) 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/corruption/> accessed 19 March 2012. 
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GREEN’S EVERYDAY NORMS 
 
The chief proponent of the new philosophical approach, Green, examines the moral 
wrongdoing in bribery from a non-consequentialist (or deontological) viewpoint. 169 
According to Green, what makes an act wrongful is some intrinsic violation of a freestanding 
moral rule or duty rather than the consequences of the act. To this end, he relies upon a series 
of everyday norms (such as cheating, deception, coercion, exploitation, disloyalty, promise-
breaking, and disobedience) to examine different types of white collar crime offences. 
 
Not everyone is convinced by Green’s assertion that the contours of white collar crime are 
mirrored by everyday norms.170 From our own point of view, it is worth pointing out that 
Green does not tell us precisely how these everyday norms are to be identified. Nor in fact, are 
we told how Green has come to identify them. Nonetheless, he prefers this approach over a 
rights-based approach because in his view, it is far more informative to say that a person has 
been cheated or deceived rather than simply saying that his rights have been violated. Green 
analyses the moral wrongdoing in bribery in two parts: passive bribery and active bribery. The 
former refers to the receipt of an inducement whereas the latter is concerned with the offer of 
an inducement. Let us consider both parts in turn. 
 
Passive bribery: the receipt of an inducement 
 
According to Green, what makes the receipt of an inducement wrongful is the disloyalty of the 
duty-holder.171 To this end, he identifies two types of loyalties. He explains that a loyalty can 
involve being true or faithful to someone172 (a principal) or something173 (a principle). Green 
 
169 Stuart P. Green, Lying, Cheating, and Stealing: A Moral Theory of White-Collar Crime (Oxford University 
Press, 2006) 193-211. 
170 Mitchell N. Berman, ‘On the Moral Structure of White Collar Crime’ (2007) 5 (1) Ohio State Journal of 
Criminal Law 301. 
171 This view mirrors the wrongdoing identified by the agency model which underpins the 1906 Act. 
172 According to this view, the proper objects of loyalty are individuals, groups, and institutions; Marcia Baron, 
The Moral Status of Loyalty (Kendall Hunt Publishing, 1984). 
173 This view argues that the proper objects of loyalty are ideals, causes, and practices; John Ladd, ‘Loyalty’ in Paul 
Edwards (ed), Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol V (Routledge, 1972) 97-98. 
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adopts a middle ground and proceeds on the basis that a loyalty may be owed to both. That is, 
one may owe a duty of loyalty to both principals and principles. 
 
However, we might formulate a counterexample along the following lines. It is a universal 
moral principle that we should not commit murder. That being so, it follows that if a contract 
killer is paid to kill a person, he breaches his duty of loyalty to that principle (i.e. not to 
commit murder). But we would not seriously argue that this is an example of bribery (it would, 
on any view, be a case of inappropriate labelling). Green recognises that this cannot be correct 
either and distinguishes this as an example of a non-positional moral duty. He argues that in 
order for a breach to constitute a breach of loyalty, the transaction must involve a breach 
arising out of some office or position or involvement in some practice. 
 
Green tests his theory by reference to an example. He tells us to imagine a prisoner in a Nazi 
concentration camp. The prisoner offers an inducement to a Nazi officer in order to secure 
her freedom. If the officer accepts, then he is clearly in breach of duty. That is, he is 
simultaneously in breach of his duty of loyalty to the Nazi party (principal) and to the 
ideology of Nazism (principle). Notwithstanding this, most people would argue that the 
conduct of the Nazi officer is not morally wrong. 
 
Green anticipates this objection and makes a distinction which lies at the heart of his theory. 
He argues that we must distinguish between loyalty in the descriptive (empirical) sense and 
loyalty in the normative (moral) sense. The former requires that the duty-holder feel obligated 
to act in the best interests of his principal (or principle). Loyalty in this sense does not require 
that the principal (or principle) be a good person (or the right cause). By contrast, loyalty in 
the normative sense requires that the duty-holder act in the best interests of his principal (or 
principle) and that his principal (or principle) be a good person (or the right cause). 
 
So returning to the example of the Nazi officer, Green concedes that by accepting the 
inducement, the officer has acted in breach of his duty of loyalty in the descriptive sense. 
However, Green argues that the officer has not been disloyal in the normative sense because 
both the Nazi party (principal) and the ideology of Nazism (principle) are morally 
reprehensible. On this basis, Green argues that the officer has done the right thing by 
accepting the inducement and releasing the prisoner. 
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It is apparent from this account that Green views the wrongdoing in passive bribery (i.e. the 
receipt of an inducement) as disloyalty. It follows from this analysis that the duty-holder’s 
disloyalty must be to either a principal or a principle. In other words, the victim of the duty-
holder’s wrongdoing is either a principal or a principle (or both). 
 
Active bribery: the offer of an inducement 
 
The second part of Green’s thesis focuses on the offer of an inducement (active bribery). 
However, his analysis of this aspect is considerably less detailed than his analysis of receiving 
an inducement in breach of duty (passive bribery).174 According to Green, the offer of an 
inducement is morally wrong because it induces a person to commit a wrongful act (i.e. 
engage in criminality). In the specific context of bribery, Green would argue that such conduct 
is morally wrong because it encourages a person to breach their duty of loyalty. 
 
We can see from this short account of the wrongdoing in active bribery (i.e. the offer of an 
inducement) that Green views the victim as the duty-holder. That is, the person to whom the 
inducement is offered. But this conclusion is both surprising and illogical for the simple 
reason that we would not have much sympathy for the duty-holder if, having accepted an 
inducement of his own volition, he were subsequently charged with accepting a bribe. Absent 
duress, it is plainly incorrect to describe one of the principal participants of a corrupt 
transaction as being a victim of the same crime. 
 
OTHER THEORISTS 
 
The remaining theorists in this area are few in number. However, although their work is not 
as detailed as Green’s, they do make some important contributions to the scholarship in this 
area. 
 
 
174 Of the 19 pages dedicated to the topic of bribery, only 3 pages are wholly concerned with active bribery; Stuart 
P. Green, Lying, Cheating, and Stealing: A Moral Theory of White-Collar Crime (Oxford University Press, 2006) 
208-210. 
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Let us begin with the work of Philips.175  Although Philips does not provide anything 
approaching a systematic analysis of the wrongdoing in corruption, he was to some extent 
ahead of his time. That is, because he wrote about wrongdoing in the 1980s at a time when the 
majority of scholars were concerned with trying to explain the remote harms which flow from 
acts of corruption. 
 
For Philips, the receipt of an inducement (he is silent as to the offer of an inducement) is 
wrongful because it causes the recipient to make his decision based on the wrong sorts of 
reasons. Philips does not expand upon this although it is arguable that his conception of 
wrongdoing is similar to that employed by the improper conduct model which underpins the 
2010 Act. That is, corruption is wrong because it causes the recipient to act in breach of a 
relevant expectation (i.e. acting for improper reasons). 
 
Moving on, Turow,176 who was also ahead of his time, approaches the matter from a different 
perspective and argues that corruption is objectionable because of its inherent favouritism. He 
borrows from Dworkin the idea that each of us stands as equal before the law. He argues that 
the payer of a bribe asks for that principle to be violated by offering an inducement and asking 
for preferential treatment. In other words, corruption is unfair because it creates an uneven 
playing field. It is worth pausing to consider Turow’s argument since he makes a valuable 
point. In fixing on the idea of equality, Turow recognises that although most individuals and 
corporations would like an advantage when it comes to business, there is no lawful 
entitlement to preferential treatment in the usual course of events. This principle can be seen 
in play in other areas. For example, the Equality Act 2010 makes it unlawful for an authority 
(e.g. government departments, local authorities, and the police, etc.) when exercising public 
functions to treat a person unfairly (e.g. by reference to their race, religion, or gender). 
Turow’s point is that equality demands that there should be a level playing field for all. This 
necessarily means that everyone should be afforded the same opportunities. Corruption 
upsets this balance because it secures for the bribe payer an unfair advantage. This unfair 
advantage morally wrongs those innocent actors who have not engaged in corruption because 
it sets back their interest in equal treatment. For example, they may be denied goods or 
services to which they are entitled, or they may be inconvenienced by delay, etc. 
 
175 Michael Philips, ‘Bribery’ (1984) 94 (4) Ethics 621. 
176 Scott Turow, ‘What's Wrong With Bribery?’ (1985) 4 (4) Journal of Business Ethics 249. 
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Although Turow does not offer an account of why it is wrong for a person to receive a bribe, it 
is possible to detect in his work an argument that such conduct is wrong because it 
compromises the recipient’s integrity. This idea is not properly developed by Turow with the 
result that he sets no boundaries as to when the receipt of an inducement might be regarded as 
corrupt (thereby undermining the recipient’s integrity). 
 
It might be argued that this view of wrongdoing is somewhat circular because it views the 
recipient of the bribe as also being the victim of the corrupt transaction. In other words, the 
victim of passive corruption is the person who is committing the wrongdoing. However, it 
may be that we are being overly critical. Turow might rescue his position by arguing that the 
receipt of a bribe compromises the integrity of the recipient because it causes them to act for 
impermissible reasons. Altering the argument in this way means that the recipient is no longer 
treated as a victim. Turow might develop the point by arguing that when the recipient of a 
bribe acts for impermissible reasons, he violates his duty to act in good faith, impartially, or in 
accordance with a position of trust and, in so doing, morally wrongs the interests of the 
person to whom the duty is owed. 
 
By contrast, Alldridge has sought to explain the wrongdoing in corruption by reference to the 
operation of markets.177 His market model argues that corruption is wrong because it 
undermines the proper and efficient operation of markets. In this theory, the word market is 
used in two distinct but overlapping senses. First, it refers to the creation of a market in things 
which ought not to be sold. For example, attempts to buy or sell the functions of government. 
Second, it refers to any conduct which undermines the allocative rules (i.e. how competition is 
to work) of a legitimate market. Such conduct distorts the proper and efficient operation of 
markets and denies the benefits of competition to the end-user and competitors. The question 
of whether a given activity undermines the proper and efficient operation of a market is to be 
determined by reference to the rules of that market. These rules (or minimum standards) are 
to be found in a variety of sources such as European law, statutes, statutory instruments, 
prerogative powers, and even self-regulatory initiatives. The market model makes a 
 
177 Peter Alldridge, ‘Reforming the Criminal Law of Corruption’ (2000) 11 Criminal Law Forum 287; Peter 
Alldridge, ‘The Law Relating to Free Lunches’ (2002) 23 (9) Company Lawyer 264; Joint Committee on the Draft 
Corruption Bill, Draft Corruption Bill: Report and Evidence (2002-03, HL Paper 157, HC Paper 705) 80-84. 
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distinction between corruption in the public sector (i.e. things which ought not to be sold) 
and corruption in the private sector (i.e. conduct which distorts allocative rules).178 
 
It might be thought from this account that the victims of corruption are the end-users and 
competitors. Somewhat surprisingly, the market model takes a different view. Instead, it 
argues that the wrongdoing in corruption is not to the rights and interests of these end users 
and competitors. Rather, the wrongdoing in corruption lies in the creation of a market in 
things which ought not to be sold and the distortion of existing markets. This 
misidentification of the wrongdoing in corruption has led to the market model being rejected 
as a viable model of corruption.179 
 
As the Law Commission points out, not all examples of corrupt conduct are competition 
offences. Neither can it be said that a single act of corruption results in the creation of a 
market in things which ought not to be sold. Rather, it is an example of an act taking place 
within an existing market. According to the Law Commission, these objections render the 
market model circular.180 
 
It is not entirely clear what the Law Commission means by this. However, it may be that the 
Law Commission’s objection is based on the market model’s reliance upon minimum 
standards. That is, the market model only has effect when a given activity breaches a 
minimum standard that affects the proper and efficient operation of a market. It therefore 
follows that in the absence of a minimum standard, there can be no prosecution for 
corruption. That being so, there would effectively be no substantive law against corruption. 
Instead, corruption would simply consist of any conduct which breaches a minimum standard 
(including activities which are not commonly regarded as being corrupt such as deception, 
theft, and fraud). This obviously cannot be correct. 
 
178 Horder is dismissive of this distinction and argues that it is unsustainable given that the line between the 
public and private sector is so blurred; Jeremy Horder, ‘Bribery as a Form of Criminal Wrongdoing’ (2011) 127 
(January) Law Quarterly Review 37. 
179 The market model was considered (and rejected) by both the Joint Committee on the Draft Corruption Bill 
and the Law Commission; Joint Committee on the Draft Corruption Bill, Draft Corruption Bill: Report and 
Evidence (2002-03, HL Paper 157, HC Paper 705); Law Commission, Reforming Bribery: A Consultation Paper 
(2007, Law Com Paper No 185). 
180 Law Commission, Reforming Bribery: A Consultation Paper (2007, Law Com Paper No 185) 34. 
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The final theorist in this area is Horder who argues that the wrongdoing in bribery (under the 
improper conduct model in the 2010 Act) is the abuse or misuse of a position rather than any 
kind of harm necessarily done. Horder argues that bribery is a criminal offence because it is 
wrongdoing that, if left unpunished, would result in an unacceptably enhanced risk that a 
whole variety of harms would become more widespread around the globe.181 This is obviously 
a reference to remote harms. Somewhat surprisingly, Horder concludes that the 
criminalisation of bribery (like many other crimes) can only be supported by remote harm 
justification. 
 
*   *   * 
 
It is clear from this analysis that there is one glaring omission in the literature on the moral 
wrongdoing in corruption. Despite an acknowledgement by some theorists that corruption 
results in harm to innocent actors, scholars in this area have failed to provide a detailed 
account of the wrongdoing to the rights and interests of these innocent actors. Moreover, the 
literature also fails to make any connection between the harm and the wrongdoing caused to 
these innocent actors by the corrupt acts of others. In this thesis, we shall argue that 
corruption is wrong because it results in inequality. As Turow argues, equality demands that 
there should be a level playing field, and that everyone should be afforded the same 
opportunities e.g. the right to access goods, services and opportunities on equal terms with 
other competitors. Corruption undermines this principle because it secures for the bribe payer 
an unfair advantage. 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
The principal aim of this chapter was to develop a context for our project. We have achieved 
this in two ways. First, by reviewing the literature on the harm and wrongdoing in corruption. 
Second, by identifying that there is a gap in the existing literature insofar as there are no 
complete accounts of the harm and wrongdoing suffered by those innocent actors whose 
rights and interests are set back by the corrupt acts of others. Our project will seek to plug this 
gap by articulating a coherent theory of the harm and wrongdoing in corruption. 
 
181 Jeremy Horder, ‘Bribery as a Form of Criminal Wrongdoing’ (2011) 127 (January) Law Quarterly Review 37. 
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Our review began by noting two important limitations in the general literature on corruption. 
First, prior to the 1960s, corruption did not receive much in the way of academic attention. At 
the time, it was regarded by most as a type of social decay (some viewed it as a moral failing 
and a religious sin). Second, the general scholarship since the 1960s has consisted broadly of 
contributions from three different types of theorists: political scientists, economic theorists, 
and legal philosophers (with the latter only properly emerging during the last decade). 
 
The political scientists fell into two rival groups: the revisionists and the post-revisionists. The 
early literature was led by the revisionists who made two main claims. First, they argued that 
corruption may make certain positive contributions to the political development of a 
developing country. Second, they argued that corruption is doomed to self-destruct as a 
country makes the transition from developing to developed status. Our review showed that 
the ideas of the revisionists have been largely discredited. For the post-revisionists, corruption 
is both dysfunctional and self-perpetuating. It results in remote harms insofar as it 
undermines the proper functioning of government and the rule of law. However, although 
post-revisionism is regarded as the superior account of corruption, it is deficient in one 
important respect. In short, it underestimates how corruption can set back the rights and 
interests of those innocent individuals who are affected by the corrupt acts of others. 
 
This shortcoming is also to be found in the work of the economic theorists. Our review 
showed that the economic theorists fall to be divided into the same two groups: the 
revisionists and the post-revisionists. Both sides approach corruption as a study in efficiency. 
The dispute between them is a disagreement as to where corruption lies on the spectrum of 
efficiency. For the revisionists, corruption is a productive activity which constitutes an 
efficient use of resources. For the post-revisionists, corruption constitutes an unproductive 
use of resources and is therefore inefficient. Our review showed that the views of the post-
revisionists are regarded as being the superior account. If further support is needed for this 
proposition, one need only refer to the multitude of national and international anti-
corruption instruments which all rely upon the remote economic harms of corruption as a 
basis for criminalisation. However, like the political scientists, the economic theorists also 
underemphasise the harm and wrongdoing caused to those innocent actors whose rights and 
interests are set back by the corrupt acts of others. 
 
We completed our literature review by examining a small body of emerging literature on the 
moral wrongdoing in corruption. This was evident from the limited number of theorists in 
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this area. Green developed an account based on his everyday norms approach and argued that 
the receipt of an inducement is wrong because it causes the recipient to act in breach of his 
duty of loyalty to his principal (or a principle). By contrast, he argued that the offer of an 
inducement is morally wrong because it induces the recipient to commit a wrongful act. 
However, Green’s analysis is incomplete because he omits to explain how corruption sets back 
(harms) the interests of innocent actors (other than principals), and the connection between 
such harms and the wrongdoing in corruption. 
 
We also looked at a small number of other theorists who offered differing accounts of the 
wrongdoing in bribery and corruption. The most recent contributor, Horder, argues that the 
wrongdoing in bribery is the abuse or misuse of a position rather than any kind of harm 
necessarily done. According to Horder, bribery is wrong because it is conduct that, if left 
unpunished, would result in an unacceptably enhanced risk that a whole variety of harms 
would become more widespread around the globe (i.e. it would result in remote harms to 
public interests). Whilst the remote harms relied upon by Horder are not disputed (in fact, the 
occurrence of remote harms is supported by both the political scientists and the economic 
theorists), it is submitted that corruption also harms the interests of other innocent actors. 
 
It is clear from our literature review that the scholarship on the harm and wrongdoing in 
corruption is incomplete. The theorists in this area recognise that there are other innocent 
actors whose rights and interests may be set back by the corrupt acts of others. However, 
notwithstanding this, there are no accounts of the harm and wrongdoing in corruption which 
provide a full explanation of the impact on these innocent actors. 
 
This thesis will plug this gap by developing a complete account of the harm and wrongdoing 
in core cases of corruption. In particular, we shall look to provide an account of the harm and 
wrongdoing suffered by those innocent actors whose rights and interests are set back by the 
corrupt acts of others. 
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III 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Having identified that there is a gap in the literature which prompts theoretical consideration, 
this chapter sets out a three-part analytical framework for analysing that gap. 
 
The three-part analytical framework furnished in this chapter will allow us to: (1) identify 
whether a given type of conduct is a core case of corruption (the first part), (2) compare the 
corrupt conduct with the law in the USA to ascertain whether there are any differences in 
terms of coverage (the second part), and (3) analyse the corrupt conduct to see what makes it 
harmful and wrongful (the third part). 
 
The first part of our analytical framework provides a mechanism for identifying core cases of 
corrupt conduct (i.e. conduct which falls within the smaller subset of bribery). This is a crucial 
step because we cannot begin to theorise about corruption until we know which types of 
conduct are to be regarded as cases of corruption. For the purposes of this thesis, we shall 
identify core cases of corruption by applying the improper conduct offences contained in the 
2010 Act.182 In short, a given type of conduct will be regarded as a core case of corruption if it 
is caught by one of the offences contained in the 2010 Act. Of course, it does not automatically 
follow from this that conduct which is not caught by the 2010 Act is not an instance of 
corruption. It may be that such conduct, though not a core case of corruption, falls within the 
wider definition of corruption. 
 
 
182 The 2010 Act has been well-received and commended as being fit for purpose by a number of important non-
governmental agencies as well as academics; Transparency International, ‘New Bribery Act will help Restore 
UK's International Reputation’ (Press Release, 8 April 2010) <http://www.transparency.org.uk/all-news-
releases/134-new-bribery-act-will-help-restore-uks-international-reputation> accessed 5 May 2012; G. R. 
Sullivan, ‘The Bribery Act 2010: Part 1: An Overview’ [2011] (2) Criminal Law Review 87; Stephen Gentle, ‘The 
Bribery Act 2010: Part 2: the Corporate Offence’ [2011] (2) Criminal Law Review 101; Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention in the United Kingdom’ (March 2012) <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/19/50026751.pdf> 
accessed 5 May 2012. 
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Our reliance upon the improper conduct offences in the 2010 Act is based on a number of 
reasons. First, it avoids any criticism about any self-constructed model of corruption being 
stipulative. Second, it gives our project a practical dimension in that allows us to take the 
improper conduct offences in the 2010 Act and see how far these take us in answering our 
research aim. Third, it allows us to bypass the general dissatisfaction with the agency model 
under the old law.183 
 
As to the last point, we have already mentioned the difficulties with the agency model. But the 
old law was not unsatisfactory simply because of its reliance on the agency model. The case 
law was equally unhelpful in defining corruption. The general juristic consensus is that in the 
leading case of Cooper v Slade,184 the House of Lords provided a circular and unhelpful 
definition when it held that the word “corruptly” meant “purposefully doing an act which the 
law forbids as tending to corrupt.”185 
 
However, this criticism is misconceived. Contrary to both the subsequent case law and the 
general literature on corruption, it is submitted that the House of Lords did not interpret the 
word “corruptly” in this way. Rather, that was the opinion of Willes J who was one of the eight 
attending judges.186 The procedure in those days was for the House of Lords to be advised by a 
number of attending judges.187 A careful reading of the decision shows that the court was 
constituted by Lord Cranworth (the Lord Chancellor) and Lord Wensleydale; both of whom 
came to a different conclusion. Lord Cranworth held that the word “corruptly” meant “a 
payment in violation of that which the statute was passed to prohibit”.188 By contrast, Lord 
 
183 The Law Commission was highly critical of the agency model’s narrow scope in its consultation paper on 
bribery; Law Commission, Reforming Bribery: A Consultation Paper (2007, Law Com Paper No 185) 28-34. 
184 (1858) 6 HL Cas 746; 10 ER 1488. 
185 (1858) 6 HL Cas 746 at 773; 10 ER 1488 at 1499. 
186 ibid. 
187 Glenn Dymond, ‘The Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords’ (20 November 2009) House of Lords 
Library Note No. 2009/010 <http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-library/lln2009-010appellate.pdf> 
accessed 8 January 2010; David Lewis Jones, ‘The Judicial Role of the House of Lords before 1870’ in Louis Blom-
Cooper, Gavin Drewry and Brice Dickson (eds), The Judicial House of Lords 1870-2009 (Oxford University 
Press, 2009). 
188 (1858) 6 HL Cas 746 at 788; 10 ER 1488 at 1504. 
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Wensleydale was less helpful and confessed “not exactly to understand the meaning of the 
term “corruptly””.189 
 
In a small number of subsequent cases, an attempt was made to define corruption. In 
Bradford Election Petition (No. 2),190 Martin B held that the word “corruptly” meant: 
 
[A] thing done with an evil mind - done with an evil intention; and except there be an 
evil mind or an evil intention accompanying the act it is not corruptly done. And thus 
when the word corruptly is used it means an act done by a man knowing that what he 
is doing is wrong, and doing so with evil feelings and evil intentions.191 
 
Similarly, in Tamworth,192 Willes J (who advised the House of Lords in Cooper v Slade) held 
that in order for treating to be corrupt: 
 
[I]t must be under circumstances and in a manner that the person who treated used 
meat or drink with a corrupt mind - that is, with a view to induce people, by the 
pampering of their appetites, to vote, or to abstain from voting, and in so doing, to act 
otherwise than they would have done without the incitement of meat or drink.193 
 
In the early twentieth century, after the coming into force of both the 1889 and 1906 Acts, 
there was another attempt. In the first instance case of Lindley,194 Pearce J directed the jury 
that in order to find the defendant guilty of corruption under the 1906 Act they had to be sure 
that he had dishonestly intended to weaken the loyalty of the servants to their master and to 
transfer that loyalty from the master to himself. This decision was followed in another first 
instance decision. In Calland,195 Veale J directed the jury that corruption meant dishonestly 
trying to wheedle an agent away from his loyalty to his employer. 
 
 
189 (1858) 6 HL Cas 746 at 790; 10 ER 1488 at 1505. 
190 (1869) 19 LT 723. 
191 ibid 727. 
192 (1869) 20 LT 181. 
193 ibid 189. 
194 [1957] Crim LR 321. 
195 [1967] Crim LR 236. 
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But this divergence in the case law was short lived. In Wellburn,196 the Court of Appeal 
expressly disapproved Lindley and Calland and reaffirmed the decision in Cooper v Slade. 
Thus, we can see that there were problems with the case law under the old law. 
 
The second part of our framework consists of a summary of some carefully selected anti-
corruption statutes from the USA. We shall apply these US anti-corruption statutes to the 
core cases of corrupt conduct identified by the first part of our analytical framework. The aim 
of this exercise is to ascertain whether there are any major differences between what is 
regarded as being a core case of corruption in England and Wales and what is regarded as a 
being a core case of corruption in the USA. The value of this endeavour is twofold. First, it will 
allow us to demonstrate that core cases of corruption travel well (thereby confirming the 
transnational nature of corruption). Second, it will allow us to articulate a theory of the harm 
and wrongdoing in core cases of corruption which is also of normative application. 
 
The third part of our analytical framework provides us with the tools for gauging harm and 
wrongdoing. Our conception of both harm and wrongdoing will be a streamlined (and 
supplemented) version of Feinberg’s defence of the harm principle. According to Feinberg, a 
person is harmed in the appropriate sense when his interests are harmed (i.e. set back) and he 
is wronged (i.e. his rights are indefensibly violated). The third part of our framework will 
explain the meaning of these key concepts and set out in detail how the harm principle 
operates. However, as previously mentioned, Feinberg’s account suffers from two weaknesses. 
First, his account of harming does not tell us how to distinguish between the different types of 
harms which may arise from a given activity. Second, although Feinberg’s account of 
wrongdoing tells us that one person wrongs another when his indefensible conduct violates 
the other’s rights (legal or moral), his account is incomplete because it does not explain what 
rights are and what they do for those who hold them. This omission is unhelpful because we 
cannot articulate the wrongdoing in corruption without first outlining an account of what it 
means to be wronged. 
 
Both of these omissions will be rectified by supplementing the harm principle. We shall attend 
to the first omission by providing an account of primary, indirect, and remote harms. This 
will allow us to distinguish between the different types of harm which may be caused by a 
 
196 (1979) 69 Cr App R 254. 
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given activity. The second omission is remedied by the provision of an account of both the 
form (i.e. a description of the internal structure of rights) and function (i.e. what rights do for 
those who hold them) of rights. Our account of the form of rights relies upon a refined 
version of Hohfeld’s well-known analytical scheme whilst our account of the function of 
rights is an adoption of MacCormick’s theory on the function of rights. 
 
Following supplementation, the third part of our analytical framework will allow us to analyse 
corrupt conduct in order to articulate the harm and wrongdoing which results from such 
conduct. Given our research aim, our focus will primarily be on the harm and wrongdoing 
caused to those innocent actors whose rights and interests are set back by the corrupt acts of 
others. 
 
 
1. PART ONE: THE 2010 ACT 
 
In this section, we shall set out the full text of the four offences and the interpretation 
provisions contained in the 2010 Act. This will be followed by a short analysis of the 2010 Act. 
We shall conclude this section by providing working summaries of the four offences and the 
interpretation provisions which will be used in the remainder of this thesis. Let us now set out 
the full text of the 2010 Act: 
 
SECTION 1 - OFFENCES OF BRIBING ANOTHER PERSON 
 
(1) A person (“P”) is guilty of an offence if either of the following cases applies. 
 
(2) Case 1 is where - 
(a) P offers, promises or gives a financial or other advantage to another person, 
and 
(b) P intends the advantage - 
(i) to induce a person to perform improperly a relevant function or 
activity, or 
(ii) to reward a person for the improper performance of such a function 
or activity. 
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(3) Case 2 is where - 
(a) P offers, promises or gives a financial or other advantage to another person, 
and 
(b) P knows or believes that the acceptance of the advantage would itself 
constitute the improper performance of a relevant function or activity. 
 
(4) In case 1 it does not matter whether the person to whom the advantage is offered, 
promised or given is the same person as the person who is to perform, or has 
performed, the function or activity concerned. 
 
(5) In cases 1 and 2 it does not matter whether the advantage is offered, promised or 
given by P directly or through a third party. 
 
SECTION 2 - OFFENCES RELATING TO BEING BRIBED 
 
(1) A person (“R”) is guilty of an offence if any of the following cases applies. 
 
(2) Case 3 is where R requests, agrees to receive or accepts a financial or other 
advantage intending that, in consequence, a relevant function or activity should be 
performed improperly (whether by R or another person). 
 
(3) Case 4 is where - 
(a) R requests, agrees to receive or accepts a financial or other advantage, and 
(b) the request, agreement or acceptance itself constitutes the improper 
performance by R of a relevant function or activity. 
 
(4) Case 5 is where R requests, agrees to receive or accepts a financial or other 
advantage as a reward for the improper performance (whether by R or another 
person) of a relevant function or activity. 
 
(5) Case 6 is where, in anticipation of or in consequence of R requesting, agreeing to 
receive or accepting a financial or other advantage, a relevant function or activity is 
performed improperly - 
(a) by R, or 
(b) by another person at R’s request or with R’s assent or acquiescence. 
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(6) In cases 3 to 6 it does not matter - 
(a) whether R requests, agrees to receive or accepts (or is to request, agree to 
receive or accept) the advantage directly or through a third party, 
(b) whether the advantage is (or is to be) for the benefit of R or another person. 
 
(7) In cases 4 to 6 it does not matter whether R knows or believes that the performance 
of the function or activity is improper. 
 
(8) In case 6, where a person other than R is performing the function or activity, it also 
does not matter whether that person knows or believes that the performance of the 
function or activity is improper. 
 
SECTION 3 - FUNCTION OR ACTIVITY TO WHICH BRIBE RELATES 
 
(1) For the purposes of this Act a function or activity is a relevant function or activity 
if - 
(a) it falls within subsection (2), and 
(b) meets one or more of conditions A to C. 
 
(2) The following functions and activities fall within this subsection - 
(a) any function of a public nature, 
(b) any activity connected with a business, 
(c) any activity performed in the course of a person’s employment, 
(d) any activity performed by or on behalf of a body of persons (whether 
corporate or unincorporate). 
 
(3) Condition A is that a person performing the function or activity is expected to 
perform it in good faith. 
 
(4) Condition B is that a person performing the function or activity is expected to 
perform it impartially. 
 
(5) Condition C is that a person performing the function or activity is in a position of 
trust by virtue of performing it. 
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(6) A function or activity is a relevant function or activity even if it - 
(a) has no connection with the United Kingdom, and 
(b) is performed in a country or territory outside the United Kingdom. 
 
(7) In this section “business” includes trade or profession. 
 
SECTION 4 - IMPROPER PERFORMANCE TO WHICH BRIBE RELATES 
 
(1) For the purposes of this Act a relevant function or activity - 
(a) is performed improperly if it is performed in breach of a relevant 
expectation, and 
(b) is to be treated as being performed improperly if there is a failure to 
perform the function or activity and that failure is itself a breach of a 
relevant expectation. 
 
(2) In subsection (1) “relevant expectation” - 
(a) in relation to a function or activity which meets condition A or B, means 
the expectation mentioned in the condition concerned, and 
(b) in relation to a function or activity which meets condition C, means any 
expectation as to the manner in which, or the reasons for which, the 
function or activity will be performed that arises from the position of trust 
mentioned in that condition. 
 
(3) Anything that a person does (or omits to do) arising from or in connection with 
that person’s past performance of a relevant function or activity is to be treated for 
the purposes of this Act as being done (or omitted) by that person in the 
performance of that function or activity. 
 
SECTION 5 - EXPECTATION TEST 
 
(1) For the purposes of sections 3 and 4, the test of what is expected is a test of what a 
reasonable person in the United Kingdom would expect in relation to the 
performance of the type of function or activity concerned. 
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(2) In deciding what such a person would expect in relation to the performance of a 
function or activity where the performance is not subject to the law of any part of 
the United Kingdom, any local custom or practice is to be disregarded unless it is 
permitted or required by the written law applicable to the country or territory 
concerned. 
 
(3) In subsection (2) “written law” means law contained in - 
(a) any written constitution, or provision made by or under legislation, 
applicable to the country or territory concerned, or 
(b) any judicial decision which is so applicable and is evidenced in published 
written sources. 
 
SECTION 6 - BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS 
 
(1) A person (“P”) who bribes a foreign public official (“F”) is guilty of an offence if P’s 
intention is to influence F in F’s capacity as a foreign public official. 
 
(2) P must also intend to obtain or retain - 
(a) business, or 
(b) an advantage in the conduct of business. 
 
(3) P bribes F if, and only if - 
(a) directly or through a third party, P offers, promises or gives any financial or 
other advantage - 
(i) to F, or 
(ii) to another person at F’s request or with F’s assent or acquiescence, 
and 
(b) F is neither permitted nor required by the written law applicable to F to be 
influenced in F’s capacity as a foreign public official by the offer, promise 
or gift. 
 
(4) References in this section to influencing F in F’s capacity as a foreign public official 
mean influencing F in the performance of F’s functions as such an official, which 
includes - 
(a) any omission to exercise those functions, and 
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(b) any use of F’s position as such an official, even if not within F’s authority. 
 
(5) “Foreign public official” means an individual who - 
(a) holds a legislative, administrative or judicial position of any kind, whether 
appointed or elected, of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom 
(or any subdivision of such a country or territory), 
(b) exercises a public function - 
(i) for or on behalf of a country or territory outside the United 
Kingdom (or any subdivision of such a country or territory), or 
(ii) for any public agency or public enterprise of that country or 
territory (or subdivision), or 
(c) is an official or agent of a public international organisation. 
 
(6) “Public international organisation” means an organisation whose members are any 
of the following - 
(a) countries or territories, 
(b) governments of countries or territories, 
(c) other public international organisations, 
(d) a mixture of any of the above. 
 
(7) For the purposes of subsection (3)(b), the written law applicable to F is - 
(a) where the performance of the functions of F which P intends to influence 
would be subject to the law of any part of the United Kingdom, the law of 
that part of the United Kingdom, 
(b) where paragraph (a) does not apply and F is an official or agent of a public 
international organisation, the applicable written rules of that organisation, 
(c) where paragraphs (a) and (b) do not apply, the law of the country or 
territory in relation to which F is a foreign public official so far as that law 
is contained in - 
(i) any written constitution, or provision made by or under legislation, 
applicable to the country or territory concerned, or 
(ii) any judicial decision which is so applicable and is evidenced in 
published written sources. 
 
(8) For the purposes of this section, a trade or profession is a business. 
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SECTION 7 - FAILURE OF COMMERCIAL ORGANISATIONS TO PREVENT BRIBERY 
 
(1) A relevant commercial organisation (“C”) is guilty of an offence under this section if a 
person (“A”) associated with C bribes another person intending - 
(a) to obtain or retain business for C, or 
(b) to obtain or retain an advantage in the conduct of business for C. 
 
(2) But it is a defence for C to prove that C had in place adequate procedures designed to 
prevent persons associated with C from undertaking such conduct. 
 
(3) For the purposes of this section, A bribes another person if, and only if, A - 
(a) is, or would be, guilty of an offence under section 1 or 6 (whether or not A has 
been prosecuted for such an offence), or 
(b) would be guilty of such an offence if section 12(2)(c) and (4) were omitted. 
 
(4) See section 8 for the meaning of a person associated with C and see section 9 for a duty 
on the Secretary of State to publish guidance. 
 
(5) In this section - 
“partnership” means - 
(a) a partnership within the Partnership Act 1890, or 
(b) a limited partnership registered under the Limited Partnerships 
Act 1907, 
or a firm or entity of a similar character formed under the law of a country or 
territory outside the United Kingdom, 
“relevant commercial organisation” means - 
(a) a body which is incorporated under the law of any part of the 
United Kingdom and which carries on a business (whether 
there or elsewhere), 
(b) any other body corporate (wherever incorporated) which carries 
on a business, or part of a business, in any part of the United 
Kingdom, 
(c) a partnership which is formed under the law of any part of the 
United Kingdom and which carries on a business (whether 
there or elsewhere), or 
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(d) any other partnership (wherever formed) which carries on a 
business, or part of a business, in any part of the United 
Kingdom, 
and, for the purposes of this section, a trade or profession is a business. 
 
SOME OBSERVATIONS 
 
We can see from the full text set out above that the 2010 Act contains two general offences 
and two discrete offences (they make no distinction between the public sector and the private 
sector).197 The first offence covers the offering, promising or giving of an advantage (section 1). 
The second offence deals with requesting, agreeing to receive or accepting an advantage 
(section 2). The third offence criminalises the bribery of foreign public officials (section 6). 
The fourth offence proscribes the failure of commercial organisations to prevent bribery 
(section 7). The interpretation provisions are to be found in sections 3 to 5.  
 
Perhaps the first thing to note about the four offences is that they can be committed on an 
accessorial (secondary) liability basis as aiding and abetting under the Accessories and 
Abettors Act 1861, inchoately as conspiracy contrary to the Criminal Law Act 1977, as a 
criminal attempt under the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, and as assisting and encouraging 
crime under the Serious Crime Act 2007.198 
 
Turning to the two general offences (sections 1 and 2), it is clear that these do not extend the 
field of criminal liability in any significant sense when compared to the old law199 (which 
complied with all of the UK’s international obligations).200 Rather, what is new is the way in 
which coverage is achieved. Whereas under the old law the tribunal of fact was required to 
determine whether a given type of conduct had been performed “corruptly”, the 2010 Act sets 
 
197 Law Commission, Reforming Bribery (2008, Law Com Report No 313) 20; Jeremy Horder, ‘Bribery as a Form 
of Criminal Wrongdoing’ (2011) 127 (January) Law Quarterly Review 37, 45. 
198  Rudi Fortson QC, ‘Understanding the Bribery Act 2010’ (1 July 2011) 
<http://www.rudifortson4law.co.uk/legaltexts/Bribery_Act_2010_R.Fortson_QC_1stJuly2011_v2.pdf> accessed 
26 August 2012. 
199 G. R. Sullivan, ‘The Bribery Act 2010: Part 1: An Overview’ [2011] (2) Criminal Law Review 87, 94. 
200 Home Office, Bribery: Reform of the Prevention of Corruption Acts and SFO Powers in Cases of Bribery of 
Foreign Officials: A Consultation Paper (December 2005) 8-9. 
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out a number of cases in which an advantage should not be offered or accepted (the 2010 Act 
is concerned with conduct not results).201 In short, a bribe under the 2010 Act is not limited to 
a single case but several. In such cases, the task for the tribunal of fact is to determine whether 
an advantage was offered or accepted together with the relevant mens rea (using the more 
familiar concepts of intent, knowledge and belief).202 
 
Of course, whether a “financial or other advantage” constitutes a bribe depends on the 
underlying aim of the offer or receipt. For the purposes of both section 1 and 2, an offer or 
receipt of an advantage will constitute a bribe only when it simultaneously constitutes the 
improper performance of a “relevant function or activity” (sections 6 and 7 are different). 
That is, a function or activity which is of a public nature, connected with a business, 
performed in the course of employment, or performed on behalf of a body of persons 
(corporate or unincorporate) and which imposes on the person performing it a duty to act in 
good faith, impartially, or in accordance with a position of trust. 
 
The 2010 Act deliberately limits the application of the 2010 Act to functions and activities 
which are essentially of a commercial or public nature. Otherwise, the reach of the 2010 would 
be extended to private transactions which are not the concern of the criminal law. For 
example, no-one would seriously argue that a mother who offers her child a reward for 
performing well in their exams should be guilty of bribery. 
 
It will be apparent from the full text set out above that some of the cases in the 2010 Act 
require the satisfaction of both subjective and objective tests before criminal liability can be 
imposed. The subjective test is a reference to the fact that both section 1 (cases 1 and 2) and 
section 2 (case 3 only) contain mens rea requirements. For the purposes of section 1, the bribe 
payer must intend to induce (case 1) or act with knowledge or belief (case 2). Similarly, 
section 2 states that the recipient of the bribe must act with intention (case 3). In these cases, 
the tribunal of fact will need to look at the intentions of the bribe payer (or the recipient of the 
 
201 Director of the Serious Fraud Office and the Director of Public Prosecutions, Bribery Act 2010: Joint 
Prosecution Guidance of the Director of the Serious Fraud Office and the Director of Public Prosecutions (30 
March 2011) 5. 
202 G. R. Sullivan, ‘The Bribery Act 2010: Part 1: An Overview’ [2011] (2) Criminal Law Review 87, 87-88. 
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bribe) and the knowledge that he possessed at the time of the corrupt transaction.203 Of course, 
this leaves open the possibility of a defendant arguing that he did not intend to induce (or be 
induced) by the provision (or receipt) of a financial or other advantage. The 2010 Act is silent 
as to this particular difficulty.204 
 
The objective test is required in order to determine what is expected in relation to the 
performance of a relevant function or activity. In other words, does the relevant function or 
activity impose upon the person performing it a duty to act in good faith, impartially, or in 
accordance with a position of trust? Without an objective test, it would be open to a defendant 
to mount a technical defence on the basis that he thought that he (or the recipient of a 
financial or other advantage) was not expected to act in good faith, impartially, or in 
accordance with a position of trust. The 2010 Act overcomes this potential obstacle by 
imposing an objective test which requires the tribunal of fact to ask what a reasonable person 
in the UK would expect in relation to the performance of the function or activity concerned. 
 
As we can see, the improper conduct in the 2010 Act consists of a person (who is performing a 
relevant function or activity) failing to act in good faith, impartially, or in accordance with a 
position of trust. Whether a person has acted improperly is an objective test which requires 
the tribunal of fact to determine: (a) whether the person was under a duty, and (b) whether 
that duty was breached. The focus is therefore on the conduct of the alleged wrongdoer rather 
than the impact on any potential victim. 
 
Accordingly, it is not possible to make a direct link between the impropriety of the conduct 
for the purposes of the 2010 Act (the first part of our analytical framework), and the 
wrongness of that conduct for the purposes of the harm principle (the third part of our 
analytical framework - discussed later in this chapter). Whereas the former is concerned with 
the conduct of the alleged wrongdoer, the latter is concerned with harm to persons other than 
the wrongdoer. This difference may point to different victims e.g. the conduct may be 
 
203 Nick Kochan and Robin Goodyear, Corruption: The New Corporate Challenge (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) 
75. 
204  Rudi Fortson QC, ‘Understanding the Bribery Act 2010’ (1 July 2011) 
<http://www.rudifortson4law.co.uk/legaltexts/Bribery_Act_2010_R.Fortson_QC_1stJuly2011_v2.pdf> accessed 
26 August 2012. 
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improper because the wrongdoer has acted in breach of a public duty, however the primary 
harm may be to an individual interest. 
 
We can demonstrate this point with a simple example. Let us imagine a public official (R) who 
is responsible for allocating a limited number of permits. Let us further assume that R accepts 
a bribe from a person (P) in return for allocating the last permit to P. In this scenario, it is 
submitted that R has acted improperly for the purposes of the 2010 Act because he has failed 
to act in good faith and impartially. This constitutes a set back to the public’s interest in the 
proper administration of government. However, it is arguable that the primary victim in this 
example, for the purposes of the harm principle, is the innocent actor who was deprived of the 
opportunity of applying for a permit. 
 
It does not follow from this that there is no connection at all between the improperness of R’s 
conduct, and the harm and wrongdoing inflicted upon the innocent actor. It is submitted that 
by acting in bad faith and partially, R has morally wronged our innocent actor’s right to be 
treated on equal terms with others i.e. to be afforded the right to access goods, services and 
opportunities on equal terms with others. This argument is considered in further detail below 
in our discussion of wrongs under the harm principle. 
 
It is also important to note that we are not suggesting that a tribunal of fact must (although it 
may) find that an alleged wrongdoer has acted improperly simply because his conduct also 
amounts to a separate and distinct criminal offence. In order for conduct to be improper 
under the 2010 Act, the alleged wrongdoer must have acted in bad faith, partially, or in breach 
of trust. This is a question of fact for the tribunal of fact. 
 
Not all of the cases contained in the 2010 Act require proof of mens rea. There is a resonance 
with the presumption of corruption under the old law insofar as some of the cases specified in 
section 2 are of strict liability. It is clear from a careful reading of section 2 that no fault is 
required when conduct falls within the ambit of cases 4 to 6. This is confirmed by section 2(7) 
which states that in cases 4 to 6 it does not matter whether the recipient of the bribe knows or 
believes that the performance of the function or activity is improper. 
 
This analysis is not accepted by all. Sullivan disagrees with the effect of section 2(7) and argues 
that in cases 4 to 6, the prosecution must prove that the request or receipt of the advantage 
itself was not made in good faith, impartially, or in accordance with a position of trust. He 
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argues that it is impossible that the liability of a recipient could be established without proof 
that the recipient was aware of the facts that made the actual or contemplated performance of 
the relevant function or activity improper.205 Whilst Sullivan makes a valuable point, his 
interpretation flies in the face of the clear wording of section 2(7) of the 2010 Act. In any 
event, whether Sullivan’s interpretation is correct is not something which we can conclusively 
determine in this thesis. Until such time as either Parliament amends the 2010 Act or the 
courts interpret section 2(7) so as to confirm Sullivan’s interpretation, we must proceed on the 
basis that Parliament intended by section 2(7) to impose strict liability in respect of cases 4 to 
6. 
 
We should not be surprised by the fact that Sullivan disagrees as to the precise impact of the 
2010 Act. There is good reason for this. One of the surprising features of the 2010 Act is the 
fact that so many of its central elements are left undefined.206 Even a straightforward concept 
such as a “financial or other advantage” is not defined. Instead, the Explanatory Notes to the 
2010 Act tell us that this to be determined as a matter of common sense by the tribunal of fact. 
 
Moving on, the offence of bribing a foreign public official (section 6) is a simple restatement 
of the old law. Like the general offences under sections 1 and 2, it does not extend the ambit of 
criminal liability any more than the old law. Unlike sections 1 and 2, the improper aim in 
section 6 (and section 7) is the obtaining or retaining of business or an advantage in the 
conduct of business. However, section 6 is not completely rigid. It contains an important 
exception which allows for the payment of an advantage to a foreign public official (which 
would otherwise be proscribed by section 6) where such payment is permitted by the written 
law in the foreign public official’s country. This exemption allows for genuine payments 
which are permitted by law whilst excluding payments made on the basis that there is a 
custom or practice of offering such payments in a given country. 
 
The innovation under the 2010 Act is section 7 which makes it an offence for commercial 
organisations to fail to prevent active bribery (but not passive bribery). Section 7, which 
 
205 G. R. Sullivan, ‘The Bribery Act 2010: Part 1: An Overview’ [2011] (2) Criminal Law Review 87, 90-93. 
206 Although Dennis was commenting on the draft bill contained in the Law Commission’s report on bribery, his 
observations are applicable to the 2010 Act which is in almost identical terms; Ian Dennis, ‘It Looks Like Bribery, 
Therefore it is’ [2009] (2) Criminal Law Review 61, 62. 
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imposes strict liability,207 has no equivalent under the old law. It is arguable that section 7 
constitutes an indirect attempt to prevent corruption from occurring in the first place. That is 
because it is a defence for a commercial organisation charged with an offence under section 7 
to show that it had in place adequate procedures designed to prevent bribery. This is obviously 
an incentive for commercial organisations to ensure that they have in place proper procedures 
(such as anti-corruption policies and regular training) to ensure that their employees do not 
engage in conduct which might fall foul of the 2010 Act. The result, it is hoped, will be an 
improvement in standards and a decline in corruption. Of course, only time will tell whether 
section 7 actually has this effect. 
 
A WORKING SUMMARY 
 
It is fair to say that the drafting in the 2010 Act has attracted criticism. For example, Colin 
Nicholls QC, a leading criminal silk, confessed that “the drafting, I am afraid, as a criminal 
lawyer ... I find impossible. Maybe I am just not very good about it, except that I notice that 
the senior partners of Herbert Smith were having problems on this issue.”208 He was not alone 
as Lord Thomas of Gresford (a member of the Joint Committee on the Draft Bribery Bill) said 
that he “found it equally as confusing as Mr Nicholls.”209 
 
In order to aid clarity, let us summarise the offences contained in the 2010 Act together with 
the interpretation provisions. The remainder of this thesis will rely upon these summaries 
with reference to the full text only when needed. 
 
Section 1: Offences of bribing another person 
 
In order to be guilty of bribing another person contrary to section 1, a person (P) must act in 
the ways set out in paragraphs (1) and (2) below, and satisfy either case 1 or case 2 (i.e. 
subparagraphs (a) or (b) below): 
 
207 Stephen Gentle, ‘The Bribery Act 2010: Part 2: the Corporate Offence’ [2011] (2) Criminal Law Review 101, 
102. 
208 Nicholls was commenting on the drafting in the Bribery Bill (Ministry of Justice, Bribery: Draft Legislation 
(Draft Bill) (2009, Cm 7570). However, the drafting in the 2010 Act is virtually identical; Joint Committee on the 
Draft Bribery Bill, Draft Bribery Bill: First Report of Session 2008-09 (HC 430-II, HL Paper 115-II) 19. 
209 ibid 19. 
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(1) P offers, promises, or gives an advantage (whether by P or through a third party), 
 
(2) to another person: 
 
(a) with the intention of inducing that person (or another person) to perform a 
relevant function or activity improperly (case 1), or 
 
(b) in the knowledge or belief that the acceptance of the advantage would itself 
constitute the improper performance of a relevant function or activity (case 2). 
 
Section 2: Offences relating to being bribed 
 
In order to be guilty of being bribed contrary to section 2, a person (R) must act in the ways 
set out in paragraph (1) below and satisfy either case 3, 4, 5, or 6 (i.e. subparagraphs (a) to (d) 
below). Only case 3 requires proof of mens rea. Cases 4 to 6 are strict liability. 
 
(1) R requests, agrees to receive, or accepts an advantage: 
 
(a) with the intention of performing a relevant function or activity improperly 
(whether by R or another person) (case 3), 
 
(b) the request or receipt of the advantage itself constitutes an improper 
performance of a relevant function or activity (case 4), 
 
(c) as a reward for having improperly performed a relevant function or activity 
(whether by R or another person) (case 5), or 
 
(d) in anticipation of receiving an advantage performs a relevant function or 
activity improperly (whether by R or another person at R’s request) (case 6). 
 
Section 6: Bribery of foreign public officials 
 
Under section 6, a person (P) who offers, promises or gives an advantage to a foreign public 
official (F) with the intention of influencing F in order to obtain or retain business or an 
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advantage in the conduct of business, is guilty of bribery unless the payment of the advantage 
is permitted by the written law applicable to F. 
 
Section 7: Failure of commercial organisations to prevent bribery 
 
In order for a commercial organisation (C) to be guilty of failing to prevent bribery contrary 
to section 7 of the 2010 Act, a person (A) associated with C must bribe another person 
intending to obtain or retain business or an advantage in the conduct of business for C. 
However, it is a defence for C to show that it had in place adequate procedures designed to 
prevent such conduct. 
 
Sections 3 to 5: The interpretation provisions 
 
Only some of the offences under the 2010 Act require proof of mens rea. Offences falling 
within section 1 (cases 1 and 2) and section 2 (case 3 only) all require mens rea. Cases 1 and 3 
require proof of intention. By contrast, case 2 requires evidence of the briber payer’s 
knowledge or belief. We can deal with these matters fairly swiftly. Intention is a familiar 
(though not necessarily settled)210 concept in English criminal law and for this reason, the 
2010 Act offers no definition. We know that a person intends a consequence if he wants that 
consequence to follow from his action. He may also be found to have acted with intent where 
consequences (which he may not want) follow his actions which he knows are virtually certain 
to occur.211 For the purposes of the 2010 Act, intention is to be judged subjectively on the basis 
of what the bribe payer (case 1) or the recipient of the bribe (case 3) intended rather than what 
actually occurred as a result of their conduct. Knowledge plays the same role in relation to 
circumstances as intention plays in relation to consequences. One knows something if one is 
absolutely sure that it is so although, unlike intention, it is of no relevance whether one wants 
or desires the thing to be so.212 Belief adds very little to the definition of knowledge; although it 
is worth noting that one can have a genuine but mistaken belief whereas knowledge implies 
correctness of belief.213 
 
210 Inconsistencies in the case law may be due to the fact that the majority of authorities concern murder cases; 
Victor Tadros, Criminal Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2005) 232. 
211 R v Woollin [1999] AC 82. 
212 Hooper LJ and David Ormerod, Blackstone's Criminal Practice 2012 (Oxford University Press, 2012) 25-26. 
213 ibid 26. 
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Under the 2010 Act, a relevant function or activity is one which is of a public nature, 
connected with a business, performed in the course of employment, or performed on behalf of 
a body of persons (corporate or unincorporate), and which imposes upon the person 
performing it a duty to act in good faith, impartially, or in accordance with a position of trust. 
 
In order to decide whether a person has performed a duty in good faith, impartially, or in 
accordance with a position of trust, the test is what a reasonable person in the UK would 
expect in relation to the performance of the function or activity concerned. Where the 
function or activity is conducted abroad, any local practice or custom must be excluded unless 
it is permitted or required by the written law of the foreign jurisdiction in question. 
 
 
2. PART TWO: THE LAW IN THE USA 
 
The US criminal law of corruption consists of a complex collection of overlapping and 
interlocking statutes and regulations enacted at both federal and state level.214 Our aim in this 
section is to carefully select and summarise some federal and state level anti-corruption 
statutes. This will allow us to compare and contrast the core cases of corrupt conduct 
identified by the first part of our analytical framework with the law in the USA. By doing this, 
we shall be able to ascertain whether core cases of corruption travel well and whether there are 
any major differences in terms of coverage. 
 
The discussion in this section will cover four federal statutes (18 USC § 201, 15 USC § 78dd, 
15 USC § 1, and 15 USC § 78j) and the law in the state of California (Cal. Penal Code § 641.3). 
Before we consider these, it is necessary to say something about why we have selected these 
particular statutory provisions. 
 
In terms of the federal statutes, we have selected 18 USC § 201 and 15 USC § 78dd because 
they are the main general anti-corruption statutes in the USA. 18 USC § 201 proscribes cases 
of domestic corruption whereas 15 USC § 78dd is concerned with the bribery of foreign public 
officials. The remaining federal statutes contain discrete offences. 15 USC § 1 deals exclusively 
with bid rigging whilst 15 USC § 78j tackles the problem of insider dealing. These two statutes 
 
214 Law Commission, Reforming Bribery: A Consultation Paper (2007, Law Com Paper No 185) 249. 
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have been selected because they are pertinent to the case studies which have been identified 
for analysis in chapter IV. 
 
Lastly, it is necessary to rely upon the law at state level for the simple reason that there is a gap 
in terms of coverage at federal level. As we shall see, the federal statutes are silent as to 
corruption which occurs exclusively within the private sector. In this section, we shall plug 
this gap by reference to the California Penal Code § 641.3. Of course, the question arises as to 
why we have selected California as opposed to some other state. The simple answer is that the 
criminal law of corruption in the state of California is clear and well-developed. We shall not 
consider the law in other states because this thesis is not intended to be a truly comparative 
study. 
 
18 USC § 201: BRIBERY 
 
Let us begin by looking at the offences which are proscribed by 18 USC sections 201(b)(1) to 
201(b)(4). These are concerned with the bribery of public officials, jurors, and witnesses in the 
domestic context. What follows is a simplified working summary. 
 
According to sections 201(b)(1) and 201(b)(3), a person is guilty of bribery if he (directly or 
indirectly): 
 
(1) corruptly gives or offers anything of value, 
 
(2) to a public official, a juror, or a witness, 
 
(3) in order to influence: 
(a) the public official or juror in his official capacity, or 
(b) the testimony of the witness or for ensuring that witness absents himself from 
any proceedings. 
 
There are mirror offences contained in sections 201(b)(2) and 201(b)(4). It is clear from these 
that a public official, juror, or witness is guilty of bribery if he (directly or indirectly): 
 
(1) corruptly seeks or accepts anything of value (for himself or on behalf of another), 
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(2) in return for: 
(a) being influenced in his capacity as a public official or juror, or 
(b) being influenced in his testimony as a witness or for absenting himself from 
any proceedings. 
 
The term “public official” has been interpreted widely and includes any person acting on 
behalf of any branch of the government in any official function. It also includes persons who 
are not government employees. In other words, it is enough for a person to occupy a position 
of trust with official federal responsibilities. Thus, in Dixson v United States215 it was held that 
employees of a private non-profit corporation that administered a sub-grant from a municipal 
federal block grant were public officials. 
 
The phrase a “thing of value” is obviously a reference to an inducement and includes both 
tangible and intangible benefits. In common with English law, there is no de minimis 
exception. 
 
As to the meaning of the word “corruptly”, in the case of United States v Sun-Diamond 
Growers216 it was held that this meant a “specific intent to give or receive something of value 
in exchange for an official act.” This is often referred to as a quid pro quo requirement. Thus, 
a vague or generalised expectation of future benefits is not sufficient to make a payment a 
bribe.217 In short, the bribe payer (or receiver) must give (or receive) an inducement in 
exchange for an official act. Of course, that does not mean that there must be reciprocity. For 
example, a briber payer would still be guilty even if the public official refused the inducement. 
 
15 USC § 78dd: THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1977 
 
The second federal statute which we shall consider is the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977 
(the FCPA). The FCPA was enacted after evidence of improper conduct emerged during the 
hearings of the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities (set up after the 
Watergate scandal). Subsequent investigations revealed that impermissible contributions 
 
215 (1984) 465 US 482. 
216 (1999) 526 US 398 at 404-405. 
217 United States v Arthur (1976) 544 F 2d 730. 
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totalling over $300 million had been made by a number of US companies. These included 
payments to President Nixon’s re-election campaign as well as bribes to foreign public 
officials. The US Congress took an interest in these findings and subsequently enacted the 
FCPA.218 
 
The substantive provisions of the FCPA take both a direct and indirect route to prohibit the 
bribery of foreign public officials. As to the former, the FCPA contains a direct prohibition on 
the bribery of foreign public officials. As to the latter, the FCPA requires US companies to 
prepare accurate accounting statements (sometimes referred to as the “books and records” 
requirement).219 This is an indirect method of ensuring that corrupt payments are not 
concealed through inventive accounting. 
 
The key provisions of the FCPA are to be found in 15 USC sections 78dd(1) to 78dd(3). What 
follows is a simplified working summary. According to sections 78dd(1) to 78dd(3), a person 
(or organisation) is guilty of an offence if he (or it): 
 
(1) corruptly, 
 
(2) gives or offers anything of value, 
 
(3) to a foreign public official (or any other person in the knowledge that it will be 
passed on to the foreign public official) for the purposes of: 
(a) influencing any decision of the foreign public official in his official 
capacity, 
(b) inducing the foreign public official to act in violation of his lawful duty, 
(c) securing any improper advantage, or 
(d) inducing the foreign public official to use his influence to affect any act of a 
foreign government, 
 
(4) for the purpose of obtaining business. 
 
218 Thomas F. Mcinerney, ‘The Regulation of Bribery in the United States’ (2002) 73 (1) International Review of 
Penal Law 81. 
219 ibid 83. 
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There are three important exceptions. First, the FCPA does not apply to any facilitation 
payments made for the purposes of expediting or securing the performance of “routine 
governmental action” by a foreign public official. However, it is important to note that this 
exception only applies to ministerial duties involving something to which one is already 
entitled (as opposed to matters of discretion such as whether to enter into a contract with a 
particular party). So for example, a payment made to expedite the installation of a telephone 
line in a country where this might otherwise take a considerable period of time would be 
regarded as a facilitation payment made in order to secure routine governmental action.220 
Second, the FCPA also excludes the giving or offering of inducements which are lawful 
according to the written laws of a particular foreign country so long as the inducements relate 
to reasonable and bona fide expenditure. This restrictive definition is meant to exclude mere 
custom or practice within a foreign jurisdiction. Third, the FCPA does not criminalise the 
conduct of foreign public officials.221 In other words, the FCPA applies exclusively to US 
citizens and corporations (i.e. the bribe payers) and leaves the punishment of foreign public 
officials to the relevant foreign jurisdiction. 
 
A person has “knowledge” if he is aware that what he has given or offered is an inducement 
which will be passed onto a foreign public official. This is a rather vague definition which 
emphasises the subjective nature of the knowledge criterion. By contrast, the term “corruptly” 
is not defined by the FCPA.222 However, according to the legislative history, the term corruptly 
is said to mean an evil motive, purpose or intent to wrongfully influence the recipient.223 In 
Arthur Andersen LLP v United States,224 the Supreme Court held that the criminal prohibition 
against corrupt conduct requires a consciousness of wrongdoing. However, it declined to 
expand upon this or to provide a more detailed definition of the term corruptly. 
 
 
 
 
220 ibid 85. 
221 United States v Blondek (1990) 741 F Supp 116. 
222 Robert W. Tarun, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Handbook: A Practical Guide for Multinational General 
Counsel, Transactional Lawyers and White Collar Criminal Practitioners (American Bar Association, 2010) 10-
12. 
223 S Rep, No 114, 95th Cong, 1st Sess 10 (1977). 
224 125 S Ct 2129 (2005). 
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15 USC § 1: THE SHERMAN ACT 1890 
 
The next federal statute which we shall consider is the Sherman Act 1890. This is concerned 
with bid rigging (which, as we shall see, is regarded as being a core case of corruption). The 
Sherman Act 1890 contains two prohibitions. Section 1 prohibits contracts, combinations, 
and conspiracies in restraint of trade. By contrast, section 2 is concerned with 
monopolisation. For our purposes, only the former is of interest. 
 
Section 1 states that every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce is an offence. But such a broad prohibition 
would, if applied literally, capture almost all commercial arrangements. Accordingly, the 
courts have held that only unreasonable restraints of trade are proscribed by section 1.225 
 
However, in determining what constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade, the courts have 
applied two approaches. The first, known as the “per se” approach, is akin to strict liability in 
English law. In short, some commercial agreements are deemed to be so harmful to 
competition that they are prohibited outright (e.g. price fixing, bid rigging, and group 
boycotts). The second, known as the “rule of reason” approach, applies to those restraints of 
trade which are not caught by the per se approach. In such cases, the courts determine 
whether the arrangement is illegal by balancing the harms and benefits of the arrangement. If 
the harms caused by the arrangement outweigh its benefits, it is deemed to be an illegal 
restraint of trade.226 
 
15 USC § 78J: THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT 1934 
 
The last of federal statutes which we shall consider is the Securities Exchange Act 1934. This is 
concerned with the problem of insider dealing (which is also regarded as a core case of 
corruption). Under the powers conferred by section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act 
1934, the US Securities and Exchange Commission enacted a number of rules to deal with the 
problem of insider dealing. These rules are to be found in the Code of Federal Regulations 
(C.F.R.) which is much like secondary legislation in England and Wales. 
 
225 Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v United States  221 US 1 (1911). 
226 Robert W. Emerson, Business Law (5th edn, Barron’s Educational Series, 2009) 517-522. 
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The most important of these rules is 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. This makes it unlawful for a 
person (P) to engage in any act or omission which operates as a fraud upon any person in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security. In order to bring a successful 
prosecution, it must be shown that P engaged in a fraudulent act (or omission) in connection 
with the purchase or sale of securities. 
 
Rule 10b-5 applies to both classical insiders (e.g. directors, officers, and large shareholders)227 
as well as third parties to whom insider information is disclosed.228 However, in order for a 
third party to be liable, it must be shown that he knew or had reason to believe that P was in 
breach of a fiduciary duty by disclosing the insider information. In addition, in such scenarios 
it must be shown that P also received some personal benefit (either tangible or intangible).229 
 
*   *   * 
 
We can see from our summary that the four federal statutes set out above are very specific. 
They criminalise the bribery of specific groups (public officials, foreign public officials, jurors, 
and witnesses) and activities (restraints of trade and insider dealing). But none of these federal 
statutes is exclusively concerned with the bribery of individuals who fall exclusively within the 
private sector (foreign or domestic).230 In fact, there are no federal statutes which expressly 
proscribe such conduct. 
 
As to the former (i.e. foreign private sector bribery), US prosecutors are forced to rely on a 
cumbersome workaround. They prosecute overseas private sector bribery using 18 USC § 
1952 (the Travel Act 1961).231 This makes it an offence to engage in any interstate or foreign 
travel, or to use any mail or facility in interstate or foreign travel, with the intention of 
carrying out any “unlawful activity.” 
 
227 Chiarella v United States  445 US 222 (1980). 
228 Dirks v Securities and Exchange Commission 463 US 646 (1983). 
229 Stephen M. Bainbridge, ‘An Overview of US Insider Trading Law: Lessons for the EU?’ (2005) 2 (1) European 
Company Law 22. 
230 Thomas L. Carson, ‘Bribery, Extortion, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’ (1985) 14 (1) Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 66, 76. 
231 D. Bruce Gabriel, ‘The Scope of Bribery under the Travel Act’ (1979) 70 (3) The Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology 337. 
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The phrase “unlawful activity” has been defined so as to include a range of different crimes 
such as gambling, narcotics, prostitution, extortion, arson, and bribery. In order for the Travel 
Act 1961 to take effect, the predicate offence must be proscribed by the law of the state in 
which the activity occurs or by the federal law of the USA. Thus, if a US citizen from the state 
of California were to offer a bribe to an individual in a foreign private sector, the Travel Act 
1961 would make that an offence because bribery is a criminal offence in California. 
 
This workaround is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, it means that the mischief proscribed 
by the Travel Act 1961 is not the bribe. Rather, it is the international travel, telephone call, or 
wire transfer involved in completing the bribe. Second, the Travel Act 1961 only applies when 
there is a statute prohibiting corruption in a given state. Unfortunately, private sector bribery 
is not an offence in every state of the USA232 (neither is it an offence at federal level). The 
coverage of the Travel Act 1961 is therefore patchy at best. 
 
As for domestic private sector bribery, such conduct may be prosecuted under state law 
(assuming that the state in question proscribes such conduct) or at federal level using the 
Travel Act 1961. Whilst it is beyond the scope of this thesis to embark upon a comprehensive 
study of US state law, our analysis would be incomplete without some consideration of private 
sector bribery at state level. Let us therefore present a short working summary of a 
commercial bribery statute from the state of California. 
 
CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE § 641.3 
 
In the state of California, bribery in the private sector is criminalised by section 641.3 of the 
California Penal Code. This creates two separate offences depending on who is being charged. 
The first states that a person (P) is guilty of bribery if he: 
 
(1) corruptly gives or offers to an employee (R) who is not his own, 
 
(2) anything of value (other than in trust for R’s employer), 
 
 
232 General commercial bribery is a criminal offence in 34 of the 50 states of the USA; Thomas F. Mcinerney, ‘The 
Regulation of Bribery in the United States’ (2002) 73 (1) International Review of Penal Law 81, 104. 
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(3) without the consent of R’s employer, and 
 
(4) in return for R using his position for the benefit of P. 
 
Similarly, an employee (R) is guilty of bribery if he: 
 
(1) corruptly solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept from a person (P) who is not his 
employer, 
 
(2) anything of value (other than in trust for his employer), 
 
(3) without the consent of his employer, and 
 
(4) in return for using his position for the benefit of P. 
 
There are a number of points to note about section 641.3. First, the offences in section 641.3 
are based on the fiduciary duty which exists between an employer and an employee. This 
imposes a duty on the latter to act in the best interests of the former. Second, the term 
“corruptly” is defined so as to mean that the person charged (P or R) must have intended to 
injure or defraud either his own employer, the employer of the person to whom the thing of 
value is given or from whom the thing of value is received, or any competitor of the 
aforementioned employers. Third, unlike federal law, section 641.3 contains a de minimis 
exception which ignores anything which is worth less than $250. This is obviously intended to 
exclude routine corporate hospitality. However, it may cause difficulties in the case of 
intangible benefits which cannot be valued in monetary terms (such as sexual favours). 
Fourth, the fiduciary nature of section 641.3 means that it is possible for an employee to run a 
defence based on consent. That is, so long as the employee acts with the consent of his 
employer when receiving an inducement, he cannot be guilty of receiving a bribe. 
 
 
3. PART THREE: HARM AND WRONGDOING 
 
In this section, we shall set out the third and final part of our analytical framework. That is, an 
account of what we mean by harm and wrongdoing. The analysis in this section relies upon a 
streamlined (and supplemented) version of the harm principle. 
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The harm principle can be traced back to Mill who was concerned with “the nature and limits 
of the power which can legitimately be exercised by society over the individual.”233 Mill 
asserted that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member 
of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”234 The harm principle 
is not without its critics.235 
 
But the harm principle also has its fair share of admirers. The most detailed and compelling 
defence of the harm principle was furnished by Feinberg. In examining the harm principle, 
Feinberg adopted a narrower position than Mill by limiting his project to the criminal law.236 
He offers a sophisticated and refined account which states that: 
 
It is always a good reason in support of penal legislation that it would probably be 
effective in preventing ... harm to persons other than the actor (the one prohibited 
from acting) and there is probably no other means that is equally effective at no 
greater cost to other values.237 
 
Feinberg argues that it is always a good reason in support of criminal legislation that it 
prevents harm to persons other than the wrongdoer. It is important to labour this point 
because Feinberg does not argue (as Mill did) that the prevention of harm to others is the only 
basis for criminalisation. Rather, Feinberg recognises that there are many other social reasons, 
or liberty-limiting principles as he calls them, that a state may appeal to in order to justify 
criminalisation of a particular activity. For example, the prevention of hurt or offence (as 
opposed to injury or harm) to others (the offence principle), the prevention of harm to the 
person who is prohibited from acting (legal paternalism), and the prevention of inherently 
 
233 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Writings (Cambridge University Press, 1989) 5. 
234 ibid 13. 
235 For example, Harcourt criticises the harm principle on the basis that it is silent on how to weigh, balance, and 
judge harms; Bernard E. Harcourt, ‘The Collapse of the Harm Principle’ (1999) 90 (1) Journal of Criminal Law 
and Criminology 109. By contrast, Ripstein calls for the abandonment of the harm principle altogether on the 
basis that it is unable account for harmless wrongdoing; Arthur Ripstein, ‘Beyond the Harm Principle’ (2006) 34 
(3) Philosophy and Public Affairs 215. 
236 Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others (The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, 1984) 3. 
237 ibid 26. 
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immoral conduct whether or not such conduct is harmful or offensive to anyone (legal 
moralism).238 
 
According to Feinberg, there are two senses of the word “harm”. The first is a non-normative 
sense which is used to describe a setback to interests. The second is a normative sense which 
describes conduct which is wrong (i.e. indefensible conduct which violates a person’s 
rights).239 Feinberg argues that a person is harmed in the appropriate sense when these two 
senses of the word harm coincide. In other words, a person is harmed in the appropriate sense 
when (1) his interests are (2) wrongfully (3) set back. Let us consider these three elements in 
more detail. 
 
INTERESTS 
 
A person has an interest in something if he has a stake in its well-being. That is, he stands to 
gain or lose depending on the nature or condition of that something.240 Put simply, a person’s 
interests comprise the things that make his life go well.241 Feinberg distinguishes between two 
types of interests: private interests and public interests. 
 
Private interests 
 
Private interests are those things in which a person has an exclusive stake. In simple terms, 
they are things that concern an individual directly. There are two types of private interests: 
welfare interests and ulterior interests. 
 
Welfare interests 
 
Welfare interests are the most important interests that a person has. They include such things 
as an interest in one’s own life, physical health, a tolerable social and physical environment, 
 
238 Joel Feinberg, Offense to Others (The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, 1985) ix-
xiv. 
239 Joel Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing (The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, 1990) 
xxvii-xxix. 
240 Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others (The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, 1984) 33-34. 
241 A. P. Simester and G. R. Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine (3rd edn, Hart Publishing, 2007) 584. 
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etc. These are basic interests that are shared by nearly all individuals. They are generalised 
means to the realisation and achievement of more ultimate goals (ulterior interests) in life. 
Welfare interests are so important that they simultaneously give rise to moral rights. When 
welfare interests are set back, a person is very seriously harmed because his more ultimate 
aspirations are defeated too. By contrast setbacks to ulterior interests alone do not inflict the 
same degree of damage to the whole network of a person’s interests.242 
 
Ulterior interests 
 
Ulterior interests are a person’s ultimate goals and aspirations in life. For example, to write a 
good novel, secure a well-paid job, to be wealthy, etc.243 Most ulterior interests are only 
indirectly invadable. The usual way of setting back a person’s ulterior interests is by invading a 
welfare interest whose maintenance at a minimal level is a necessary condition for the 
advancement of ulterior interests.244 For example, if a person’s physical health is impaired (a 
welfare interest) then it is likely that a large proportion of his ulterior interests will also be set 
back. 
 
Public interests 
 
By contrast, public interests are interests of a widely shared character. They are things in 
which a person has an interest by virtue of his membership of society. There are two types of 
public interests: community interests and governmental interests. 
 
Community interests 
 
These are specific interests of the same kind which are possessed by most, if not all people. 
The interests in this category do not necessarily belong to everyone, but they could belong to 
anyone, without further specification. Setbacks to community interests result in direct harm 
to individual members of the community. For example, we all have a shared interest in public 
 
242 Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others (The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, 1984) 37. 
243 ibid 37. 
244 ibid 112. 
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peace, security from foreign enemies, a sound economy, etc. If one of these interests were set 
back, we would all be personally affected. 
 
Governmental interests 
 
By contrast, governmental interests are generated by the activities of governing. They are 
common interests shared by all or most people in precisely the same thing. For example, the 
promotion of economic prosperity, the collection of taxes, the proper functioning of the 
courts, etc. The difference is that setbacks to governmental interests result in indirect harm to 
individual members of the community. For example, tax evasion harms members of society in 
a remote sense in that it deprives the government of revenue which would otherwise be 
available for public expenditure. But if such conduct were allowed to spread it could threaten 
direct harm by endangering the proper functioning of government in whose efficient 
functioning we all have a stake.245 
 
Exceptions 
 
A person may have an interest in all manner of things. However, the harm principle rejects (as 
valid) cruel, sadistic, wicked, sick, and morbid interests. According to Feinberg, these interests 
are morally disreputable and no-one has a moral right to their protection.246 In this context, a 
moral right is a claim backed by valid reasons and addressed to the conscience of other 
individuals or to public opinion. Feinberg’s argument is that no-one has a valid claim backed 
by valid reasons for the protection of such interests. 
 
WRONGS 
 
As mentioned, it is not enough for an interest to be set back. The harm principle states that a 
person’s interests must be wrongfully set back. It is this act of setting back an interest (e.g. 
thwarting, impairing, defeating an interest, etc.) which makes an act wrongful. However, 
Feinberg qualifies this by excluding cruel, sadistic, wicked, sick, and morbid interests on the 
basis that these are morally disreputable, and no-one has a moral right to the protection of 
 
245 ibid 63-64 and 221-225. 
246 ibid 111-112. 
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such interests. Thus, we can see that Feinberg makes a connection between interests and 
moral rights. According to Feinberg, morally disreputable interests aside, a person has a valid 
moral claim (a claim is a type of right) against others for their respect and non-interference 
with his interests. In short, Feinberg argues that one person “wrongs” another when his 
indefensible (unjustifiable and inexcusable) conduct violates the other’s interests (i.e. those 
interests which he has a moral right to claim).247 Of course, it will frequently be the case that a 
moral right is also protected by law; thereby simultaneously giving rise to a legal right.248 
Unfortunately, Feinberg does not offer a theory of rights (either as to form or function). This 
omission is rectified later in this section. 
 
Two points arise from this formulation. First, Feinberg is careful not to define a “wrong” 
simply as the violation of a legal right. He recognises that this would lead his project into 
circularity or, as he calls it, the “mistaken premise”. The mistaken premise states that: 
 
(1) we cannot know which harms may be criminalised until we know which harms are 
wrongs, 
 
(2) we cannot know which harms are wrongs until we know which harms people have 
a legal right not to have inflicted upon them (the mistaken premise), 
 
(3) but we cannot know which harms people have a legal right not to have inflicted 
upon them until we know which harms they can claim protection for from the 
state.249 
 
This completes the circle and leads to the conclusion that we cannot know which harms are 
wrongs until we know which harms are wrongs. However, as we have seen, Feinberg resolves 
this difficulty by stipulating that a wrong is the indefensible (unjustifiable and inexcusable) 
violation of another’s interests. By this he means those interests which form the basis of a valid 
moral claim against others for their respect and non-interference. As we have noted, it will 
 
247 ibid 34 and 105. 
248 ibid 110-112. 
249 ibid 110-111. 
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frequently be the case that a moral right will also be protected by law; thereby simultaneously 
giving rise to a legal right. 
 
Second, although Feinberg does not make it clear, it is important to remember that interests 
and rights are distinct concepts. For example, let us imagine that X is a businessman who runs 
a shop. His business premises are situated in a location where there are a number of 
competitors. However, although X may have an interest in the absence or reduction of 
competition, he has no moral right to this. 
 
It is convenient to pause at this stage in order to provide some examples of the types of 
interests which may be relevant to our analysis of wrongdoing in chapter IV. To this end, it is 
submitted that any indefensible (i.e. unjustifiable and inexcusable) violation of a welfare 
interest will constitute a wrong. The reason for this is that welfare interests are the most 
important interests that a person has. They are generalised means to the realisation and 
achievement of more ultimate goals in life. When welfare interests are indefensibly set back, a 
person is very seriously harmed because his more ultimate aspirations are defeated too. 
Feinberg tells us that welfare interests are so important that they simultaneously give rise to 
moral claims against others for their respect and non-interference. Most welfare interests are 
also legal rights e.g. the right to liberty is both a moral and a legal right. 
 
Some of the more common welfare interests include an interest in one’s liberty, in one’s 
family life, an interest in a fair trial, and financial interests. It is submitted that an indefensible 
setback to any of these interests constitutes a wrong. Another important welfare interest is the 
right to equal treatment. This is particularly relevant in the discourse relating to corruption 
because it helps explains why corruption is objectionable in the commercial world. Recall 
Turow’s argument that equality demands that there should be a level playing field, and that 
everyone should be afforded the same opportunities. That is, the right to access goods, 
services and opportunities on equal terms with other competitors. Corruption undermines 
this principle, and thereby sets back the rights of innocent actors by securing for the bribe 
payer an unfair advantage. 
 
This principle holds true even where two or more competitors have engaged in corruption but 
only one has succeeded in securing an advantage. For example, let us suppose that two 
competitors, X and Y, have both offered bribes to Z in order to secure a contract. Let us 
suppose that X is successful. In this scenario, it is submitted that X has set back Y’s interests. 
 98 
By this, we mean Y’s legitimate interests rather than illegitimate interests (i.e. in successfully 
bribing Z). The fact that Y was also engaged in corruption does not alter the fact that Y’s 
legitimate interests (as opposed illegitimate interests) were set back. Y would, of course, be 
guilty of attempting to bribe Z. But this is a separate offence. 
 
It is possible to provide a rough sketch of some of the wrongs which will be central to our 
discussion of wrongdoing in chapter IV. In the main, these tend to fall into one or both of two 
groups. The first group consists of cases where an agent owes a moral or legal duty to a 
principal. In these cases, it is submitted that the agent has a duty to act with integrity and not 
to bring his principal into disrepute. When the agent solicits or accepts a bribe, he acts in bad 
faith, partially, or in breach of trust (i.e. improperly for the purposes of the 2010 Act), and 
thereby morally wrongs his principal.  
 
The second group consists of cases where a person (P) owes a moral duty to third parties to 
act in good faith, impartially, or in accordance with a position of trust. In other words, P is 
under a moral duty to treat these third parties equally. When P solicits or accepts a bribe, he 
breaches this duty and acts improperly for the purposes of the 2010 Act. That is, because he 
has created an uneven playing field by giving the bribe payer preferential treatment. This 
wrongs the innocent third parties because it breaches their moral right to be treated on equal 
terms i.e. to be afforded the right to access goods, services and opportunities on equal terms 
with other competitors. 
 
However, we must be careful not to be over-categorical as there may be other moral wrongs 
involved. For example, recall the case of Munir Patel from chapter I. The imposition of 
penalty points was a relevant matter for the insurance companies because bad drivers pose a 
higher risk than good ones. As a result of Patel’s misconduct, the insurance companies carried 
risks at an inappropriate cost by insuring bad drivers as if they were good ones. 
 
But the wrong to the insurance companies does not fall into the two groups which we have 
identified. They were not Patel’s principals, and this was not a case where there was a denial of 
a right to equal treatment. Rather, it is submitted that the insurance companies were morally 
wronged because they had a direct financial interest in the integrity of the administration of 
the criminal justice system. This reliance generated a moral right that public officials working 
in the system (such as Patel) would act with integrity. Patel violated this by accepting a bribe. 
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Exceptions 
 
We must note two exceptions. First, conduct is not indefensible (i.e. wrong) if the wrongdoer 
is justified or has an excuse. So for instance, a police officer acting in the course of his duty is 
justified in detaining a suspect (who it subsequently transpires is innocent) even though this 
sets back the suspect’s welfare interest in liberty. Second, it is impossible for a person to 
consent to being wronged. To do so would be to consent to being treated contrary to one’s 
wishes, which is a contradiction in terms.250 
 
SETBACKS 
 
The final part of the harm principle states that a person’s interests must also be set back. The 
test for establishing whether an interest has been set back is whether that interest is in a worse 
condition than it would otherwise have been had the invasion not occurred at all.251 A person’s 
interests are set back when the invader of a personal interest: 
 
(1) modifies an interest directly so that it comes into conflict or competition with another 
interest, or else modifies the circumstances to make scarcer the means of joint 
satisfaction of two or more already competing interests, 
 
(2) diminishes the extent to which prudential interests are protectively diversified, or 
 
(3) directly impairs a welfare interest thereby diminishing the person’s means to advance 
his various ulterior interests.252 
 
Exceptions 
 
Not all setbacks to interests are caught by the harm principle. Some setbacks invade another’s 
interests excusably or justifiably. For example, a judge who sentences an offender to a 
custodial sentence inevitably sets back the offender’s welfare interests. But the judge is 
 
250 ibid 115. 
251 ibid 34. 
252 ibid 41-42. 
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justified in depriving the offender of his liberty because he is acting in accordance with the law. 
This simple example demonstrates that it is possible to set back an interest without falling foul 
of the harm principle. 
 
In addition, consent can also take a setback outside the ambit of the harm principle. A person 
cannot rely on the harm principle for protection in circumstances where he has consented to 
being harmed. This includes harms voluntarily inflicted by the actor upon himself, or the risk 
of which the actor freely assumed, and harms inflicted upon him by the actions of others to 
which he has freely consented.253 
 
Lastly, as we have already noted, there are some interests which a person has no right to have 
respected (cruel, sadistic, wicked, sick, and morbid interests). Such interests are morally 
disreputable and no-one has a moral right to their protection.254 Accordingly, setbacks to such 
interests are excluded by the harm principle. 
 
MEDIATING MAXIMS 
 
The harm principle as set out offers a guide for justifying the imposition of criminal sanctions. 
However, its utility can only be realised by tempering it with a number of mediating maxims. 
First, legislators must look at the risk of a given harm. This is a compound of the probability 
of the harm occurring and the magnitude of the harm (subject to the de minimis principle). 
Second, legislators should balance the risk of the harm against the value of the risk-creating 
conduct before deciding whether to criminalise a given activity on the basis that it causes 
wrongful harm to others.255 
 
WIGMOREAN ANALYSIS 
 
The intricacies of the harm principle are easier to understand when presented in a visual 
format. This allows us to see how the various components of the harm principle interact with 
 
253 ibid 35-36 and 115-117. 
254 ibid 111-112. 
255 ibid 187-193. 
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one another. To this end, it is possible to present the harm principle in the form of a 
simplified Wigmorean chart. 
 
If we turn to the Wigmorean chart on the next page, the white circles represent the necessary 
or essential elements of the harm principle. The grey circles represent exceptions and 
mediating maxims which restrict and temper the application of the harm principle. 
 
We can demonstrate the application of our Wigmorean chart with a short example. We know 
that the harm principle is only concerned with “wrongful harms”. If we look at the top of our 
chart, we can see that a “wrongful harm” consists of a “wrong” and a “harm”. If we carry on 
with the example, we can see that a “wrong” is the “violation” of a “right”. We can break down 
a “violation” into “indefensible” and “culpable conduct”. Our chart tells us that conduct is 
“indefensible” when it is “unjustifiable” and “inexcusable”. However, as we can see from the 
chart, a “violation” will not be indefensible if there is “justification or excuse”. 
 
The usefulness of the Wigmorean chart lies in its ability to present a visual account of all the 
necessary elements of the harm principle. It allows us to see, at a glance, how the various 
elements interact with one another and how the exceptions and mediating maxims fit in. 
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WIGMOREAN CHART OF THE HARM PRINCIPLE
256
 
 
 
256 Based on a simplified version of Wigmore’s chart method; Terence Anderson, David Schum and William Twining, Analysis of Evidence (2nd edn, Cambridge 
University Press, 2005) 123-144. 
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PRIMARY, INDIRECT, AND REMOTE HARMS 
 
We mentioned at the outset of this chapter that the harm principle suffers from two 
weaknesses. The first of these, which we shall attend to now, is its inability to distinguish 
between the different types of harm which may arise from a given activity. 
 
Primary and indirect harms 
 
Let us begin with an uncontroversial example. Criminal damage is harmful because it results 
in unlawful physical damage to another’s property. However, this is not the only harm to 
result from such conduct. It is easy to imagine harm in other dimensions. For example, 
criminal damage may also cause immediate inconvenience if the property is rendered 
unusable by the damage. It may also cause financial hardship insofar the property has to be 
repaired or replaced. Thus, we can see that criminal damage may simultaneously give rise to a 
number of different harms. 
 
The harm principle does not tell us how to differentiate between these different harms. It does 
not tell us whether we ought to take some or all of these harms into consideration for the 
purposes of criminalisation. This omission has the potential to dilute the effectiveness of the 
harm principle. 
 
Von Hirsch and Jareborg recognise that an activity may result in harm to different 
dimensions.257 They refer to the immediate harm which flows from an activity as the “primary 
harm”. They refer to all other harms as “indirect harms” and regard such harms as features 
which aggravate the primary harm. So if we recall our example of criminal damage, the 
primary harm would be the physical damage to property (i.e. a setback to proprietary 
interests). By contrast, the indirect harm would be the other harms which we identified such 
as the financial hardship incurred in repairing or replacing the property. There is no 
mechanical procedure for distinguishing between primary and indirect harms. It is, to a large 
extent, a matter of judgement. 
 
 
257 Andrew von Hirsch and Nils Jareborg, ‘Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living-Standard Analysis’ (1991) 11 (1) 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1, 31-32. 
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Let us adopt this distinction between primary and indirect harms. In the remainder of this 
thesis, the phrase “primary harm” will be used as a shorthand to refer to the immediate harm 
which flows from an activity. The phrase “indirect harm” will be used to describe the other 
harms which occur either with or as a direct result of the primary harm. 
 
Before proceeding any further, it is important to clarify two matters. First, the label “primary 
harm” is not a synonym for the most serious harm which results from corruption. The most 
serious harm which results may be any one of the three types of harm which we have 
identified: primary, indirect, and remote. 
 
So for example, let us suppose that a judge has accepted a bribe from a claimant to find in his 
favour. In this example, we might argue that the primary harm was to the interests of the 
defendant whose right to a fair trial was set back. Equally, we might be able to identify indirect 
harms to the defendant such as a setback to his financial interests (if he has paid damages – 
especially if he was not liable), or the time and expense incurred in appealing (or judicially 
reviewing) the judge’s decision. But the most serious harm in this example is arguably the 
remote harm to the public interest. That is, a setback to the public’s interest in the fair and 
proper administration of justice. 
 
Second, it is important to say something about the relationship between primary and indirect 
harms and Feinberg’s welfare and ulterior interests. Whilst primary harms will usually consist 
of a setback to welfare interests (e.g. a setback to financial interests), they are not limited in 
this way, and may also include setbacks to ulterior interests (e.g. being unfairly deprived of the 
offer of a place at university). By contrast, indirect harms may consist of a setback to any of 
Feinberg’s interests: welfare interests, ulterior interests, community interests, and 
governmental interests. 
 
We can better demonstrate this by recalling our example of criminal damage. It will be 
recalled that the primary harm was the unlawful physical damage to property (a welfare 
interest). However, the indirect harm consisted of both inconvenience and financial hardship. 
Whilst an interest in one’s financial wellbeing is a welfare interest, it is artificial to describe the 
avoidance of inconvenience as an ulterior interest. Thus, we can see that primary and indirect 
harms are not synonyms for welfare and ulterior interests. 
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It is also worth reiterating that that there is no mechanical procedure for identifying primary, 
indirect, and remote harms. This does not undermine our thesis as Feinberg himself was 
unable to articulate a mechanical procedure for identifying and distinguishing welfare, 
ulterior, community, and governmental interests. 
 
As we can see from this short discussion, the nexus between primary and indirect harms is 
that they both constitute a direct setback to individual interests. It is important to stress this 
connection because it is what distinguishes primary and indirect harms from remote harms 
which affect only public interests. Let us consider remote harms in further detail. 
 
Remote harms 
 
In a subsequent article, von Hirsch argues that the usefulness of the harm principle may be 
blunted if it is not limited to primary harms.258 Von Hirsch’s concern was with “remote 
harms”. That is, conduct which is remote in the sense that it depends on certain contingencies. 
For example, the possession of a gun is, by itself, a harmless activity. However, if the gun is 
mishandled, it may result in injury or death to others (thereby activating the operation of the 
harm principle). 
 
The harm principle recognises the existence of remote harms. Recall that one of the mediating 
maxims which governs the operation of the harm principle is the risk of a given harm. This is 
a compound of the probability of the harm occurring and the magnitude of the harm (subject 
to the de minimis principle). Feinberg tells us to balance the risk of the harm occurring 
against the value of the risk-creating conduct before deciding whether to criminalise the said 
conduct on the basis that it causes wrongful harm to others. 
 
Von Hirsch develops the idea of remote harms and identifies three different types of 
contingencies: 
 
(1) Abstract endangerment (e.g. driving whilst intoxicated may present a danger to 
other road users and pedestrians). 
 
258 Andrew von Hirsch, ‘Extending the Harm Principle: 'Remote' Harms and Fair Imputation’ in AP Simister and 
ATH Smith (eds), Harm and Culpability (Clarendon Press, 1996) 259-265. 
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(2) Intervening choices (e.g. gun possession may result in death or injury if the 
weapon is handled or used in a certain way). 
 
(3) Accumulative harms (e.g. conduct which only results in harm when combined 
with the similar acts of others). 
 
We can demonstrate von Hirsch’s argument more clearly by reference to a simple nursery 
rhyme: 
 
 For want of a nail, the shoe was lost 
 For want of a shoe, the horse was lost 
 For want of a horse, the rider was lost 
 For want of a rider, the battle was lost 
 For want of a battle, the kingdom was lost 
 And all for the want of a horseshoe nail 
 
Let us assume that the farrier who shod the horse intentionally used two nails instead of the 
usual six. That being so, it is arguable that his misconduct lead to the loss of the kingdom. Von 
Hirsch’s point is that we would not seriously argue that that the farrier’s conduct should be 
criminalised on the basis of the remote consequences outlined in the nursery rhyme. To do so 
would be to distort the usefulness of the harm principle. We can derive support for this view 
from the rules of remoteness in civil law. If a wrongdoer were responsible ad infinitum for all 
the consequences of his actions (however remote in time or indirect the causation), all human 
activity would be unreasonably hampered. The law must draw a line somewhere, simply for 
practical reasons.259 
 
We cannot deny the strength of these arguments. If the harm principle were extended to cover 
remote harms its utility would be blunted and the possibilities for criminalisation would be 
endless.260 Von Hirsch argues that the operation of the harm principle should be restricted to 
primary harms. He tells us to disregard remote harms when considering whether to 
criminalise a given activity. 
 
259 W. V. H. Rogers, Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (16th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2002) 223. 
260 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th edn, Oxford University Press, 2006) 41-42. 
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Since our project is not concerned with the justification for criminalising corruption, we need 
not dwell on the merits of von Hirsch’s arguments. However, let us borrow from von Hirsch 
the idea of remote harms. In the remainder of this thesis, the phrase “remote harm” will be 
used as a shorthand to describe harms which may occur if corruption were to become 
endemic. 
 
ANALYSIS OF RIGHTS 
 
The second weakness in Feinberg’s version of the harm principle is the lack of a detailed 
account of the form and function of rights (Feinberg does, in fairness, touch upon these 
issues). According to the harm principle, one person wrongs another when his indefensible 
conduct (unjustifiable and inexcusable) violates the other’s rights (legal or moral). 261 
Notwithstanding this, the harm principle does not provide us with a complete account of what 
rights are and what they do for those who hold them. In this section, we shall rectify this 
weakness. After all, we cannot analyse the wrongdoing in corruption unless we have a 
complete idea of what it means to be wronged. 
 
By recognising that a person may be harmed when their interests are wrongfully set back, the 
harm principle implicitly acknowledges that such conduct constitutes an invasion of a 
person’s autonomy. Ashworth argues that wrongfulness is an important concept which needs 
to be analysed in terms of the interests of others and conceptions of their personhood and 
autonomy.262 The role of rights in moral philosophy is primarily to justify action and restraints 
upon action rather than to describe states of affairs. Thus, the idea that has come to be 
centrally important to rights in moral arguments is that of being entitled. Rights are not only 
things which we can assert and demand, they are also something which we must be morally 
accorded. In short, to assert a right is to say that we are entitled to that right and that others 
are morally obliged to act in ways which are consistent with that right. When we are denied 
our rights, we are victims of an injustice. 
 
 
261 Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others (The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, 1984) 34. 
262 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (5th edn, Oxford University Press, 2006) 31. 
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It is in this way that rights are closely associated with the concept of autonomy.263 The clearest 
way to give moral standing to human beings, to respect them as persons, is to accord them 
rights.264 When others interfere with our rights, they interfere with our ability to make self-
regarding decisions (even if those decisions are ill-considered or substantively unwise). 
 
Unfortunately, Feinberg does not develop these ideas in any detail although he does make it 
clear that the harm principle’s reliance upon moral rights does not mean that it is committed 
to a natural law theory of rights.265 Let us address this weakness by furnishing an account of 
both the form and function266 of rights. By form we mean a description of the internal 
structure of rights. By function we mean an explanation of what rights do for those who hold 
them.267 
 
Our understanding of both these concepts is remarkably fragile and we fall into trouble when 
we try to say what legal rights and duties are.268 According to Dworkin, in most cases, when we 
say that someone has a right to do something, we imply that it would be wrong to interfere 
 
263 Autonomy consists of an external and an internal dimension. The former refers to the fact that individuals 
require space in which to shape their lives as they choose. The latter recognises that individuals are capable of 
making their own choices and decisions; Richard H. Fallon Jr, ‘Two Senses of Autonomy’ (1994) 46 (4) Stanford 
Law Review 875. 
264 Peter Jones, Rights (Palgrave, 1994) 48-50 and 120-142. 
265 Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others (The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, 1984) 111. 
266 The function of rights has given rise to a long-running debate between two competing theories: the will (or 
choice) theory and the interest (or benefit) theory. This is not a debate that we can hope to explore in any 
meaningful way within the confines of this thesis. The will theory argues that a right confers on a right-holder a 
choice as to whether or not to do something. It accentuates freedom and self-fulfilment; Hart; H. L. A. Hart, ‘Are 
There Any Natural Rights?’ (1955) 64 (2) Philosophical Review 175. By contrast, the interest theory states that 
the function of a right is to protect, not a right-holder’s choices, but certain of his interests; Neil MacCormick, 
‘Rights, Claims and Remedies’ (1982) 1 (2) Law and Philosophy 337; Joseph Raz, ‘On the Nature of Rights’ 
(1984) 93 Mind 194; Joseph Raz, ‘Legal Rights’ (1984) 4 (1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1. The interest theory 
is generally regarded as the superior account of what having a right entails. Although these theories are not 
necessarily opposed, the longstanding debate as to which account is correct remains one of the major unresolved 
issues in legal philosophy; Raymond Wacks, Philosophy of Law (Oxford University Press, 2006) 52-74; Michael 
Freeman, Lloyd's Introduction to Jurisprudence (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2008) 394-396. 
267  Leif Wenar, ‘Rights’ in Edward N Zalta (ed), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 edn) 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/rights/> accessed 21 November 2010. 
268 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, 2004) 14. 
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with their exercise of that right, or at least that some special grounds are needed to justify any 
interference.269 As we have seen, corruption sets back the interests of innocent actors. At the 
very least, those who engage in corrupt conduct bear a burden of justification for what they 
do.270 
 
The form of rights: Hohfeld’s analytical scheme 
 
It is generally accepted that the starting-point for any discussion about the form of rights is 
Hohfeld’s analytical scheme.271 There are many types of “rights” and the concept is often used 
ambiguously.272 Hohfeld sought to introduce some clarity and precision to rights-talk by 
reducing legal rights to their lowest common denominator.273 
 
Although Hohfeld was concerned with legal rights, his analysis is equally applicable to 
discussions about moral rights.274 His analytical scheme is a useful tool for demonstrating the 
different ways in which the term “right" can be used and its interplay with other important 
concepts. In this section, we shall furnish a refined account of Hohfeld’s analytical scheme. In 
particular, we shall adopt the refinements suggested by Wenar275 (although these are not 
accepted by all).276 
 
 
269 ibid 188-189. 
270 Michael S. Pritchard, ‘Bribery: the Concept’ (1998) 4 (3) Science and Engineering Ethics 281, 281. 
271 Michael Freeman, Lloyd's Introduction to Jurisprudence (8th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2008) 398. 
272 ibid 396. 
273 Wesley Hohfeld, ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’ (1913) 23 (1) Yale 
Law Journal 16; Wesley Hohfeld, ‘Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’ (1917) 26 
(8) Yale Law Journal 710; Wesley Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning 
(Yale University Press, 1919). 
274 Matthew H. Kramer, ‘Rights Without Trimmings’ in Matthew H Kramer, N E Simmonds and Hillel Steiner 
(eds), A Debate Over Rights: Philosophical Enquiries (Clarendon Press, 1998) 8; James G. S. Wilson, ‘Rights’ in 
R. E. Ashcroft and others (eds), Principles of Health Care Ethics (2nd edn, John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2007) 239. 
275 Leif Wenar, ‘The Nature of Rights’ (2005) 33 (3) Philosophy & Public Affairs 223. 
276 For example, Kramer and Steiner argue that Wenar’s refinements oversimplify the involutions of Hohfeldian 
relations. Their main concern, however, is with a different aspect of Wenar’s work. That is, to deny Wenar’s 
claim that his refined account (or several-functions theory) represents a middle ground in the longstanding 
debate between the will and the interest theory; Matthew H. Kramer and Hillel Steiner, ‘Theories of Rights: Is 
There a Third Way?’ (2007) 27 (2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 281. 
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According to Hohfeld, the word “right” has four different meanings. In other words, it can be 
used to describe at least four types of legal relations: (1) claims, (2) liberties,277 (3) powers, and 
(4) immunities. Each of these rights (or Hohfeldian incidents) is said to have an opposite and 
a correlative. The scheme is best presented in the form of a simple chart: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Claims 
 
A claim-right implies two things. First, that the claim-holder has a right against other 
individuals (duty-holders). Second, that the duty-holder owes a corresponding duty278 to the 
claim-holder to do something (positive) or refrain from doing something (negative). Claim-
rights are rights in the strict sense. So for example, let us assume that X lends money to Y. In 
this example, X has a right to be repaid. Moreover, X’s right imposes a corresponding duty on 
Y to repay X.  
 
 
277 Hohfeld uses the term “privilege” but most scholars prefer the term “liberty”; Glanville Williams, ‘The 
Concept of Legal Liberty’ (1956) 56S (8) Columbia Law Review 1129. 
278 This is sometimes known as the doctrine of logical correlativity; Joel Feinberg, ‘Duties, Rights, and Claims’ 
(1966) 3 (2) American Philosophical Quarterly 137; Joel Feinberg, ‘The Nature and Value of Rights’ (1970) 4 The 
Journal of Value Inquiry 243. 
OPPOSITE CORRELATIVERIGHT OPPOSITE/CORRELATIVE
IMMUNITY
DISABILITY
POWER
LIABLITY
LIBERTY
NO-RIGHT
CLAIM
DUTY
KEY:
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Wenar argues that claim-rights can have three different functions. They may entitle the right-
holder to protection against harm or paternalism, to provision in the case of need, or to insist 
upon the specific performance of some agreed-upon action.279 
 
Liberties 
 
A liberty-right is a right to do or not to do something (or both). In other words, there is no 
duty on the right-holder to the contrary. Liberty-rights vest only in the right-holder and do 
not impose a corresponding obligation on anyone else. To use Hart’s well-known example, a 
man has a right to look over the garden fence at his neighbour in that he is under no duty not 
to do that. However, that does not mean that the man’s neighbour is under a correlative duty 
to allow herself to be looked at or not interfere with the man’s exercise of his liberty. The 
neighbour is at liberty to erect a screen on her side of the fence to obstruct the man’s gaze if 
she so chooses.280 
 
Sometimes, a liberty-right may confer a single liberty on the right-holder in the form of an 
exemption from a general duty. So for example, James Bond’s licence to kill grants him a 
single liberty in that it exempts him from a general duty not to kill.281 
 
However, a liberty-right may also be paired. That is, the right-holder may simultaneously have 
a right to both do or not do something. So for example, a chess player has the right to either 
capture or not capture his opponent’s pawn en passant.282 This is a paired liberty-right in that 
the player has a right to capture en passant (because there is no duty on him not to capture) 
and a right not to capture en passant (because there is no duty requiring him to capture). In 
other words, the player has a discretion whether to capture his opponent’s pawn. The function 
 
279 Leif Wenar, ‘The Nature of Rights’ (2005) 33 (3) Philosophy & Public Affairs 223, 229-230. 
280 H. L. A. Hart, Essays on Bentham (Clarendon Press, 1982) 166-167. 
281 Leif Wenar, ‘The Nature of Rights’ (2005) 33 (3) Philosophy & Public Affairs 223, 226. 
282 A pawn attacking a square crossed by an opponent’s pawn, which has advanced two squares in one move from 
its original square, may capture the opponent’s pawn as though the latter had moved only one square; World 
Chess Federation, ‘FIDE Laws of Chess’ (adopted at the 79th FIDE Congress between 23-25 November 2008, 
entered into force 1 July 2009) <http://www.fide.com/component/handbook/?id=124&view=article> accessed 29 
December 2010. 
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of a right that is a paired privilege is to endow the liberty-right holder with a discretion over 
some action.283 
 
Powers 
 
A power-right allows the right-holder to alter his claim-rights and liberty-rights (or those of 
others). More specifically, a power-right is the ability within a set of rules to change a legal 
relation. So for example, a judge has the power-right to pass a sentence of immediate 
imprisonment and so deprive a convicted defendant of his claim-right to liberty. 
 
Power-rights are often qualified and do not apply equally to all citizens.284 So to continue with 
our example, a layman is unable to pass a valid sentence of imprisonment because he is not 
legally qualified and has not been appointed to the bench. 
 
There are two types of authority which may be conferred by a power-right. A single power-
right confers on the right-holder a non-discretionary authority. So for example, in certain 
cases, a judge may be required to pass an immediate custodial sentence. In such cases, the 
judge has no discretion not to pass an immediate custodial sentence. By contrast, a paired 
power-right confers on the right-holder discretionary authority.285 If we remain with our 
example, a judge may have a power-right to pass either an immediate custodial sentence or 
some other sentence (such as a suspended sentence of imprisonment). 
 
Immunities 
 
A right-holder has an immunity-right whenever another person lacks the ability within a set 
of rules to change the right-holder’s legal relations. That is, to alter the right-holder’s claim-
rights and liberty-rights. In simple terms, immunity-rights entitle their holders to protection 
against harm or paternalism.286 So for example, a defendant who is convicted of a summary 
 
283 Leif Wenar, ‘The Nature of Rights’ (2005) 33 (3) Philosophy & Public Affairs 223, 227. 
284 Peter Jones, Rights (Palgrave, 1994) 22-24. 
285 Leif Wenar, ‘The Nature of Rights’ (2005) 33 (3) Philosophy & Public Affairs 223, 230-237. 
286 ibid 230-237. 
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offence punishable by a fine only, has an immunity-right against being sentenced to an 
immediate custodial sentence. 
 
*   *   * 
 
As we can see from this outline, rights (i.e. claims, liberties, powers, and immunities) may be 
found in isolation, with other incidents, or all together. Any assertion of a right can be 
translated into an assertion about a single Hohfeldian incident, or into an assertion about a 
complex of incidents, or into a set of alternative assertions about such incidents. 
 
But what do these rights mean to those who hold them? This is a question about the function 
of rights. Let us turn to this now. 
 
The function of rights: MacCormick’s theory 
 
The function of rights has given rise to a long-running debate between two competing 
theories: the will (or choice) theory and the interest (or benefit) theory. The former argues 
that a right confers on a right-holder a choice as to whether or not to do something. It 
accentuates freedom and self-fulfilment. The latter argues that the function of a right is to 
protect, not a right-holder’s choices, but certain of his interests. Which theory is correct 
remains one of the major unresolved debates in legal philosophy. 
 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to embark upon a deep philosophical study of these 
theories. Neither is it necessary for us to resolve this debate (if that were even possible) in 
order to furnish an account of the function of rights. This thesis will rely upon the interest 
theory for an account of the function of rights. In particular, we shall rely upon the ideas of 
the prominent interest theorist, MacCormick. It is neither necessary nor possible, within the 
confines of this thesis, to set out a detailed account of MacCormick’s ideas. What follows 
therefore is a summary of his theory. 
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Features common to all types of rights 
 
MacCormick argues that all rights (legal and moral) have a number of features in common.287 
First, he argues that rights can only exist within the confines of a normative order. Second, 
rights can only vest in those individuals (both natural and artificial persons) that are 
recognised by the given normative order. Third, the vesting of rights in an individual is 
dependent upon rules which are universal in tenor (i.e. they apply equally to all who qualify). 
Fourth, having a right relates to something which in normal circumstances is deemed to be 
good for the individual who possesses it. MacCormick’s point is that the possession of a right 
itself is generally a good thing. It is important to make this clear because it does not 
necessarily follow from this that every right which a person possesses is actually good for him. 
For example, an adult individual has the right to purchase and smoke cigarettes even though it 
is a well-known fact (and stated very clearly on every cigarette packet) that smoking is harmful 
to one’s health. Fifth, not everything which is good for an individual is automatically his as of 
right. Only those things which are actually secured to him under some rule of a normative 
order are his by right. 
 
The last point requires a little more elaboration. In simple terms, to say that a person holds a 
particular right is to accept that that right has been secured in some way. So how does a 
person secure a right? MacCormick argues that it can be done in one of four ways.288 First, he 
argues that the most basic concept of any normative order is reasonable clarity about wrongs 
and offences (i.e. the things it is wrong to do or not to do). Thus, if something is not wrong to 
do, then one is normally at liberty to do that something. It is this realm of secured normative 
liberty that gives rise to the very existence of rights (both legal and moral). Second, the fact 
that an individual has a right to do something implies, at least, that doing it is not wrong. In 
such cases, the normative order ensures that the individual’s exercise of his right is recognised 
and respected. Thus, the realm of normative liberty secures for the individual a sphere of 
competence and decision-making within which he is sovereign. Third, most normative orders 
provide legal remedies by which an individual may protect his rights from unjustified 
interference by others. Fourth, the security of an individual’s rights lies in restricting the 
ability of all or most other individuals to change the norms under which such rights are 
 
287 Neil MacCormick, ‘Rights, Claims and Remedies’ (1982) 1 (2) Law and Philosophy 337, 337-338. 
288 ibid 338-346. 
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constituted. Thus, to the extent that a person’s position is immune from change, his rights, 
which are already secured by the first three methods, are even more firmly secured. 
 
The autonomous moral agent 
 
The picture painted so far shows that human beings are autonomous moral agents. By this we 
mean that human beings are able to engage in practical reasoning through their capacity for 
self-command and self-government when dealing with dilemmas and decisions in their 
lives.289 
 
This capacity for self-command and self-government means that a moral agent may choose to 
act in a particular way for a number of different reasons. He may act for self-regarding reasons 
which promote his self-interest. Equally, he may act for other-regarding reasons due to his 
commitment to others. Lastly, he may choose to act for community-regarding reasons (i.e. for 
the common good of the community).290 These three reasons can be woven into the harm 
principle in the following way. We might argue that self-regarding motives are welfare and 
ulterior interests. Similarly, we might say that other-regarding reasons are community 
interests, whilst community-regarding motives are governmental interests under the harm 
principle. 
 
But an autonomous moral agent’s capacity for self-command and self-government is not 
completely unfettered. We know that a moral agent has normative liberty when conduct is not 
wrong in that what to do is at his discretion. In short, all non-wrong options are available. But 
when an act is wrong, it is excluded from deliberation as an available course of action by any 
moral agent committed to the normative order within which it is wrong.291 
 
But as we have seen, this realm of normative liberty can only be secured by restricting the 
ability of other moral agents to change the norms under which such rights are constituted. In 
other words, by restricting the rights of others. 
 
 
289 Neil MacCormick, Practical Reason in Law and Morality (Oxford University Press, 2008) 2. 
290 ibid 16-17. 
291 ibid 49-50. 
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MacCormick argues that the insight that one is oneself autonomous entails recognition of the 
like autonomy of every other person.292 In other words, we must recognise that other people 
have rights also. In this way, moral rights are dual in aspect. That is, they are reciprocal in that 
the wrongness of one person attacking another person entails the equal and similar wrongness 
of the latter attacking the former. We can mesh this idea with Hohfeld’s analytical scheme 
which tells us that rights are corresponding. For example, a claim-right implies that the claim-
holder has a right against other individuals and that those other individuals owe a 
corresponding duty to the claim-holder either to do or not to do something. 
 
The recognition that other people are also autonomous has two consequences. First, it 
amounts to a self-imposed restriction on what we can rightly permit ourselves to do. Second, 
it demarcates a domain of normative liberty where we are free to act as we think best once we 
are satisfied that will not violate any duty or obligation or commit some crime or other form 
of legal wrong. The disapproval of the people with whom we live and work means that we 
have a self-regarding reason to respect the rights of others. This is in addition to legal 
sanctions which provide another self-regarding reason for abiding by the law.293 
 
The acceptance of these two truths implies a commitment to the principles of obedience, 
freedom, and engagement. So far as concerns obedience, these are basic moral duties that we 
must fulfil to each other and that cannot legitimately be neglected or defied. So long as we 
fulfil these basic duties, we have freedom and, as free moral agents, are at liberty to pursue the 
good as we see it. But we also have the ability to limit this freedom in favour of others under 
the principle of engagement. That is, through promises, contracts, and many other kinds of 
voluntary arrangements, we can enter into obligations to others, who may also reciprocally 
obligate themselves in our favour.294 
 
 
 
 
 
 
292 ibid 93-94. 
293 ibid 22-24. 
294 ibid 3. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this chapter was to set out a three-part framework for analysis which would allow 
us to: (1) identify whether a given type of conduct is a core case of corruption (the first part), 
(2) compare core cases of corruption with the law in the USA to ascertain whether there are 
any differences in terms of coverage (the second part), and (3) analyse core cases of 
corruption so as to articulate the harm and wrongdoing which results from such conduct (the 
third part). It is submitted that the three-part framework which we have furnished satisfies all 
of these aims. Let us briefly review the three parts of our analytical framework. 
 
The first part of our framework allows us to identify core cases of corrupt conduct through the 
application of the improper conduct offences in the 2010 Act. By applying these offences to a 
given type of conduct, we will be able to ascertain whether we are in fact dealing with a core 
case of corruption. Our decision to adopt the improper conduct offences is strengthened by 
the fact that the 2010 Act has been very well-received by both academics and non-
governmental anti-corruption organisations alike. 
 
The second part of our analytical framework consists of some carefully selected anti-
corruption statutes from the USA. By applying these to the corrupt conduct identified by the 
first part of our analytical framework, we will be able to determine whether there are any 
major differences in terms of coverage between what is regarded as a core case of corruption 
in England and Wales and what is regarded as a core case of corruption in the USA. 
 
Assuming that there are no major differences in terms of coverage, we can then begin to look 
at the harm and wrongdoing which results from corruption. The third part our analytical 
framework allows us to assess the harm and wrongdoing arising from corrupt conduct by 
using a streamlined and supplemented version of the harm principle. The harm principle 
provides us with the tools to articulate how corruption sets back the rights and interests of 
innocent actors. It allows us state with precision how these innocent actors are harmed (i.e. 
how their interests are set back) and wronged (i.e. how their rights are indefensibly violated). 
 
Let us apply this analytical framework to a range of different case studies and embark upon 
the kind of systematic analysis which is currently missing from the general literature on 
corruption. 
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IV 
CASE STUDIES 
 
In this chapter, we shall apply the three-part analytical framework set out in chapter III to a 
range of different case studies (we shall, so far as possible, rely upon actual rather than 
hypothetical examples). The aim of this chapter is articulate a complete account of the harm 
and wrongdoing in core cases of corruption. The pattern of examination for each case study 
will be as follows. 
 
First, we shall begin by determining whether our case study is a core case of corruption (there 
being no universally agreed list of corrupt conduct). In short, if our case study falls within the 
ambit of one of the improper conduct offences contained in the 2010 Act, it will be treated as 
a core case of corruption (i.e. bribery). This approach will ensure that we focus our attention 
on those case studies which are commonly regarded as being forms of corruption. This does 
not mean that those case studies which are not caught by the 2010 Act are automatically 
deemed not to be forms of corruption. It may be that these case studies are examples of 
corruption in the wider sense. However, as this thesis is concerned with the harm and 
wrongdoing in core cases of corruption, there will be no discussion about whether conduct 
which is not caught by the 2010 Act is or ought to be regarded as a type of corruption (in the 
wider sense). 
 
Having identified that a particular case study is a core case of corruption, the second part of 
our analytical framework will allow us to explore whether the case study is also caught by the 
criminal law of corruption in the USA (at either federal or state level). The purpose of this 
endeavour is to gauge whether there are any major differences in terms of coverage between 
the law in England and Wales and the law in the USA (it goes without saying that there are 
likely to be some minor differences between the two jurisdictions). The aim of this 
comparison is to show that core cases of corruption travel well (i.e. they are transnational in 
nature) and therefore do not vary in any major sense between the two jurisdictions. 
 
The third part of our analytical framework is the application of a supplemented version of the 
harm principle to our case studies. This is the most important part of our analysis because it 
will allow us to undertake the type of systematic examination of the harm and wrongdoing in 
corruption which is currently missing from the general literature. 
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The application of the third part of our analytical framework will demonstrate two important 
points. First, that core cases of corruption typically (though not always) give rise to three 
different types of harm: primary, indirect, and remote. These harms are descriptive (rather 
than definitional) features of core cases of corruption. Second, that there is a nexus between 
such harming and the wrongdoing which results from corruption. Our analysis will focus on 
those innocent actors whose rights and interests are set back by the corrupt acts of others. It is 
worth repeating that it is not our contention that primary harms are the most serious harms 
which flow from acts of corruption. Rather, primary harms are simply the most direct harms 
to result from such conduct. In any given case, the most serious harm could be any of the 
three harms with which we are concerned: primary, indirect, and remote. 
 
It is also worth reiterating that that there is no mechanical procedure for identifying primary, 
indirect, and remote harms. It is, to a large extent, a matter of judgement. This does not 
undermine our thesis as Feinberg himself was unable to articulate a mechanical procedure for 
identifying and distinguishing welfare, ulterior, community, and governmental interests. 
 
 
1. BRIBERY 
 
The paradigm form of corruption is bribery. But bribery can take many different forms. One 
distinction that is often made, both in the literature and in many jurisdictions such as the USA, 
is between bribery in the public sector and bribery in the private sector. The 2010 Act makes 
no such distinction on the basis that the divide between the public and private sector is 
difficult to demarcate and, in any event, there is no compelling reason why any distinction 
needs to be made. Nonetheless, since the literature and the law in the USA make this 
distinction, let us consider some examples from both sectors. 
 
BRIBERY OF A PUBLIC OFFICIAL 
 
Let us begin by examining the paradigm form of bribery: bribery of a public official. Since the 
coming into force of the 2010 Act on 1 July 2011, there has been one successful prosecution 
under the 2010 Act for bribery of a public official. 
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The facts can be stated fairly shortly.295 The defendant, Munir Patel, was employed as an 
Administrative Officer at Redbridge Magistrates’ Court. A member of the public, Jayraj Singh, 
telephoned the court and spoke to Patel in connection with a summons that he had received 
for a road traffic offence. Later that day, Patel returned Singh’s telephone call and offered to 
“get rid of” the summons in return for £500. Singh said that he would think about it but 
instead contacted The Sun newspaper to report the matter. A reporter from The Sun 
newspaper devised a sting operation. As part of the sting, Singh met with Patel and handed 
over £500. The latter was covertly filmed accepting the bribe. Patel explained that he got rid of 
summonses by omitting to enter their details into the court’s computer database.296 Following 
the transaction, the police were furnished with the evidence gathered during the sting. 
 
As a direct result, the police subsequently arrested and charged Patel with one count of 
bribery contrary to section 2 of the 2010 Act and one count of misconduct in a public office 
(for advising members of the public on how to avoid being summonsed to court for road 
traffic offences). In addition, Patel was also charged with seven counts of possession of an 
article for use in fraud (a search of his premises revealed a number of blank invoices from a 
garage which were intended to help members of the public avoid prosecutions for road traffic 
offences). He pleaded guilty to both bribery and misconduct in a public office. The seven 
counts of possession of an article for use in fraud were left to lie on the file (i.e. not to be 
proceeded with without leave of the Crown Court or the Court of Appeal). 
 
Following an adjournment for a pre-sentence report, Patel was sentenced to three years’ 
imprisonment for bribery and six years’ imprisonment for misconduct in a public office to 
run concurrently (the latter was subsequently reduced on appeal to four years’ 
imprisonment).297 In passing sentence, HHJ McCreath made, inter alia, the following remarks: 
 
 
295 Summarised from R v Munir Patel [2012] EWCA Crim 1243. 
296 Owen Bowcott, ‘Magistrates' Court Clerk is First to be Convicted Under Bribery Act’ The Guardian (London, 
14 October 2011) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2011/oct/14/magistrates-court-clerk-bribery-act> accessed 14 
April 2012; Frances Gibb, ‘Clerk of Court is Convicted of Bribery’ The Times (London, 15 October 2011) 
<http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/crime/article3195319.ece> accessed 14 October 2012. 
297 R v Munir Patel [2012] EWCA Crim 1243. 
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Your position as a court clerk had at its heart a duty to uphold and protect the 
integrity of the criminal justice process. What you did was to undermine it in a 
fundamental way. 
 
By doing what you did, you created a danger not only to the integrity of the process 
but also to public confidence in it. The harm you did was not just to the process. It 
extended more widely because by your actions a number of people who should have 
been subject to monitoring and control by way of the imposition of penalty points 
avoided that. The penalty point system has two aspects. The obvious one is that it puts 
bad drivers off the road for a period of time. The other one is that it is a wake-up call 
to many. We all know of motorists whose driving habits are transformed when points 
are added to their licences through fear of the consequences of further offending. 
 
And it should not be forgotten that the imposition of penalty points is a relevant 
matter for insurance companies. Bad drivers pose a higher risk than good ones. One of 
the effects of your offending was that insurers were carrying risks at an inappropriate 
cost, insuring bad drivers as if they were good ones.298 
 
Let us apply our analytical framework to this set of facts. 
 
Part 1: The 2010 Act 
 
The facts of this case will obviously fit the first part of our analytical framework. We know 
that it falls within the ambit of the improper conduct offences because it was successfully 
charged and prosecuted under section 2 of the 2010 Act. We can therefore be brief in our 
analysis. 
 
Recall that Patel was charged with an offence of being bribed contrary to section 2. Our 
working summary tells us that a person is guilty of being bribed if he requests, agrees to 
 
298 Judiciary of England and Wales, ‘R v Munir Patel (Southwark Crown Court): Sentencing Remarks of HHJ 
Alistair McCreath’ (Press Release, 18 November 2011) 
<http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Judgments/munir-patel-sentencing-remarks.pdf> 
accessed 19 November 2011. 
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receive, or accepts an advantage in one of four scenarios. First, with the intention of 
performing a relevant function or activity improperly (case 3). Second, where the request or 
receipt of the advantage itself constitutes an improper performance of a relevant function or 
activity (case 4). Third, as a reward for having improperly performed a relevant function or 
activity (case 5). Fourth, in anticipation of receiving an advantage performs a relevant 
function or activity improperly (case 6). 
 
There is little difficulty in establishing that Patel either requested, agreed to receive, or 
accepted an advantage from Singh. It is clear from the evidence that he not only requested a 
financial advantage of £500 but he also accepted the same. However, in order to satisfy section 
2, we must also satisfy one of cases 3 to 6. In the present case, it is submitted that cases 3 and 4 
are applicable. It is important to remember that there is a fundamental difference between 
cases 3 and 4. Whereas the former requires proof of mens rea (intention), the latter is strict 
liability. Let us consider both. 
 
In order to satisfy case 3, it must be shown that Patel received the advantage with the intention 
of performing a relevant function or activity improperly. In the context of the present example 
this is fairly easy to satisfy. We know that Patel requested and accepted an advantage of £500 
in return for not entering the details of Singh’s summons into the court’s computer database. 
Moreover, given that Patel contacted Singh and instigated the transaction, it is submitted that 
a tribunal of fact would have little hesitation in inferring that Patel’s intention in requesting 
the payment of £500 was to perform a relevant function or activity improperly. 
 
There is also no doubt that Patel was performing a relevant function or activity. It is clear 
from the evidence that he was engaged in a function of a public nature. That is, because he was 
employed as a public official and was responsible for inputting details of summonses into the 
court’s computer database. It is submitted that this imposed on him a duty to act in good 
faith. He had no discretion in the matter. A reasonable person looking at the facts would have 
no hesitation in finding that Patel had breached this duty to act in good faith when he solicited 
a payment of £500 in return for not entering the details of Singh’s summons into the court’s 
computer database. It is immaterial that Patel did not actually fulfil his end of the bargain 
since the 2010 Act is concerned with corrupt conduct rather than results. 
 
However, even if we are wrong about this, it is arguable that the facts of the present case also 
satisfy case 4 (which imposes strict liability). Section 2 states that a person is guilty of being 
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bribed if he requests, agrees to receive, or accepts an advantage in circumstances where the 
request or receipt of the advantage itself constitutes an improper performance of a relevant 
function or activity (case 4). It is trite that a public official should neither solicit nor accept 
bribes in the performance of their duties. That being so, it follows that Patel’s request (let 
alone his acceptance) of an advantage constituted an improper performance of his function as 
a public official. 
 
As a matter of completeness, it is worth pointing out that both Singh and The Sun newspaper 
could also have been prosecuted under the 2010 Act. Singh’s behaviour in paying a bribe of 
£500 to Patel in order to induce the latter not to enter the details of his summons into the 
court’s computer database constituted the offer of a bribe contrary to section 1 (either case 1 
or case 2). As to The Sun newspaper, it arguably committed an offence of failing to prevent 
bribery contrary section 7 insofar as its employees (the reporter and the editor) authorised the 
payment of £500 to Singh who in turn paid Patel. However, in the context of the present case, 
it is clear that such prosecutions would not have been in the public interest. 
 
Part 2: The law in the USA 
 
Let us now consider whether Patel’s case is caught by the law in the USA. Of the two general 
federal anti-corruption statutes, we can immediately discount the FCPA as our example does 
not involve the bribery of a foreign public official. Let us see whether the second general anti-
corruption statute, 18 USC § 201(b)(2), is applicable. 
 
It will be recalled that 18 USC § 201(b)(2) makes it an offence for a public official to corruptly 
accept anything of value in return for being influenced in his capacity as a public official. In 
the present case, it is arguable that Patel satisfies all of these elements. He was a public official 
who corruptly (i.e. with a consciousness of wrongdoing) accepted an inducement of £500. The 
wrongdoing consisted of Patel’s promise that he would, in return for the payment of £500, 
omit to properly perform his duty as a public official by not entering the details of Singh’s 
summons into the court’s computer database. 
 
Thus, we can see that in terms of coverage, bribery of a public official is contrary to the 
criminal law in both England and Wales and the USA. As the paradigm form of bribery, this is 
to be expected. But this coverage also lends support to our claims that core cases of corruption 
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travel well, and that our account of the harm and wrongdoing in corruption in England and 
Wales has normative force. 
 
Part 3: Harm and wrongdoing 
 
Let us now apply the third part of our analytical framework. At first sight, it might be thought 
that Patel’s offending was harmless. After all, Singh suffered no loss and the other unidentified 
defendants whom Patel assisted actually benefited from Patel’s actions. However, this view of 
harming is incomplete. As we shall see, Patel’s conduct caused harm in a number of different 
dimensions. Some of these harms were referred to by HHJ McCreath when he sentenced Patel. 
 
Let us begin by identifying the primary harm which resulted from Patel’s misconduct. The 
obvious victim in our example is Singh. However, if we pause to consider the facts, this 
description seems artificial. There is no doubt that Singh was inconvenienced but to describe 
him as a victim may be stretching matters too far. We can support this view by noting that 
Patel’s misconduct did not directly set back any identifiable welfare or ulterior interests which 
Singh may have had. In other words, the harm principle tells us that Singh did not suffer any 
personal setbacks to his interests. 
 
In the alternative, it might be argued that the victims of Patel’s misconduct were the other 
defendants who had been summonsed to court but were unable to avail themselves of Patel’s 
services. However, this argument is flawed because it presupposes that what Patel was doing 
was lawful. Given that Patel was not providing a lawful service, it follows that the other 
defendants were not entitled to use his services. In short, they received sentences which were 
entirely commensurate with their own misdoing, and there were no direct setbacks to their 
interests as a result of Patel’s misconduct. 
 
The other candidate for a victim is the public at large. There is little doubt that Patel’s 
misconduct undermined the proper functioning of the administration of justice in which we 
all have an interest. However, the harm principle tells us that this is a generalised harm to the 
public interest. 
 
In the context of the present case, it is submitted that the primary victims were those 
insurance companies whose interests were wrongfully set back by Patel’s corrupt conduct. As 
HHJ McCreath noted, the imposition of penalty points is a relevant factor for insurance 
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companies. Bad drivers pose a higher risk than good drivers. As a direct result of Patel’s 
misconduct, these insurance companies were carrying risks at an inappropriate cost and 
effectively insuring bad drivers as if they were good drivers. 
 
Moreover, the insurance companies no doubt charged reduced premiums in the case of these 
bad drivers because they assumed, as a result of Patel’s misconduct, that they were good 
drivers. Not only did this deprive these insurance companies of valuable revenue, it also 
meant that they were exposed to a risk (i.e. the likelihood of the insured driver being at fault 
for a road traffic accident) which they had not fully appreciated (due to Patel’s misconduct). 
 
In short, as HHJ McCreath remarked, bad drivers pose a higher risk than good ones. It is for 
this reason that insurance companies tend to charge higher premiums in the case of bad 
drivers. As a result of Patel’s action, these insurance companies suffered a financial loss. This 
loss was incurred in at least three ways. First, as we have mentioned, a loss in revenue through 
the charging of reduced premiums. Second, the insurance companies may also have had to 
settle insurance claims on behalf of bad drivers whom, in the ordinary course of events, they 
would have declined to insure. Third, they may have had to settle insurance claims on behalf 
of bad drivers who should not have been driving at all (i.e. because they would have been 
disqualified from driving but for Patel’s failure to enter the details of their summonses into the 
court’s computer database). 
 
For an insurance company, any setback to its financial interests constitutes a setback to its 
welfare interests. If an insurance company is unable to charge the correct premiums, and is 
required to regularly pay out on claims that it would ordinarily not be responsible for, it goes 
without saying that it is unlikely to flourish as a business. Thus, we can see that Patel’s 
misconduct harmed the financial interests of these insurance companies. 
 
As to the indirect harm resulting from Patel’s misconduct, we have already alluded to this. It is 
submitted that the public have an interest in the proper functioning of the administration of 
justice. Most people (though not necessarily all people) have an interest in a fair and impartial 
criminal justice system. Patel set back this important public interest by engaging in corrupt 
conduct which undermined the proper administration of justice. In addition, as HHJ 
McCreath remarked, Patel’s actions also undermined the integrity of the criminal justice 
system and the public’s confidence in it. 
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Let us now consider some of the remote harms stemming from Patel’s misconduct. At this 
point, our analysis neatly dovetails with the general literature on corruption. It is submitted 
that if the bribery of public officials became commonplace, the criminal justice system would 
cease to be fair and impartial. Moreover, it would most likely lose legitimacy in the eyes of the 
public. In addition, the corruption of some public officials may cause others to act in a similar 
fashion thereby leading to a spillover into other areas of government. If this were to happen, 
the government itself would lose legitimacy in the eyes of the people thereby leading to civil 
unrest. 
 
Thus far, we have discussed the harms arising from Patel’s misconduct. We have not enquired 
into the wrongfulness of Patel’s conduct. In order to identify the wrongdoing, we must recall 
that the primary victims were those insurance companies whose financial interests were set 
back by Patel’s corrupt conduct. By denying these insurance companies the opportunity to 
charge increased premiums of bad drivers, Patel set back their financial interests. As against 
Patel, the insurance companies had a right to non-interference with this important interest. 
The harm principle tells us that financial interests are to be regarded as welfare interests. 
Moreover, the harm principle tells us that welfare interests are so important that any setback 
to these interests constitutes a wrong. Thus, we can see that Patel wronged these innocent 
insurance companies insofar as his misconduct interfered with their financial interests and 
thus deprived them of valuable revenue. The fact that the loss was likely to have been relatively 
small does not detract from the fact that the insurance companies were wronged in this way. 
In short, it is clear that there is a nexus between the primary harm and the wrongdoing 
suffered by the insurance companies. By virtue of his misconduct, Patel not only harmed the 
financial interests of these insurance companies, he also wronged them. 
 
Additionally, it might be argued that the insurance companies were also wronged in another 
way. It is clear that they had a financial interest in the penalty points system, and therefore a 
real interest in the integrity of the criminal justice system. It is submitted that this in turn 
generated a moral right that the actors working in the system (such as Patel) would act with 
integrity. Patel’s misconduct breached that moral right. 
 
BRIBERY IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
 
Let us now consider an example of bribery in the private sector. By this we mean a 
commercial transaction which takes place between two actors in the private sector. 
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In 2002, an undercover reporter from The Sunday Times approached two senior members of 
staff at Pembroke College, Oxford.299 Posing as a wealthy banker, he offered to make a 
donation of £300,000 in order to secure a place for his (fictitious) son on a law degree course. 
The banker explained that his son wished to attend Oxford but was not certain of achieving 
the required grades. He was informed by John Platt (a former admissions tutor and senior 
fellow at the college) and Mary-Jane Hilton (the college’s chief fundraiser) that they could 
create an extra place for his son on the law degree course in return for the donation. 
 
Platt revealed that similar deals had been struck in the past owing to the poor financial health 
of the college. He explained that there was normally a quota for the law degree course and that 
those places were awarded to the best students. However, if the banker were to make a 
donation, pressure could be brought to bear upon tutors to create an extra place (under the 
college admissions system, the tutors make the final decision on which students are awarded a 
place). 
 
We should add that no donation was actually made and the college did not create or offer a 
place on the law degree course. Let us see how this example of bribery in the private sector 
fares against our analytical framework. 
 
Part 1: The 2010 Act 
 
There is no dispute that Platt and Hilton were both approached by the undercover reporter 
and offered a bribe. It therefore follows that we are dealing with a case of passive bribery (i.e. 
an offence of being bribed). As to this, section 2 of the 2010 Act states that a person is guilty of 
being bribed if two conditions are met. First, he requests, agrees to receive, or accepts an 
advantage. This criterion is easily satisfied on the facts of the present case as both Platt and 
Hilton made it clear in no uncertain terms that they were agreeable to accepting an 
inducement from the banker in the form of a donation to the college. There is no suggestion 
that either Platt or Hilton intended to keep any of the money for themselves. Rather, it is 
abundantly clear that they intended for the college to benefit from the donation. However, 
 
299 Jonathan Calvert, ‘Revealed: Degrees for Sale at Oxford College’ The Sunday Times (London, 24 March 2002) 
News 1; Jonathan Calvert, ‘Money Talks at Oxford’ The Sunday Times (London, 24 March 2002) News 3. 
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this is immaterial as the 2010 Act allows for the payment of an advantage to another (in this 
case the college). 
 
The second part of section 2 requires the satisfaction of one of cases 3 to 6. In the present 
example, it is submitted that only cases 3 and 4 are applicable. It will be recalled that the one 
of the main differences between the two lies in the fact that case 3 requires proof of mens rea 
(intention) whereas case 4 is strict liability. 
 
In order to satisfy case 3, we must show that Platt and Hilton agreed to accept the advantage 
with intention of performing a relevant function or activity improperly (whether by 
themselves or by another person). In the present case, we know Platt and Hilton were both 
employed by the college and spoke to the reporter in course of their employment (a relevant 
function or activity). Moreover, it is submitted that a reasonable person would hold that both 
Platt and Hilton, by virtue of their positions, were required to act in good faith (as with all 
employees). The evidence shows that they failed to do this. Instead, they made it clear to the 
reporter that they would be willing to bend the rules in return for the donation. This was not 
just an empty promise. It will be recalled that Platt revealed that similar deals had been struck 
in the past owing to the poor financial health of the college. In short, it is submitted that on 
the facts of the present example, the second part of section 2 (case 3) is also satisfied. 
 
As to case 4, it will be recalled that this imposes strict liability. In order to satisfy case 4, it 
must be shown that the request or receipt of the advantage itself constituted an improper 
performance of a relevant function or activity. This need not detain us for long. We have 
already concluded that both Platt and Hilton were performing a relevant function or activity 
which imposed upon them a duty to act in good faith. In other words, they were required to 
act in a lawful manner. By agreeing to accept a bribe, they breached this duty. Thus, we can 
see that case 4 is also satisfied. 
 
Before moving on to the second part of our analytical framework, we must say something 
about the liability of both the undercover reporter and the college. The position of the 
undercover reporter is fairly easy to deal with as his conduct is caught by section 1. It is clear 
that he offered an advantage with the intention of inducing Platt and Hilton to perform a 
relevant function or activity improperly (case 1). However, as with our previous example, it is 
submitted that it is not generally in the public interest to prosecute investigative journalists. 
By contrast, the college would not be caught by section 7 (failing to prevent bribery) since 
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neither Platt nor Hilton were involved in active bribery (they were guilty of being bribed 
contrary to section 2). 
 
Part 2: The law in the USA 
 
Since we are dealing with a case of private sector bribery, we must turn to the California Penal 
Code § 641.3 for assistance. Section 641.3 states that a person (R) is guilty of being bribed if 
he: (1) corruptly solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept from a person (P) who is not his 
employer, (2) an inducement (other than in trust for his employer), (3) without his employer’s 
consent, (4) in return for using his position for the benefit of P. 
 
Dealing with the first criterion, we know that Platt and Hilton agreed to accept a substantial 
inducement from a person other than their employer. The crucial question is whether this 
agreement to accept an inducement was corrupt. Section 641.3(d)(3) states that to be corrupt, 
the recipient must have intended to injure or defraud his employer or any competitor of his 
employer. At first sight, it might be thought that this is not satisfied as there was no intention 
by Platt and Hilton to injure the college. Rather, it is clear that they intended to benefit the 
college. However, whilst this may be true, it is submitted that Platt and Hilton’s conduct did 
result in injury to the other constituent colleges of the University of Oxford. The receipt of an 
additional £300,000 would have allowed Platt and Hilton’s employer, Pembroke College, to 
outmuscle other colleges in terms of attracting academic staff and students (i.e. by offering 
higher salaries and scholarships). Of course, the difficulty for us is showing that Platt and 
Hilton intended to injure the other constituent colleges. In the absence of further evidence, it 
is difficult to establish this as their intention and so satisfy the first criterion. 
 
Turning to the second criterion, it might seem like this is not satisfied on the facts. However, 
although Platt and Hilton agreed to receive an inducement of £300,000 for the benefit of the 
college, it cannot be said that this was received in trust. By breaching their fiduciary duty to 
the college, they acted in bad faith and therefore in a way which was not in the college’s best 
interests. Let us therefore hold that the second is criterion is satisfied. 
 
The third and fourth criteria are dealt with more easily. It is clear from the facts of our 
example that Platt and Hilton were acting without the consent of the governing body of the 
college. In addition, we know that in return for receiving the inducement, they agreed to 
pressure college tutors into creating an extra place on the law degree course. 
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We can see from this analysis that our current example is not caught by section 641.3(d)(3). 
However, it is submitted that this difference in coverage is due only to the stricter culpability 
requirements in section 641.3(d)(3) as opposed to any other reason (i.e. the need to show that 
R intended to injure or defraud his employer or a competitor of his employer). 
 
Part 3: Harm and wrongdoing 
 
Unlike our previous example, the primary victim of Platt and Hilton’s misconduct is far easier 
to identify. It is fairly obvious that Platt and Hilton’s behaviour resulted in a set back to the 
interests of their employer, Pembroke College. It also goes without saying that a scandal 
played out on the front page of a national newspaper obviously constituted a serious setback 
to the reputation and integrity of the college. It is submitted that these two interests are of 
paramount importance to the college as they help to ensure that it attracts not only the best 
students but also valuable research grants. In order to survive as a commercial entity, the 
college needs to consistently attract the best students and research grants. Given the 
importance of these interests to the college’s financial health, it is submitted that they are best 
viewed as welfare interests. In short, by engaging in corrupt conduct, Platt and Hilton 
breached their duty of loyalty to the college and thereby set back its reputation and integrity. 
 
Let us now consider the indirect harm which resulted from Platt and Hilton’s misconduct. 
There are two possible groups of actors who might have suffered indirect harm. The first 
group consists of students. There is no question of any potential applicants to the college 
being harmed since the extra place was created improperly. In the normal course of events, 
there would have been no additional place and therefore no expectation of applying for it. 
However, as to the existing students, it is arguable that the damage to college’s reputation and 
integrity may have resulted in a drop in revenue. This may, in turn, have resulted in reduced 
opportunities for the students (e.g. in the form equipment, materials, academic staff, etc.). 
However, as this is speculative, we can discount this group. 
 
The second group of victims consists of the other constituent colleges of the University of 
Oxford. These colleges must have suffered setbacks to their reputation and integrity as a result 
of Platt and Hilton’s misconduct. Although the harm to these colleges would not have been as 
pronounced, their membership of the federal University of Oxford means that they would 
have suffered some harm to their reputation and integrity. The unwanted and adverse 
publicity may have caused some students to rethink their choice of university and set back the 
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ability of these constituent colleges to attract research grants. After all, organisations that are 
prepared to fund expensive research would want to be sure that their investment is funding 
the most academically able minds rather than those with the deepest pockets. 
 
The remote harm resulting from Platt and Hilton’s misconduct is fairly simple to identify. 
Pervasive corruption in the education system is likely to result in a number of undesirable 
consequences. First, it devalues the education system with the result that employers may be 
hesitant about employing graduates as there would be no guarantee as to quality and 
standards. Second, it may lead to a reduction in the number of overseas students applying to 
study in the UK. Given the revenue generated by overseas students studying in the UK’s 
higher education system, any decline in numbers would constitute a huge financial loss to the 
UK’s economy. 
 
We can derive support for these claims from the Russian education system which is so corrupt 
that teachers and administrators are sustained by bribes from students. In fact, corruption is 
so widespread that students can buy good grades. As a result, degrees are awarded to those 
who are most able to pay a bribe rather than to the smartest students.300 
 
Let us now consider the wrongdoing arising from our example. In order to articulate this, we 
must recall the primary harm. We previously argued that the primary harm arising from our 
example consisted of Platt and Hilton breaching their duty of loyalty to their employer by 
omitting to act in good faith. In so doing, they set back the college’s welfare interests. Put 
simply, Platt and Hilton were not entitled to act in the way that they did. Their actions 
constituted a breach of the duty of loyalty which they owed to their employer, Pembroke 
College. The college not only had a right to their loyalty, it also had a right to non-interference 
with its welfare interests; especially by employees who ought to have realised the ramifications 
of their behaviour. In short, Platt and Hilton were obliged to act in ways which promoted the 
college’s welfare interests. As a direct result of their misconduct, Platt and Hilton set back the 
college’s welfare interests and thereby wronged it. 
 
 
 
300 Sabrina Tavernise, ‘A Russian Tilts at Graft (It Could be a Quixotic Task)’ The New York Times (New York, 
10 February 2003) 3. 
 132
 
2. NOBLE CAUSE 
 
Noble cause is the use of improper means to secure what would, but for the impropriety, be 
regarded as a legitimate aim. The noble aspect of noble cause is said to be the furtherance of 
the common good.301 However, not everyone views noble cause in this way. For example, the 
Commissioner for the Metropolitan Police has previously acknowledged that there are a small 
number of corrupt police officers who commit crimes and neutralise evidence in important 
cases.302 
 
The most typical example consists of a police officer who fabricates evidence in order to help 
convict a suspect he believes to be guilty. Other examples include lying on reports, perjury, the 
use of excessive force, illegal surveillance tactics, and racial profiling. Although the scholarship 
in this area is almost exclusively concerned with the conduct of police officers, it is arguable 
that anybody can act for a “noble” cause (e.g. expert witnesses, politicians, judges, etc.). 
 
The reader may be sceptical about whether noble cause is properly described as a type of 
corruption. However, it is apparent from the general literature that noble cause is not only 
regarded as being a type of corruption, it is regarded as being a core case of corruption based 
on analogical reasons.303 In short, it is said to be a core case of corruption because it shares 
some (though not all) of the characteristics of bribery. 
 
Miller argues that when police officers act in accordance with the law they simultaneously 
perform three tasks. They do what is morally right, they act in ways which are lawful, and they 
act in accordance with the will of the community.304 When a police officer engages in noble 
cause corruption, he violates all three of these duties. Since the 1970s, there have been a 
number of high profile miscarriage of justice cases in which the presence of noble cause 
corruption has subsequently been discovered. Some well-known examples include the cases of 
 
301 Thomas J. Martinelli, ‘Unconstitutional Policing: The Ethical Challenges in Dealing with Noble Cause 
Corruption’ (2006) 73 (10) Police Chief 146. 
302 Select Committee on Home Affairs, Police Disciplinary and Complaints Procedure (1997-98, HC 258-I) 1. 
303 Edwin J. Delattre, Character and Cops: Ethics in Policing (American Enterprise Institute, 1989); John Kleinig, 
‘Rethinking Noble Cause Corruption’ (2002) 4 (4) International Journal of Police Science and Management 287. 
304 Seumas Miller, ‘Noble Cause Corruption in Policing’ (1999) 8 (3) African Security Review 12. 
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the Guildford Four,305 the Birmingham Six,306 and Judith Ward.307 In the cases of the Guildford 
Four and the Birmingham Six, it subsequently emerged on appeal that police officers had used 
improper methods to secure convictions.308 We can only speculate as to their reasons for 
resorting to noble cause corruption. However, it is possible that these police officers were 
motivated by a desire to promote the public interest based on their (erroneous) belief of the 
defendants’ guilt. Of course, it is equally possible that they simply bowed to the immense 
public pressure to make arrests. 
 
Let us analyse the cases of Judith Ward and the Birmingham Six by reference to our analytical 
framework. 
 
JUDITH WARD 
 
In September 1973, a bomb exploded at Euston Station injuring several people and causing 
damage. In February 1974, a second bomb exploded on a coach carrying soldiers and their 
families along the M62 motorway. Twelve people died. A week later a third bomb exploded at 
the National Defence College in Latimer injuring a number of people and causing damage. 
The explosions were all attributed to the IRA.309 
 
Soon afterwards, the police arrested Judith Ward and charged her with 12 counts of murder 
and three counts of causing an explosion. The prosecution’s case at trial was largely based 
upon confessions and admissions which Ward had made in interviews with the police. It was 
the prosecution’s case that these admissions were substantially supported by the scientific 
evidence. To this end, they called a number of forensic scientists who testified that traces of 
nitroglycerine had been found on Ward’s hands after both the Euston and National Defence 
College explosions, and inside her caravan (and on various possessions) after the coach 
explosion on the M62. The defence argued that Ward had been suffering from a severe mental 
 
305 R v Richardson, Conlon, Armstrong, and Hill, The Times, 20 October 1989 (CA). 
306 R v McIlkenny, Hill, Power, Walker, Hunter, and Callaghan [1991] 93 Cr App R 287. 
307 R v Ward [1993] 1 WLR 619. 
308 Ian Dennis, ‘Miscarriages of Justice and the Law of Confessions: Evidentiary Issues and Solutions’ [1993] 
Public Law 291, 291-297. 
309 ibid 298-299. 
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disorder which meant that the admissions she had made could not be relied upon as being 
true. 
 
The jury rejected the defence and found Ward guilty on every count. She was sentenced by 
Waller J to life imprisonment on each of the 12 counts of murder and a total determinate 
sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment for the three counts of causing an explosion. 
 
In 1992, after serving nearly 18 years in prison, Ward’s convictions were quashed as unsafe by 
the Court of Appeal.310 During the appeal, it emerged that, inter alia, three of the forensic 
scientists called by the prosecution had taken “the law into their own hands, and concealed 
from the prosecution, the defence and the court, matters which might have changed the 
course of the trial.”311 For example, they had suppressed data and knowingly placed a false and 
distorted scientific picture before the jury. The Court of Appeal held that they had misled both 
the prosecution and the defence in order to promote a cause which they had made their own, 
namely that Ward had been in contact with nitroglycerine. 
 
We can see from the facts of this example that the three forensic scientists resorted to the use 
of improper means in order to promote an otherwise legitimate aim (assisting with a criminal 
prosecution). In other words, they were engaged in noble cause corruption. Let us see how the 
behaviour of the forensic scientists fares against our analytical framework. 
 
Part 1: The 2010 Act 
 
Perhaps the first thing to note is that it is not immediately apparent whether our example falls 
within the ambit of section 1 (offences of bribing another person) or section 2 (offences 
relating to being bribed). However, upon reflection, it is submitted that section 2 is not 
applicable as the forensic scientists neither requested, agreed to receive, nor accepted an 
advantage. Rather, it submitted that it was they who conferred an advantage. Let us see 
whether the conduct of the forensic scientists is caught by section 1. 
 
 
310 R v Ward [1993] 1 WLR 619. 
311 ibid at 674. 
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Recall our working summary of section 1. This states that a person (P) is guilty of bribing 
another person if two conditions are satisfied. First, P offers, promises, or gives an advantage 
to another person (R). Second, P does this with the intention of either inducing R to perform a 
relevant function or activity improperly (case 1) or in the knowledge or belief that the 
acceptance of the advantage would itself constitute the improper performance of a relevant 
function or activity improperly by R (case 2). 
 
The first criterion essentially deals with the actus reus of section 1. Although the forensic 
scientists did not offer or promise an advantage to another person, it is arguable that they gave 
an intangible advantage to another person (i.e. prosecution counsel). That is, by suppressing 
data and knowingly placing a false and distorted scientific picture before the jury, they 
furnished prosecution counsel with an evidential advantage. 
 
Of course, the sceptical reader will point to the fact that prosecution counsel was no doubt 
unaware that he had been furnished with an advantage. Whilst this might seem like an 
attractive counter-argument, it does not impact upon the operation of section 1. The reason 
for this is that the focus of section 1 is on the conduct of P rather than R (it will be recalled 
that the 2010 Act is concerned with conduct and not results).312 In short, it is not a 
requirement of section 1 that R (i.e. prosecution counsel) must be aware that he has been 
provided with an advantage for the purposes of inducing him into performing a relevant 
function or activity improperly. 
 
We can demonstrate this point more clearly with a simple example. Let us suppose that P 
offers an advantage to R in order to induce him into performing a relevant function or activity 
improperly. Let us further suppose that R is unaware as to the quality of the offer (i.e. he does 
not appreciate that he is being offered a bribe). In this scenario, we would have no hesitation 
in holding that P is guilty of bribery contrary to section 1 (case 1). That being so, it is 
submitted that the same applies to the present example. The forensic scientists furnished 
prosecution counsel with an advantage. The fact that prosecution counsel was unaware that 
 
312 Director of the Serious Fraud Office and the Director of Public Prosecutions, Bribery Act 2010: Joint 
Prosecution Guidance of the Director of the Serious Fraud Office and the Director of Public Prosecutions (30 
March 2011) 5. 
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an advantage had been conferred does not detract from the fact that the forensic scientists had 
provided him with an advantage. Let us therefore hold that the first criterion is satisfied. 
 
We must now turn to the second criterion. This essentially deals with the mens rea of section 
1. In short, P’s offering, promising, or giving of an advantage must have been made with the 
intention of either inducing R to perform a relevant function or activity improperly (case 1) or 
in the knowledge or belief that the acceptance of the advantage would itself constitute the 
improper performance of a relevant function or activity by R (case 2). 
 
Let us begin by looking at case 1. It is submitted that the central question in this respect is 
whether the forensic scientists intended by their misconduct to induce prosecution counsel 
into performing a relevant function or activity improperly. Whilst there is no suggestion that 
prosecution counsel was privy to the forensic scientists’ misconduct, it must follow that as a 
result of the forensic scientists’ misconduct, prosecution counsel was misled into presenting a 
case which he would otherwise not have presented. Moreover, this must have been the 
intention of the forensic scientists as it is the only logical explanation for their misconduct. 
 
There is support for this in the judgment of the Court of Appeal which found that the forensic 
scientists’ had deliberately concealed from the prosecution, the defence, and the court, matters 
which might have changed the course of the trial.313 They had suppressed data and knowingly 
placed a false and distorted scientific picture before the jury. The only party that could have 
benefited from this misconduct was the prosecution. 
 
That being so, the next question is whether the forensic scientists’ misconduct resulted in 
prosecution counsel performing a relevant function or activity improperly. We can be fairly 
confident in asserting that prosecution counsel was performing a function or activity of a 
public nature. However, even if we are wrong about that, there is no doubt that prosecution 
counsel was acting in the course of employment. Moreover, it is submitted that by virtue of 
his position, prosecution counsel was under a duty to act impartially. There is ample support 
for this proposition in the case law. For example, in Puddick314 it was held that prosecution 
counsel is a minister of justice and should not struggle for a conviction. 
 
313 R v Ward [1993] 1 WLR 619 at 674. 
314 (1865) 4 F & F 497. 
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In view of this, it is submitted that a reasonable person would have no hesitation in holding 
that the forensic scientists’ misconduct caused prosecution counsel to inadvertently breach his 
duty of impartiality. Let us therefore hold that the misconduct of the forensic scientists is 
caught by section 1 (case 1) of the 2010 Act as a core case of corruption. 
 
However, even if we are wrong about the application of case 1, it is submitted that case 2 is 
also satisfied. It will be recalled that case 2 states that P’s offering, promising, or giving of an 
advantage must have been provided in the knowledge or belief that the acceptance of the 
advantage would itself constitute the improper performance of a relevant function by R. We 
can deal with this fairly quickly. It must have been obvious to the forensic scientists that it was 
improper for prosecution counsel to place misleading evidence before the jury, whether 
knowingly or not. Thus, we can see that case 2 is also satisfied. 
 
Part 2: The law in the USA 
 
Let us now apply the second part of our analytical framework. As our example is not 
concerned with the bribery of a foreign public official, a restraint of trade, insider dealing, or 
private sector bribery, we can discount the FCPA, the Sherman Act 1890, the Securities 
Exchange Act 1934, and the California Penal Code § 641.3. Let us move straight on to 18 USC 
§ 201. This federal statute states that a person is guilty of bribery if he corruptly gives anything 
of value to a public official in order to influence the public official in his official capacity. 
Section 201 is remarkably similar to section 1 (case 1) of the 2010 Act. 
 
Taking matters out of turn, it is helpful to begin with the question of whether prosecution 
counsel can be described as a “public official”. It will be recalled that the term “public official” 
has been interpreted widely so as to include any person acting on behalf of any branch of the 
government in any official function. It is submitted that this interpretation is wide enough to 
include counsel engaged in the prosecution of a criminal trial.315 
 
That being so, let us now consider whether the forensic scientists gave anything of value to 
prosecution counsel in order to influence him in his official capacity (we shall return to the 
 
315 The only minor difference is that in England and Wales prosecutions are brought on behalf of the Crown 
whereas in the USA they are brought on behalf of the state or the federal government. 
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question of whether the forensic scientists acted “corruptly”). As to this, we have already 
established that the forensic scientists gave prosecution counsel “a thing of value” in the form 
of an evidential advantage. Under section 201, a thing of value includes both tangible and 
intangible items. It is arguable that the forensic scientists’ misleading testimony is an 
intangible thing of value. 
 
Any hesitation as to this conclusion can be dispelled by looking at the matter from a different 
perspective. Let us imagine that prosecution counsel was privy to the forensic scientists’ 
misconduct and knowingly placed misleading testimony before the jury. In this situation, we 
would have no hesitation in holding that prosecution counsel had been influenced in his 
capacity as a public official. That being so, it is submitted that the same applies even though 
prosecution counsel was unaware that the forensic scientists had given misleading evidence. 
 
However, it is not enough for a thing of value to have been provided to prosecution counsel. 
Section 201(b)(1) states that a thing value must have been given “corruptly” in order to 
influence a public official in his official capacity. It will be recalled the term “corruptly” means 
a specific intent to give or receive something of value in exchange for an official act. In short, 
it imposes a quid pro quo requirement. 
 
In the present case, there is little difficulty in satisfying this since it is clear that prosecution 
counsel (unintentionally) presented an unfair case against Ward (which resulted in her 
conviction and imprisonment) as a direct result of the forensic scientists’ misconduct. 
Moreover, there can be little doubt that this is what the forensic scientists intended to achieve. 
It is important to note that the quid pro quo requirement in section 201(b)(1) does not 
require any knowledge or reciprocation on the part of the public official. It is sufficient that 
the forensic scientists intended to influence prosecution counsel in his official capacity.316 
 
We can see from this analysis that the present example is caught by section 201. Let us now 
consider the harm and wrongdoing resulting from the forensic scientists’ misconduct. 
 
 
 
 
316 United States v Labovitz 251 F.2d 393 (3d Cir. 1958). 
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Part 3: Harm and wrongdoing 
 
The primary victim of the forensic scientists’ corruption was, on any view, Ward. As a direct 
result of their misconduct, she was wrongfully imprisoned for almost 18 years. The harm 
principle tells us that this resulted in a very grave and serious setback to Ward’s entire 
network of interests. In fact, as a result of being imprisoned, a large tranche of her interests 
were set back including her welfare and ulterior interests (i.e. her more ultimate aims and 
aspirations in life). However, it is sufficient for our purposes to select the most important of 
these in order to illustrate the harm suffered by Ward. It is submitted that of all the setbacks to 
Ward’s interests, the most serious setback was to her right to liberty. This welfare interest is so 
important (to most if not all people) that when it was unlawfully taken away from Ward, 
almost all her other interests were set back. We can see from this brief sketch that the primary 
harm resulting from the forensic scientists’ misconduct was to Ward’s right to liberty. 
 
But this brief sketch only touches upon the harms suffered by Ward. If we look a bit harder, 
we can see that there are other innocent actors who were indirectly harmed by the corrupt acts 
of the forensic scientists. These include Ward’s immediate family, extended family, friends, 
employer, etc. However, it is Ward’s immediate family who suffered the most serious harm as 
they were deprived of a daughter and sister for almost two decades. It is submitted that the 
indirect harms suffered by Ward’s family were so serious that they constituted a setback to 
their welfare interests (thereby wronging them). We can derive support for this argument 
from the fact that our right to respect for our private and family life is so important that it has 
been enshrined as a human right and fundamental freedom.317 Thus we can see that Ward’s 
family were indirectly harmed by the corrupt conduct of the forensic scientists. 
 
Let us now consider the remote harm arising from the misconduct of the forensic scientists. 
As to this, we can borrow from the general literature on corruption the likely effects of 
pervasive corruption on the legal system. It is easy to imagine how pervasive corruption might 
undermine the integrity of the legal system (both criminal and civil). If witnesses (including 
expert witnesses such as forensic scientists) were allowed to manipulate the trial process, the 
 
317 The Human Rights Act 1998 gives effect to article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) of the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (signed by the UK on 4 November 
1950, ratified on 8 March 1951, entered into force 3 September 1953). 
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integrity of the legal system would be undermined. A legal system which lacks integrity is 
unlikely to command the respect of the general public. When the legal system cannot be relied 
upon by the public to resolve legal disputes (both criminal and civil), there is likely to be a 
spillover in terms of civil disorder and unrest. 
 
The harm principle tells us that a properly functioning legal system is a public interest. It is 
something which we all have an interest in by virtue of our membership of society. A setback 
to the proper operation of the legal system (a governmental interest) therefore results in 
remote harms to individual members of society. 
 
We must now consider the wrongdoing resulting from our example. To this end, we must 
recall the serious setback suffered by Ward as a result of the forensic scientists’ misconduct. It 
is submitted that the forensic scientists’ actions constituted an unjustified and inexcusable 
interference with Ward’s moral right to liberty. When this important fundamental right was 
set back, Ward was simultaneously wronged. This is not difficult to understand given that she 
was wrongfully deprived of her right to liberty for almost 18 years. This deprivation of liberty 
constituted an unlawful interference with her autonomy and her ability to make self-regarding 
decisions about her life. We can support this proposition by reference to the fact that Ward’s 
unlawful detention meant that she was denied the opportunity of pursuing and advancing 
most of her interests (e.g. obtaining employment, starting a family, etc.). In short, it is fairly 
obvious that the wrong suffered by Ward was of a particularly egregious nature. 
 
Let us consider another example of noble cause corruption. 
 
THE BIRMINGHAM SIX 
 
In 1974, IRA bombs exploded in two public houses in Birmingham killing 21 people and 
injuring 162 others. Shortly afterwards, six men were arrested in connection with the matter. 
Following extensive interrogation, four of the six signed written confessions and, according to 
the evidence of police officers, the other two made oral admissions. In 1975, the six men were 
each convicted of 21 counts of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. 
 
In 1990, the Home Secretary referred their cases to the Court of Appeal following the 
emergence of fresh evidence (a previous appeal against conviction by the defendants and a 
previous referral by the Home Secretary had both been dismissed). In 1991, after serving 
 141
 
almost 16 years in prison, the Court of Appeal allowed the defendants’ appeals and quashed 
their convictions.318 
 
Although the case against the defendants at trial was convincing, it depended heavily on 
scientific evidence and the testimony of police officers about their interviews with the six 
defendants. Before the Court of Appeal, the scientific evidence was shown to be erroneous. 
However, of more concern was the evidence given by the police officers at the trial. The Court 
of Appeal found that they had deceived the court when giving evidence. At best, they had lied. 
At worst, they had fabricated parts (if not the whole) of the defendants’ interviews. The Court 
of Appeal also found that the police officers had altered statements and notes after they were 
first made.319 
 
We can see from the facts of this example that it involves the quintessential form of noble 
cause corruption. It is clear that the police officers in the present case resorted to the use of 
improper means in order to help convict the six defendants. Let us see how this example fares 
against our analytical framework. 
 
Part 1: The 2010 Act 
 
Given that it was the police officers who resorted to improper means to help convict the 
defendants, it is submitted that section 1 (offences of bribing another person) is applicable 
rather than section 2 (offences relating to being bribed). 
 
It will be recalled from our summary of section 1 that a person (P) is guilty of bribing another 
person if he offers, promises, or gives an advantage to another person (R) with the intention of 
either inducing R to perform a relevant function or activity improperly (case 1) or in the 
knowledge or belief that the acceptance of the advantage would itself constitute the improper 
performance of a relevant function or activity by R (case 2). 
 
 
318 Ian Dennis, ‘Miscarriages of Justice and the Law of Confessions: Evidentiary Issues and Solutions’ [1993] 
Public Law 291, 295-297. 
319 R v McIlkenny, Hill, Power, Walker, Hunter, and Callaghan [1991] 93 Cr App R 287. 
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There is no difficulty in establishing the first part of section 1 (the actus reus). As with our 
previous example, it is submitted that the police officers gave an intangible advantage to 
prosecution counsel. This was confirmed by the Court of Appeal which held that the police 
officers had tampered with the evidence and given false testimony. Of course, there is no 
suggestion that prosecution counsel was even aware of this. However, as we have already 
established, it is not a necessary ingredient of section 1 that R (i.e. prosecution counsel) need 
be aware that he has been furnished with an advantage. 
 
The crucial question is whether the police officers intended by their misconduct to induce 
prosecution counsel into performing a relevant function or activity improperly (case 1) or in 
the knowledge or belief that the acceptance of the advantage by prosecution counsel would 
itself constitute the improper performance of a relevant function or activity (case 2). 
 
Dealing with case 1, it is difficult to think of an innocent explanation as to why the police 
officers might have fabricated evidence and given false testimony. Rather, it is submitted that 
the only plausible explanation for their behaviour is that they must have formed a personal 
view that the defendants were guilty of the offences with which they had been charged. In 
order to ensure that the defendants were convicted (thereby promoting their personal view as 
to the defendants’ guilt), the police officers fabricated evidence and gave false testimony. Since 
prosecution counsel was responsible for presenting the case for the Crown, it must be the case 
that the police officers intended by their misconduct to influence prosecution counsel’s 
performance of this function or activity. 
 
The next step is to consider whether prosecution counsel was performing a relevant function 
or activity. We can deal with this matter fairly swiftly since we have previously concluded that 
counsel acting on behalf of the Crown is engaged in a relevant function or activity for the 
purposes of the 2010 Act. In the context of the present case, it is submitted that prosecution 
counsel was performing a function of a public nature. In the alternative, he was acting in the 
course of his employment. Moreover, by virtue of his position as prosecution counsel and a 
minister of justice, he was under a duty to act impartially. 
 
As to the question of whether prosecution counsel acted improperly, there can be no doubt 
that he failed to act impartially. Of course, there is no suggestion that prosecution counsel did 
this deliberately. Rather, it is quite clear that prosecution counsel failed to act impartially as a 
direct result of the police officers’ misconduct. That being so, it is submitted that a reasonable 
 143
 
person would come to the same conclusion (i.e. that the police officers had induced 
prosecution counsel into performing his duties improperly). Let us therefore hold that the 
misconduct of the police officers satisfies section 1 (case 1) of the 2010 Act. In short, it is a 
core case of corruption. 
 
As with our previous example (the case of Judith Ward), it is submitted that case 2 is also 
satisfied. This states that P’s offering, promising, or giving of an advantage must have been 
provided in the knowledge or belief that the acceptance of the advantage by R would itself 
constitute the improper performance of a relevant function or activity by R. This point need 
not trouble us for long since it would have been obvious to the police officers that it was 
improper for prosecution counsel to place misleading evidence before the jury, whether 
knowingly or not. Thus, we can see that case 2 is also satisfied. 
 
Part 2: The law in the USA 
 
Let us now apply the second part of our analytical framework. According to the federal 
statute, 18 USC § 201(b)(1), a person is guilty of bribery if he corruptly gives or offers 
anything of value to a public official in order to influence the public official in his official 
capacity. 
 
We have previously noted that the term “public official” includes any person acting on behalf 
of any branch of the government in any official function. We concluded that this description 
is broad enough to include prosecution counsel. In addition, we also argued that a “thing of 
value” is a reference to an inducement which may be either tangible or intangible. Lastly, we 
observed that the term “corruptly” refers to a specific intent to give or receive something of 
value in exchange for an official act (i.e. it imposes a quid pro quo requirement). Of course, 
the quid pro quo requirement does not require an actual exchange of benefits. 
 
Returning to our example, it is submitted that the police officers gave prosecution counsel “a 
thing of value” by fabricating evidence and giving false testimony. It will be recalled that 
under section 201, a thing of value includes both tangible or intangible items. However, the 
key question is whether this intangible advantage was given corruptly. One immediate 
difficulty is the fact that prosecution counsel was not privy to the police officers’ misconduct. 
In short, he did not know and had no reason to believe that evidence had been fabricated and 
that the police officers had given false evidence. However, this difficulty is more apparent than 
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real for the simple reason that there is no requirement that the recipient of the advantage (i.e. 
prosecution counsel) be aware that he is being offered an advantage.320 Section 201(b)(1) 
focuses on the intention of the bribe payer rather than the intention of the recipient. Thus, an 
advantage will have been conferred corruptly if the bribe payer intended to influence a public 
official in his official capacity. 
 
In the present example, it must be the case that by conferring an advantage on prosecution 
counsel, the police officers intended to influence prosecution counsel in the performance of 
his duties. But section 201(b)(1) also requires a quid pro quo. It is submitted that this was 
satisfied when prosecution counsel relied upon the police officers’ false evidence as part of the 
prosecution’s case. 
 
Let us therefore hold that that this example satisfies the requirements of section 201(b)(1) and 
is therefore an offence contrary to the federal law of the USA. 
 
Part 3: Harm and wrongdoing 
 
We are now ready to consider the third and final part of our analytical framework. That is, the 
harm and wrongdoing which resulted from the police officers’ corrupt conduct. 
 
As with the case of Judith Ward, it is submitted that the primary victims of the police officers’ 
misconduct were the six defendants. The actions of the police officers resulted in a setback to 
the defendants’ entire network of interests (both welfare and ulterior). However, there is no 
doubt that the most serious setback was to their right to liberty. As a direct result of the police 
officers’ misconduct, the defendants were unlawfully deprived of their liberty for almost 16 
years. This was a serious invasion which had the effect of setting back a whole raft of the 
defendants’ welfare and ulterior interests. It adversely affected their ability to go about their 
daily lives and to do and enjoy the things that most people take for granted. Let us therefore 
hold that the primary harm was a setback to the defendants’ right to liberty. 
 
Turning to the question of indirect harm, it is possible to locate in the present example other 
actors whose interests were indirectly harmed by the corrupt conduct of the police officers. 
 
320 United States v Labovitz 251 F.2d 393 (3d Cir. 1958). 
 145
 
The first group consists of the families of the six defendants. As we have previously discussed 
the impact on this group (in the context of the Judith Ward case), we can be brief in our 
discussion. It goes without saying that each family was deprived of a family member for a 
considerable period of time and that this constituted a clear invasion of their welfare interests 
(most people have a welfare interest in the well-being of their family). However, in addition to 
this, the defendants’ wrongful incarceration may have set back the welfare interests of their 
respective families in others ways. For example, given that the defendants were men, it may be 
that they were the main breadwinners for their respective families. As a result of the police 
officers’ misconduct, they were prevented from providing financial support for their families 
through gainful employment. However, without further information as to their domestic 
circumstances prior to arrest, it is difficult to assert this point in any real certainty. 
 
The second group of actors who suffered indirect harm consists of the 162 individuals who 
were injured by the explosions and the families of the 21 people who were killed. It is 
submitted that the corrupt conduct of the police officers denied this group their right to 
justice. The former because they had been physically harmed and the latter because their 
relatives had lost their lives. As a result of the police officers’ misconduct, the two explosions 
were not properly investigated and the perpetrators remain at large. This group of actors had a 
legitimate expectation that the matter would be properly investigated by the police and the 
perpetrators tried for their crimes. By acting in the way that they did, the police officers set 
back this right and denied the group their right to see the perpetrators brought to justice and 
punished for their wrongdoing. 
 
Let us now consider the issue of remote harms. These are fairly easy to identify. The general 
scholarship tells us that if police officers routinely took to fabricating evidence and giving false 
testimony, there would be a complete breakdown in both policing and the criminal justice 
system. Not only would the public have no confidence in policing, they would also have no 
confidence in the administration of the criminal justice system. That being so, it easy to 
imagine how this could lead to a rise in lawlessness. 
 
The public interest have a vested interest in a police force which is impartial. The job of a 
police officer is to investigate allegations of criminal wrongdoing, and to arrest and charge 
those who are suspected of having committed crimes. The public’s confidence in policing is 
prefaced on this integrity. In the absence of such integrity, there would be little incentive for 
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the public to abide by the law. Let us therefore hold that the remote harm stemming from the 
present example is a setback to the public’s interest in a fair and impartial police force. 
 
We must now consider the wrongdoing in our example. It is trite that the defendants were 
wronged insofar as their right to liberty was set back. We discussed this in some detail when 
looking at the case of Judith Ward. But the six defendants were also wronged in another way. 
They were deprived of a very important right when they were denied a fair trial by virtue of 
the police officers’ misconduct. The right to a fair trial is widely recognised as an important 
right. The fact that it is enshrined in English law as a human right and fundamental freedom 
lends considerable weight to this claim.321 Both of these setbacks were so serious that they 
simultaneously wronged the six defendants. The net effect of these breaches was an unlawful 
interference with the six defendants’ autonomy and personhood. 
 
In sum, it is apparent from this example that the corrupt conduct of the police officers gave 
rise not just to remote harms but a number of different harms (i.e. primary harms and indirect 
harms). Moreover, we have seen how the police officers’ misconduct adversely affected the 
interests of different groups of actors. 
 
 
3. NEPOTISM 
 
Nepotism is a type of favouritism towards one’s kin.322 Bellow argues that nepotism is more 
expansive than this insofar as it also includes favouritism towards close friends.323 This view is 
not shared by all. For example, Transparency International refer to favouritism towards close 
friends as a type of cronyism.324 However, despite this minor disagreement over labelling, both 
Bellow and Transparency International agree that nepotism and cronyism are to be regarded 
as core cases of corruption. In this section, Bellow’s broader description is preferred simply as 
 
321 The Human Rights Act 1998 gives effect to article 6 (right to a fair trial) of the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (signed by the UK on 4 November 1950, ratified on 8 March 1951, 
entered into force 3 September 1953). 
322 Jeremy Pope, TI Source Book 2000 (2nd edn, Transparency International, 2000) 197. 
323 Adam Bellow, In Praise of Nepotism (Doubleday, 2003) 11. 
324  Chandrashekhar Krishnan and Robert Barrington, Corruption in the UK: Overview and Policy 
Recommendations (Transparency International UK, 2011) 6. 
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a matter of convenience. In other words, we shall proceed on the basis that nepotism is a type 
of favouritism towards both one’s kin and close friends. 
 
Bellow argues that there are two types of nepotism: old nepotism and new nepotism.325 He 
argues that old nepotism describes a situation where a person takes active steps to secure a 
benefit for a family member or a friend. This can be contrasted with new nepotism which 
operates from the bottom up. That is, where a person exploits their family name, connections, 
or wealth in order to further their interests. Whilst this may seem like a neat distinction, it is 
submitted that it is not as clear cut as Bellow suggests. That is because there is an obvious 
overlap between old nepotism and new nepotism. For example, if a person takes active steps 
to secure a benefit for a family member, they will have engaged in old nepotism. However, if 
we shift our standpoint and focus instead on the conduct of the family member, we can see 
that the family member has engaged in an act of new nepotism by exploiting their connections. 
The distinction made by Bellow is therefore not as helpful as might seem at first sight and is 
entirely dependent on one’s standpoint. 
 
However, for the purposes of this section, there is no need to dwell on this distinction as it 
does not impact upon our analysis. Our concern in this section is with analysing some 
examples of nepotistic conduct in order to explore how such conduct fares against our 
analytical framework. Let us turn to this task now. 
 
THE UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND SCANDAL 
 
In 2011, the University of Queensland became the centre of a high profile nepotism scandal. 
According to newspaper reports, a meeting had taken place between the scholarships office, 
the Dean of Medicine, and the Vice-Chancellor, Paul Greenfield. Following this meeting, 
Greenfield’s daughter was offered a place on a highly competitive medical degree course. 
 
However, although Greenfield’s daughter had obtained the required overall position ranking, 
it transpired that she had not achieved the required score in the undergraduate medicines and 
health sciences admission test (UMAT). Notwithstanding this, she had not only been offered a 
 
325 Adam Bellow, In Praise of Nepotism (Doubleday, 2003) 14. 
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place on the degree course but had actually commenced her studies by the time the matter 
came to light.326 
 
The matter was referred by the Chancellor of the University to the Crime and Misconduct 
Commission327 (CMC) for investigation. Initially, the CMC indicated that it would not 
commence proceedings against the University as both Greenfield and the Dean of Medicine 
had resigned from their positions after the matter had come to light.328 However, in May 2012, 
the CMC reversed this decision and stated that it would begin an investigation into the affair 
after the Queensland Police Service referred a complaint by a member of the public regarding 
the commission of possible criminal offences.329 Let us apply our analytical framework to 
Greenfield’s conduct. 
 
Part 1: The 2010 Act 
 
Perhaps the first thing to note about the scandal is that there is no direct evidence as to what 
transpired at the meeting between the scholarships office, the Dean of Medicine, and 
Greenfield. However, what is clear is that in the ordinary course of events, Greenfield’s 
daughter would not have been offered a place on the degree course. There is no dispute that 
the degree course was highly competitive and there was no shortage of appropriately qualified 
students. The inference is that Greenfield used his position and influence to ensure that his 
 
326  Bernard Lane, ‘'All clear' for UQ after nepotism scandal’ The Australian (Sydney, 14 May 2012) 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/higher-education/all-clear-for-uq-after-nepotism-scandal/story-e6frgcjx-
1226354925933> accessed 30 May 2012; Des Houghton, ‘University of Queensland nepotism furore prompts 
changes to accountability rules’ The Courier Mail (Brisbane, 18 May 2012) 
<http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/university-of-queensland-nepotism-furore-prompts-
changes-to-accountability-rules/story-e6freoof-1226359356447> accessed 30 May 2012. 
327 The Crime and Misconduct Commission is an independent law enforcement agency which was created by the 
Crime and Misconduct Act 2001 (Australia). 
328 Crime and Misconduct Commission (Queensland), ‘University of Queensland matter’ (Press Release, 9 
December 2011) <http://www.cmc.qld.gov.au/news-and-media/media-releases/cmc-media-statement-
university-of-queensland-matter> accessed 30 May 2012. 
329  Daniel Hurst, ‘UQ nepotism scandal report to go public’ Brisbane Times (Brisbane, 28 May 2012) 
<http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/queensland/uq-nepotism-scandal-report-to-go-public-20120528-
1zenm.html> accessed 2 June 2012. 
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daughter was offered a place notwithstanding the fact that she had not obtained the required 
UMAT score. 
 
Another slight difficulty with our example is that it is not immediately apparent whether 
Greenfield engaged in active bribery (bribing another person contrary to section 1) or whether 
he is guilty of passive bribery (being bribed contrary to section 2). Let us analyse both and see 
how they fare against our example. 
 
Recall section 1 of the 2010 Act. This makes it an offence for a person (P) to bribe another 
person (R). In order to satisfy section 1, P must offer, promise, or give an advantage to R with 
the intention of inducing R (or another person) to perform a relevant function or activity 
improperly (case 1) or in the knowledge or belief that the acceptance of the advantage would 
itself constitute the improper performance of a relevant function or activity by R (case 2). 
 
It is immediately apparent that section 1 does not seem to fit the facts of our example. The 
primary difficulty is that there is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that Greenfield either 
offered, promised, or gave any advantage to any member of staff so as to cause them to 
perform a relevant function or activity improperly. Although it is arguable that the offer of a 
place to Greenfield’s daughter constituted the improper performance of a relevant function or 
activity, there is no evidence to suggest that the offer was prompted by the provision of an 
advantage. Rather, our example taken at its highest shows that there was some collusion 
between the scholarships office, the Dean of Medicine, and Greenfield which led to 
Greenfield’s daughter being offered a place on the degree course. Thus, in the absence of 
further evidence, it would appear that section 1 of the 2010 Act is not engaged by the facts of 
this particular example. 
 
Let us consider whether section 2 (offences relating to being bribed) takes us any further. It 
will be recalled that section 2 states that a person (R) is guilty of being bribed if he requests, 
agrees to receive, or accepts an advantage in one of the circumstances set out in cases 3 to 6. In 
the context of the present case, it is submitted that only cases 3 and 4 are applicable. In order 
to satisfy case 3, it must be shown that R requested, agreed to receive, or accepted an 
advantage with the intention of performing a relevant function or activity improperly 
(whether by R or another person). By contrast, to satisfy case 4, it must be shown that R 
requested, agreed to receive, or accepted an advantage in circumstances where the request or 
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receipt of the advantage itself constituted an improper performance of a relevant function or 
activity by R. 
 
If we recall the facts of our example, it is arguable that Greenfield either requested or accepted 
an advantage. Nothing particularly turns on which of these methods he may have relied upon. 
What is important is the fact that Greenfield must have colluded with the scholarships office 
and the Dean of Medicine in order to secure a place for his daughter on the medical degree 
course. As to the question of whether this should be regarded as an advantage, section 2(6)(b) 
of the 2010 Act makes it clear that it does not matter whether the advantage is for the benefit 
of R or another person. In other words, it is possible for R to request an advantage for the 
benefit of another person. In the present case, it is arguable that the offer of a place on the 
degree course constituted an advantage for both Greenfield and his daughter. As to Greenfield, 
it is submitted that something which promotes the well-being of one’s family must be an 
intangible benefit especially as it also promotes one’s self-interest. As for his daughter, there 
can be little doubt that she would have regarded as an advantage the offer of a place on a 
highly competitive degree course. 
 
The next question is whether Greenfield’s conduct also satisfies the requirements of cases 3 
and 4. Let us begin by considering case 3. In order to prove this, we must show that by 
requesting and accepting an advantage, Greenfield intended to perform a relevant function or 
activity improperly (whether by himself or through another person). It is helpful to pause and 
consider this carefully as there is no evidence of what occurred at the meeting between the 
scholarships office, the Dean of Medicine, and Greenfield. It is submitted that after requesting 
an advantage for his daughter, Greenfield must have conspired with his colleagues in order to 
ensure that she was formally offered a place. As we have previously noted, there is no way that 
she would, in the ordinary course of events, have been offered a place on the medical degree 
course. 
 
However, that is not the end of the matter. In order to bring our example within the ambit of 
case 3 we must show that either Greenfield or his colleagues performed a relevant function or 
activity improperly. Before we consider this, it is important to note that it is immaterial that 
we cannot state with certainty exactly who acted improperly. It is sufficient that we can draw 
an inference from the fact that one, some, or all of the conspirators must have acted 
improperly. 
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There is little difficulty with establishing that all of the conspirators were engaged in a relevant 
function or activity. It will be recalled that a relevant function or activity is one which is of a 
public nature, connected with a business, performed in the course of employment, or 
performed on behalf of a body of persons (corporate or unincorporate), and the person 
performing it is expected to act in good faith, impartially, or in accordance with a position of 
trust. It is submitted that in the present case, the conspirators were all acting in the course of 
their employment. Moreover, it is submitted that a reasonable person would expect them to 
discharge their duties impartially. That is, because a reasonable person would expect a 
university, in making offers, to do so on the basis of academic ability rather than nepotistic 
reasons. In short, the improper performance was the award of a place to a student who did not 
satisfy the entry requirements for the course. Thus, we can see that Greenfield’s conduct is 
caught by section 2 (case 3). 
 
However, even if we are wrong about case 3, it is submitted that case 4 is also satisfied. It will 
be recalled that unlike case 3, case 4 imposes strict liability. As to case 4, it is submitted that 
Greenfield’s request (let alone the acceptance by his daughter of the advantage) to the 
scholarships office and the Dean of Medicine constituted the improper performance of a 
relevant function or activity by these actors. Moreover, given that Greenfield was the Vice-
Chancellor, this would have been obvious to him. Let us therefore hold that case 4 is also 
satisfied. 
 
Part 2: The law in the USA 
 
Let us now compare our example against the law in the USA. The first of our four federal 
statues, 18 USC § 201, is concerned with the bribery of public officials, jurors, and witnesses in 
the domestic context. However, although the phrase “public official” includes any person 
acting on behalf of any branch of the government in any official function or a non-
government employee occupying a position of trust with federal responsibilities, it is 
submitted that neither Greenfield nor his colleagues at the University of Queensland fit this 
description. The second of the federal statutes, the FCPA, can also be excluded because it is 
concerned with the bribery of foreign public officials. We can also exclude the Sherman Act 
1890 and the Securities Exchange Act 1934 because the present example is not concerned with 
restraints of trade or insider dealing. 
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We are therefore left with the California Penal Code § 641.3. This proscribes both active and 
passive bribery in the private sector. As to the former, active bribery, a person (P) commits an 
offence if he corruptly gives or offers to an employee (R) (who is not his own) anything of 
value (other than in trust for R’s employer) without the consent of R’s employer in return for 
R using his position for the benefit of P. 
 
It is immediately apparent that this does not fit the facts of the present example. There is no 
evidence to suggest that Greenfield gave anything of value to his colleagues in the scholarships 
office or the Dean of Medicine. As an aside, the fact that the conspirators in our example all 
worked for the same employer (the University of Queensland) does not cause any problems in 
terms of the application of section 641.3 as the staff in the scholarships office and the Dean of 
Medicine were not Greenfield’s employees. 
 
Let us see whether Greenfield’s conduct is caught by the passive bribery provisions of section 
641.3. This states that an employee (R) is guilty of being bribed if he corruptly solicits or 
accepts from a person (P) who is not his employer anything of value (other than in trust for 
his employer) without the consent of his employer and in return for using his position for the 
benefit of P. 
 
There is little difficulty with satisfying the majority of section 641.3. We know that Greenfield 
was an employee of the University of Queensland and that he solicited from his colleagues an 
advantage for his daughter. There is also no problem in showing that this solicitation was 
corrupt given that Greenfield must have realised that he was setting back his employer’s 
interest in offering places only to the most academically able students. We are also able to 
satisfy the next requirement of section 641.3 which makes it clear that P cannot be R’s 
employer. This is easily done since Greenfield’s colleagues were obviously not his employer. It 
is also clear from the evidence that Greenfield’s employer, the University of Queensland, did 
not consent to Greenfield’s daughter being offered a place on the degree course. The difficulty 
comes when we try to establish the last limb of section 641.3. That is, that Greenfield used his 
position for the benefit of P (i.e. his colleagues). Put simply, there is no evidence that 
Greenfield used his position for the benefit of his colleagues. Obviously, if such evidence 
emerged, we would have no hesitation in holding that Greenfield’s misconduct is caught by 
section 641.3. However, in the absence of such evidence it is clear that we are unable to satisfy 
the passive bribery provisions of section 641.3. 
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However, there is an alternative argument which might be made. Section 641.3 stipulates that 
in order to be guilty of being bribed, R must corruptly solicit or accept from P a thing of value 
without the consent of his employer, and in return for using his position for the benefit of P. It 
is arguable that first requirement may be satisfied by the fact that Greenfield corruptly 
accepted a thing of value from his daughter. That is, his daughter’s acceptance of a place on 
the medical degree course. Given that this would have promoted Greenfield’s welfare interests 
(he obviously had a stake in the well-being of his own family), it is arguable that his daughter’s 
acceptance of the offer constituted an intangible benefit to Greenfield. The next requirement 
is easily satisfied as there is no doubt that the transaction was corrupt given that Greenfield 
intended to defraud the University of Queensland (by securing a place for his daughter over a 
better qualified student). In addition, we know that the University of Queensland did not 
consent to this course of conduct. Turning to the last requirement, it is arguable that this too 
is satisfied. Greenfield must have known that his daughter would accept the offer of a place on 
the degree course (she herself must have been aware that she did not have the appropriate 
UMAT score). That being so, it is arguable that in return for his daughter agreeing to accept 
the offer of a place on the degree course, Greenfield used his position for her benefit. 
 
Although this analysis may seem a little strained, there is no reason why the facts of the 
present case should not be caught by section 641.3. Our hesitation stems from the fact that an 
intangible benefit is involved. But this hesitation is misplaced for the simple reason that we 
would have no difficulty if there was evidence that Greenfield’s daughter had provided him 
with a tangible benefit (i.e. a bribe). 
 
On the basis of this analysis, we can see that Greenfield’s misconduct is caught by the passive 
bribery provisions of section 641.1 of the California Penal Code. 
 
Part 3: Harm and wrongdoing 
 
It is arguable that there are two primary victims whose interests were set back by Greenfield. 
On the one hand, it is clear that Greenfield’s misconduct must have set back the interests of 
the University of Queensland. In particular, its legitimate interest in attracting the most 
academically able students. But it is submitted that there is another innocent actor whose 
interests were more seriously harmed by Greenfield’s misconduct and who is arguably the 
primary victim in this scandal. 
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In short, it is submitted that the primary victim is the innocent student who was not offered a 
place on the medical degree course because his place was corruptly offered to Greenfield’s 
daughter instead. Of course, it is highly unlikely that the innocent student would have been 
aware that his interests had been set back in this way. We can support this argument by 
reference to a press release from the University of Queensland.330 According to this, 11 manual 
offers were made to students on the medical degree course. Of these 11 students, 7 were the 
recipients of prestigious scholarships which marked them as amongst the “best and brightest” 
students. Accordingly, they were made offers despite the fact that they had not obtained the 
appropriate UMAT score. Another 3 places were offered to students of aboriginal or Torres 
Strait descent under the University of Queensland’s alternative entry scheme. The remaining 
place was offered to Greenfield’s daughter who was neither the recipient of a scholarship nor 
of aboriginal or Torres Strait descent. As a result of Greenfield’s nepotism, an innocent 
student’s interests were set back when his offer of a place on the degree course was made to 
Greenfield’s daughter instead. Of course, it is possible than an extra place may have been 
created and therefore no other student was affected. However, this argument is misconceived 
since any extra place could and should have been offered in a transparent manner to the best 
qualified student. 
 
It is difficult to articulate with precision the harm suffered by the innocent student. The main 
reason for this is that we have no information as to his personal circumstances. All things 
being equal, it is possible that he may have accepted an offer at another university and 
therefore there was no material setback to his interests. However, this does not alter the fact 
that he was denied the offer of a place at the University of Queensland (which obviously 
constitutes a setback). Of course, it is equally possible that our innocent student was unable to 
secure an offer elsewhere. The point is that we do not know. However, if our project is to have 
any utility, we must assume the worst case scenario. Let us therefore assess the harm and 
wrongdoing to this innocent student on the basis that as a result of Greenfield’s misconduct 
he was unable to secure a place elsewhere. 
 
 
330 University of Queensland, ‘Memorandum on the making of offers into the 2011 undergraduate-entry MBBS 
program’ (Press Release, 9 December 2011) <http://www.uq.edu.au/about/planning-docs/2011-mbbs-program-
admissions/> accessed 2 June 2012. 
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It is submitted that our innocent student had a right to the offer of a place on the medical 
degree course. It represented the culmination of much hard work and study. Greenfield’s 
misconduct deprived the innocent student of this opportunity and thereby breached his rights. 
But that is not the end of the matter. It is arguable that there were further harms which 
resulted from Greenfield’s misconduct. A degree is usually a means to obtaining gainful 
employment. In the present example, the course in question was a medical degree. This meant 
that our innocent student’s ability to practise in the medical sciences was set back when he 
was denied the offer of a place on the degree course. Of course, this in turn would have limited 
his employment opportunities (at least temporarily if not permanently) and thereby affected 
his financial circumstances. The harm principle tells us that a person’s employment and their 
ability to earn remuneration are both welfare interests. Any setback to these interests 
constitutes a serious setback to interests. This is the primary harm resulting from Greenfield’s 
misconduct. 
 
Let us now consider the indirect harm which resulted from Greenfield’s misconduct. We have 
already mentioned the setback to the interests of the University of Queensland. It is submitted 
that as a direct consequence of Greenfield’s nepotism, the University of Queensland’s interests 
were set back in two ways. First, it was deprived of the benefit of a better qualified student. All 
universities take a keen interest in their position in league tables. They can determine the 
funding that a university is able to attract. One way in which a university can promote this 
interest is by making offers of places to the brightest students. In the present case, it is clear 
that Greenfield’s conduct set back this interest. Second, the university also suffered damage to 
its reputation as the matter was widely reported in the press. It is an obvious point, but no 
academic institution would want the kind of adverse publicity generated by this scandal. 
 
As to the remote harms arising from Greenfield’s misconduct, the general scholarship 
suggests that if such conduct were to become commonplace, there would be a setback to the 
integrity of the education system. It will be recalled from our analysis of the Pembroke College 
scandal (bribery in the private sector) that pervasive corruption in the education system can 
have a number of undesirable consequences. The general literature suggests that the education 
system as whole would become devalued with the result that employers would be reluctant to 
employ graduates as there would be no guarantee as to quality. In addition, students 
themselves would be deterred from applying to university as there would be no guarantee that 
their applications would be assessed fairly. Given the importance to the economy of an 
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educated workforce, it is easy to foresee the long-term harm to the economy from such 
corruption. 
 
Let us now consider the wrongdoing stemming from our example. Perhaps the first thing to 
note is that our innocent student had a moral right to be treated on equal terms with the other 
students who applied for a place on the medical degree course. In the ordinary course of 
events, he would have been offered a place on the basis of his academic ability alone. 
Greenfield’s misconduct indefensibly breached our innocent student’s moral right to this offer. 
Greenfield had no legitimate basis for denying our innocent student of the offer of a place on 
the degree course. In short, Greenfield’s misconduct wronged our innocent student insofar as 
it deprived him of the opportunity of accepting (or rejecting) a place on the degree course. In 
other words, it constituted an unlawful interference with his ability to make a self-regarding 
decision. It is also arguable that Greenfield set back our innocent student’s welfare interests 
since the possession of a degree is usually a valuable commodity in the context of employment. 
The harm principle tells us that the invasion of a welfare interest simultaneously constitutes a 
wrong because of their importance to a person’s ulterior interests. 
 
A HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE 
 
Our previous example was concerned with the steps taken by a father to secure the offer of a 
place on a medical degree course for his daughter. It is not difficult to understand the 
motivation for such conduct. Familial bonds are strong and people are more likely to put their 
family ahead of other interests and obligations. This lends support to our earlier conclusion 
that Greenfield benefitted from his conduct insofar as his familial interests were advanced by 
his nepotism. 
 
But would our conclusion be the same if, instead of securing a benefit for a family member, 
Greenfield had secured a benefit for a friend? We have already established that such conduct 
is regarded as a core case corruption (Bellow calls it nepotism whereas Transparency 
International refer to it as cronyism). Let us explore this question with a hypothetical set of 
facts. 
 
Let us assume that a university admissions tutor (P) is asked by a close friend to offer a place 
on a degree course to the latter’s daughter (R). P receives no benefit (either tangible or 
intangible) from her friend. P obliges and offers R a place on the degree course despite the fact 
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that R does not possess the requisite grades. R accepts the offer of a place on the degree course. 
Additionally, let us assume that there are only a limited number of places available on the 
degree course. Let us see how this example fares against our analytical framework. 
 
Part 1: The 2010 Act 
 
As with our previous example, it is submitted that section 1 (offences of bribing another 
person) is not engaged. It is clear from the facts that P has not sought to induce another 
person. Let us therefore turn our attention to section 2 of the 2010 Act which is concerned 
with offences relating to being bribed. 
 
In order to establish guilt under section 2, we must show that P either requested, agreed to 
receive, or accepted an advantage in one of the circumstances set out in cases 3 to 6. Before we 
consider these, we must first establish whether P requested, agreed to receive, or accepted an 
advantage. 
 
As to this, it is clear from the facts that P did not request an advantage from her friend. The 
question therefore arises as to whether she agreed to receive or accepted an advantage from 
her friend. It is here that we encounter difficulties. Put simply, whilst it is relatively easy to 
argue that promoting the interests of one’s own family is an advantage because it 
simultaneously promotes one’s self-interest, it is much more difficult to make the same 
argument in respect of one’s friends and their family members. It will be recalled that the 
harm principle tells us that there are two main types of interests: welfare interests and ulterior 
interests. Whilst the well-being of one’s own family may properly be categorised as a welfare 
interest, it is difficult to argue that the well-being of one’s friends is also a welfare interest. At 
best, it might be said that we have an ulterior interest in the well-being of our friends. Looking 
at the matter another way, if P were unable to offer a place to R, there would be no setback to 
P’s welfare interests. By contrast, if P were unable to offer a place to her own daughter, there 
might be a setback to her welfare interests. It is submitted that this difference reflects the 
strength of the bond between the parties (i.e. familial bonds being stronger than the bonds of 
friendship). 
 
Thus, on the basis that P only has an ulterior interest in the well-being of her friend (and R), it 
is difficult to see how, for the purposes of section 2, it could be argued that P either received or 
accepted an advantage when R accepted the offer of a place on the degree course. Whilst P 
 158
 
may have received some satisfaction from being able to assist her friend, it would be stretching 
matters to describe this as an intangible benefit to P. 
 
Of course, it does not follow from this conclusion that nepotistic conduct which favours one’s 
friends is not a form of corruption. This thesis does not argue that the 2010 Act is 
determinative of the range of conduct which may properly be regarded as corrupt. It may be 
the case that nepotism which favours one’s friends falls under the broad umbrella of 
corruption whereas nepotism which favours one’s family falls within the smaller subset of 
bribery. However, whatever the merits of this view, it is an exercise in labelling and is 
therefore beyond the scope of this thesis (which is concerned with the harm and wrongdoing 
in core cases of corruption). 
 
Part 2: The law in the USA 
 
Let us see whether the position in the USA is any different in terms of coverage. Once again, it 
is clear that the four federal statutes are not applicable. The simple reason for this is that our 
example does not concern the bribery of a public official (domestic or foreign), juror, 
witnesses, a restraint of trade, or insider dealing. 
 
If we recall the California Penal Code § 641.3, it is evident that the active bribery provisions do 
not apply either. That is, because P did not corruptly give or offer to an employee (who is not 
her own) anything of value in return for the latter using their position for the benefit of P. 
Rather, as can be seen from our example, P was approached by her close friend. 
 
The prohibition on passive bribery contained in section 641.3 states that an employee is guilty 
of being bribed if he corruptly solicits or accepts from a person who is not his employer 
anything of value (other than in trust for his employer) without the consent of his employer 
and in return for using his position for the benefit of that other person. 
 
The immediate problem from our point of view is that P neither solicited nor accepted from 
her close friend anything of value. In addition, as we argued earlier, the acceptance by R of the 
offer of a place on the degree course did not constitute a thing of value for P (because it did 
not promote her interests). That being so, it is submitted that the passive bribery provisions of 
section 641.3 are not engaged either. 
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In short, we can see that in terms of coverage, the position is largely the same as that in 
England and Wales. That is, whereas nepotism involving family members is caught as a core 
case of corruption, nepotism involving friends is not. 
 
Part 3: Harm and wrongdoing 
 
We argued earlier that the fact that our hypothetical example does not satisfy the first and 
second parts of our analytical framework suggests that such conduct is not a core form of 
corruption. However, this does not preclude us from looking at the harm and wrongdoing 
arising from our hypothetical example. In fact, any similarities with our first example (the 
University of Queensland scandal) would lend analogical support to the idea that nepotistic 
conduct which favours one’s friends is a form of corruption (in the wider sense) as opposed to 
a core case of corruption (bribery). 
  
Let us begin by looking at the primary harm resulting from P’s offer to R of a place on the 
degree course. As with our previous example, it is submitted that there are two potential 
victims whose interests were set back: the university and the innocent student who was 
deprived of the offer of a place. However, it is arguable that the harm to the innocent student 
is more serious than the harm to the university. Our innocent student was denied the offer of 
a place on the degree course which was rightfully his and which represented the culmination 
of much hard work on his part. Assuming the worst case scenario, it is arguable that given the 
importance of a degree to one’s employment prospects, P’s nepotism set back our innocent 
student’s interests in this regard. We have previously argued that a person’s employment and 
their ability to earn remuneration are both welfare interests. Any setback to these interests 
constitutes a serious harm. Thus, we can see that the primary harm in our hypothetical 
example is very similar to the primary harm in the University of Queensland case. 
 
Turning to the indirect harm, it is arguable that the university’s interests were set back by P’s 
misconduct. That is, because P deprived the university of a better qualified student. The ability 
of a university to attract the brightest students has a direct bearing on two important interests. 
First, any dilution in the quality of students has a direct impact on a university’s position in 
league tables. Second, if a university slides down the league tables, it may find that there is a 
reduction in the funding that it is able to attract. Thus, we can see that the university’s 
interests were also set back by the corruption of P. It will be recalled that this is similar to the 
harm in our previous example involving the University of Queensland. 
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As to the remote harms arising from P’s conduct, the general literature tells us that if 
nepotism (involving friends) were to become pervasive, it would devalue the education system 
with the result that employers would be reluctant to employ graduates as there would be no 
guarantee as to quality. In addition, students themselves may be deterred from applying to 
university if they know that their applications will not be considered on merit. Given the 
importance to the economy of an educated workforce, it is submitted that this would result in 
a set back to the economy. These remote harms are identical to those identified in our 
previous example. 
 
Finally, let us consider the wrongdoing arising from our hypothetical example. Our innocent 
student had a right to be considered equally with other students for a place on the degree 
course. P’s misconduct constituted an indefensible violation of that right. 
 
In addition to this, it is submitted that our innocent student’s welfare interests were also set 
back. Assuming the worst case scenario, P’s misconduct set back our innocent student’s ability 
to compete in a competitive employment market. It is generally accepted that a degree is a 
useful qualification when pursuing employment opportunities, especially those of a 
professional nature. The harm principle tells us that a person’s employment is a welfare 
interest. It is easy to understand this since most people require remunerative employment in 
order to live their day-to-day lives. Without remuneration, the opportunities for most people 
are significantly reduced. P’s invasion of this welfare interest constituted a wrong because of 
its importance to our innocent student’s general network of interests. Thus, we can see that 
the wrongdoing in our hypothetical example is very similar to the University of Queensland 
case. 
 
*   *   * 
 
It is clear from this analysis, that the harm and wrongdoing stemming from nepotism 
involving family and nepotism involving friends is largely the same. The difference lies in the 
fact that in the former P receives an inducement whereas in the latter P does not. This is an 
important distinction because the presence of an inducement is a key feature in core cases of 
corruption (i.e. bribery). It is the central feature which distinguishes bribery from other 
similar activities. In the absence of an inducement, it is arguable that P’s conduct is more akin 
to some form of misconduct. It may be well that this distinction is best reflected in terms of 
labelling or even sentencing. 
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In sum, we can see from this analysis that whilst both types of nepotism share similarities 
based on harm and wrongdoing, it is only nepotism involving family members which falls to 
be properly described as a core case of corruption. 
 
 
4. MATCH-FIXING 
 
Match-fixing describes a situation in which the outcome of a competitive sporting fixture is 
predetermined. A narrower form of match-fixing, called spot-fixing, involves the fixing of 
specific incidents (as opposed to the overall outcome) within a competitive sporting fixture. 
Match-fixing is regarded by many as a core type of corruption.331 So for example, offering an 
inducement to a professional tennis player to throw a match, and placing a bet on the 
outcome would constitute match-fixing.332 
 
There are a number of different actors who may be involved in match-fixing ranging from 
individuals betting on the outcome of matches to sportsmen, staff (both coaching and 
management), and match officials. The first and most obvious reason for engaging in match-
fixing is financial gain. Gambling on the outcome of sporting events is a multimillion pound 
industry. In keeping with technological advances, it is now possible for gamblers to place bets 
not only in advance of a sporting fixture but also during the game itself. In fact, bookmakers 
will accept bets on almost any aspect of a game. Thus, the ability to fix even a small incident 
within a game, such as the time of the first corner kick in a football match, opens up the 
possibility of betting on that outcome and winning large dividend pay outs. 
 
But financial gain is not the only motivator. Those involved in professional sports may also 
resort to match-fixing in order to ensure victory in a particular competition, secure 
promotion to a higher division, prevent relegation to a lower division, etc. In 2006, Juventus 
Football Club was stripped of two of its titles and demoted to Serie B after it was found guilty 
 
331 Ian Preston and Stefan Szymanski, ‘Cheating in Contests’ (2003) 19 (4) Oxford Review of Economic Policy 
612; Michael Macaulay and Gary Hickey, National Integrity System Assessment: United Kingdom (Transparency 
International UK, 2011) 16. 
332 Thomas L. Carson, ‘Bribery, Extortion, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’ (1985) 14 (1) Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 66, 70. 
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of match-fixing. Four other clubs, AC Milan, Lazio, Fiorentina, and Reggina, were deducted 
points and fined for their part in the scandal.333 The fact that these incidents were not purely 
driven by financial rewards shows that those involved in match-fixing may act for mixed 
reasons. That is, not only for financial gain but also to secure specific results (sometimes very 
prestigious results such as winning the league). Let us consider some examples. 
 
THE PAKISTAN CRICKETERS’ SPOT-FIXING SCANDAL 
 
A recent and well-known case of match-fixing (or spot-fixing to be precise) occurred during 
the Pakistan cricket team’s tour of England during the summer of 2010. The facts can be 
summarised shortly.334 
 
In August 2010, an undercover reporter from the News of the World newspaper approached 
Mazhar Majeed (an agent of some Pakistani cricketers) posing as a wealthy businessman. A 
number of meetings took place between the pair during the course of which the subject of 
spot-fixing was discussed. Majeed boasted that he had been spot-fixing with the Pakistan team 
for some years. 
 
In due course, it was agreed that in return for £150,000, Majeed would arrange for three no-
balls to be bowled by Pakistani cricketers during the Fourth Test at Lords. Following payment, 
three no-balls were bowled at the precise moments identified by Majeed. 
 
Three Pakistani cricketers were implicated in the affair: Salman Butt, the captain of the 
Pakistan Test side, Mohammad Asif, and Mohammad Amir. The trio were disciplined by the 
International Cricket Council (ICC) Disciplinary Tribunal and suspended (for differing 
periods) from playing all forms of professional cricket (international, first class, and club 
cricket).335 
 
 
333 Gabriele Marcotti, ‘Penalties Reduced in Italian Scandal’ The Times (London, 26 July 2006) 68. 
334 Summarised from R v Mohammad Amir and Salman Butt [2011] EWCA Crim 2914. 
335  International Cricket Council (ICC) v Salman Butt, Mohammad Asif and Mohammad Amir (ICC 
Disciplinary Tribunal Determination, 5 February 2011). 
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In September 2011, Majeed, Butt, Asif, and Amir, appeared in the Crown Court at Southwark 
on criminal charges. Majeed and Amir pleaded guilty. The former to conspiracy to give 
corrupt payments (to Butt, Asif, and Amir) and conspiracy to cheat. The latter to conspiracy 
to accept corrupt payments (from Majeed) and conspiracy to cheat. Butt and Asif were 
charged with the same offences as Amir but pleaded not guilty. They were tried by a jury and 
convicted of both offences. On 3 November 2011, the defendants were all sentenced. Majeed 
received two years and eight months’ imprisonment (concurrent), Butt received two years and 
six months’ imprisonment (concurrent), Asif received one year’s imprisonment (concurrent), 
whilst Amir received a concurrent sentence of six months’ detention in a Young Offender 
Institution. Butt and Amir appealed their sentences but both appeals were dismissed.336 
 
Part 1: The 2010 Act 
 
Before we apply the first part of our analytical framework, it is important to point out that 
none of the defendants were prosecuted under the 2010 Act. The reason for this is that the 
spot-fixing occurred prior to the coming into force of the 2010 Act on 1 July 2011 (the 2010 
Act does not have retrospective force). 
 
Let us begin with an examination of Majeed’s role in the scandal. It is clear from our summary 
that Majeed was the link between the briber payer (the undercover reporter) and the Pakistani 
cricketers. That is, because he negotiated the bribe and instructed the Pakistani cricketers to 
bowl no-balls at specific moments. 
 
Section 1 of the 2010 Act states that a person (P) is guilty of bribing another person if he offers, 
promises, or gives an advantage (whether by P or through a third party) to another person 
with the intention of inducing that person (or another person) to perform a relevant function 
or activity improperly (case 1) or in the knowledge or belief that the acceptance of the 
advantage would itself constitute the improper performance of a relevant function or activity 
(case 2). 
 
In the present case, it is clear from the evidence that Majeed received a bribe of £150,000 from 
the undercover reporter and then furnished the Pakistani cricketers with some of this 
 
336 R v Mohammad Amir and Salman Butt [2011] EWCA Crim 2914. 
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money.337 Thus, we can see that, for the purposes of section 1, Majeed gave an advantage to 
the Pakistani cricketers. Let us begin by considering case 1. As to this, the first question which 
arises is what Majeed intended by his actions. That is, did he intend to induce them into 
performing a relevant function or activity improperly. There is little difficulty with the first 
part since the evidence at trial showed that Majeed paid the Pakistani cricketers in order to 
induce them into bowling three no-balls during the Fourth Test at Lords. The question for us 
is whether the Pakistani cricketers were performing a relevant function or activity. 
 
Section 3 of the 2010 Act tells us that a relevant function or activity is one which is of a public 
nature, connected with a business, performed in the course of employment, or performed on 
behalf of a body of persons (corporate or unincorporate), and the person performing it is 
expected to act in good faith, impartially, or in accordance with a position of trust. 
 
It is obvious that the Pakistani cricketers were not performing a function or activity of a public 
nature. Neither were they acting on behalf of a body of persons. So we can exclude both of 
these. However, it is arguable that they were simultaneously performing a function or activity 
connected with a business and acting in the course of their employment. As to the former, 
section 3(7) tells us that the word “business” includes a trade or profession. It is submitted 
that this is expansive enough to include a professional cricketer. After all, professional cricket 
(like most professional sports) is not a hobby. It is a professional and regulated sport for 
which professional cricketers are paid a salary. Let us therefore hold that the Pakistani 
cricketers were performing a relevant function or activity. 
 
But that is not the end of the matter. In order to bring Majeed within section 1 (case 1), we 
must also show that the Pakistani cricketers acted improperly by accepting the money from 
Majeed. We can deal with this matter fairly quickly. By accepting an inducement from Majeed, 
the Pakistani cricketers not only breached the rules of the game, they also breached their 
contract with the Cricket Board of Pakistan. This imposed upon them a number of obligations 
including compliance with the Anti-Corruption Rules of the ICC.338 In those circumstances, a 
reasonable person would have little hesitation in holding that the Pakistani cricketers had 
 
337 ibid at paras 19-20 (Lord Judge). 
338 ibid at para 8 (Lord Judge). 
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been induced into performing a relevant function or activity improperly. Let us therefore hold 
that Majeed’s conduct is caught by section 1 (case 1) of the 2010 Act. 
 
However, even if we are wrong about case 1, it is submitted that case 2 is satisfied. That is 
because Majeed, as a professional agent, would have known that the mere acceptance of 
money (in the circumstances set out above) by the Pakistani cricketers would constitute the 
improper performance of a relevant function or activity. 
 
Let us now consider the actions of the three Pakistani cricketers. To this end, we must recall 
section 2 of the 2010 Act which deals with offences relating to being bribed. Section 2 states 
that a person (R) is guilty of being bribed if he requests, agrees to receive, or accepts an 
advantage in one of the ways set out in cases 3 to 6. Although we cannot be sure that the 
Pakistani cricketers requested an advantage, there is no doubt that, at the very least, they 
agreed to receive and accepted an advantage (i.e. money) from Majeed. The question is 
whether in accepting the advantage, they acted in any of the ways proscribed by cases 3 to 6. It 
will be recalled that case 3 requires proof of mens rea (intention) whereas cases 4 to 6 are strict 
liability. 
 
In order satisfy case 3, it must be shown that R agreed to receive or accepted an advantage 
with intention of performing a relevant function or activity improperly (whether by R or 
another person). It is clear from the evidence before the jury that the Pakistani cricketers 
intended, by their acceptance of the advantage, to perform a relevant function or activity 
improperly. In fact, the evidence showed that the Pakistani cricketers were not prepared to 
bowl no-balls unless the undercover reporter paid a large and substantial amount of money. 
According to the evidence, they were concerned when the undercover reporter initially 
indicated that he was only prepared to pay £10,000. It was only when this sum was increased 
to £150,000 that an agreement was reached that three no-balls would be bowled.339 When 
viewed in the context of this evidence, it is clear that the Pakistani cricketers must have 
intended to perform a relevant function or activity improperly when they accepted the money 
from Majeed. We have already established that the acceptance of a bribe by a professional 
cricketer and the bowling of no-balls constitutes the improper performance of a relevant 
 
339 ibid at paras 14-17 (Lord Judge). 
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function or activity. Let us therefore hold that the Pakistani cricketers’ conduct is caught 
section 2 (case 3). 
 
But that is not the end of the matter because it is submitted that in this example, case 4 is also 
satisfied. Case 4 imposes strict liability and does not require proof of mens rea. It is submitted 
that case 4 is met because the Pakistani cricketers’ very acceptance of an advantage constituted 
the improper performance of a relevant function or activity. They must have been aware of 
this since they were contractually prohibited from accepting bribes by the anti-corruption 
rules imposed by the ICC. 
 
It may be that cases 5 and 6 are also satisfied but we cannot be certain without further 
evidence. In order satisfy case 5, we would have to show that the Pakistani cricketers received 
a reward (i.e. a payment after the event) for having behaved improperly (i.e. bowling no-balls). 
However, there is no evidence that they received any additional money after the Fourth Test 
at Lords. Rather, the evidence suggests that they were paid in advance. By contrast, case 6 
states that R must perform a relevant function or activity in anticipation of receiving an 
advantage. Again, there is no evidence to suggest that the Pakistani cricketers bowled no-balls 
in anticipation of receiving a reward (or further reward). Rather, the evidence suggests that 
they were paid in advance. 
 
In short, we can see from this analysis that the conduct of both Majeed and the three Pakistani 
cricketers is caught by the provisions of the 2010 Act. 
 
Part 2: The law in the USA 
 
Let us now consider the second part of our analytical framework. Our four federal statutes do 
not apply as we are not concerned with the bribery of a public official (domestic or 
international), a juror, a witness, a restraint of trade, or insider dealing. Let us therefore 
consider the California Penal Code § 641.3. 
 
It is clear from our earlier discussion that Majeed was engaged in active bribery. That is, he 
was concerned with bribing the Pakistani cricketers. According to section 641.3, a person (P) 
is guilty of active bribery if he corruptly gives or offers an employee (R) (not his own) 
anything of value (other than in trust for R’s employer) without the consent of R’s employer in 
return for R using his position for the benefit of P. 
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In the context of the present case, there is little doubt that Majeed gave a thing of value to the 
Pakistani cricketers in return for them using their position for his benefit. He paid them to 
bowl three no-balls so that he could make a financial gain for himself. When he was 
interviewed by the police, Majeed admitted that he was in debt and explained that he had 
acted in order to extract money from the undercover reporter.340 The key question is whether 
Majeed acted corruptly. For the purposes of section 641.3, P acts corruptly if he intended to 
injure or defraud R’s employer or any competitor of R’s employer. Whilst it might is difficult 
to argue that Majeed’s primary intention was to injure the Cricket Board of Pakistan, it must 
have been obvious to him that by bribing the Pakistani cricketers, he was in effect setting back 
the interests of the Cricket Board of Pakistan. Let us therefore hold that Majeed’s actions are 
caught by section 641.3 of the California Penal Code. 
 
As to the conduct of the Pakistani cricketers, we must recall the passive bribery provisions of 
section 641.3. This states that an employee (R) is guilty of being bribed if he corruptly solicits, 
accepts, or agrees to accept from a person (P) who is not his employer anything of value 
(other than in trust for his employer) without the consent of his employer in return for using 
his position for the benefit of P. 
 
By accepting the money, the Pakistani cricketers obviously accepted a thing of value from 
Majeed in return for bowling no-balls. There is little doubt that this behaviour was corrupt 
given that it was received without the consent of the Cricket Board of Pakistan. It must have 
been obvious to the Pakistani cricketers that their actions would undermine the interests of 
the Cricket Board of Pakistan and thereby injure its interests. 
 
Thus, we can see that the actions of Majeed and the three Pakistani cricketers are also caught 
by section 641.3 of the California Penal Code. 
 
Part 3: Harm and wrongdoing 
 
There are a number of potential primary victims whose interests were adversely affected by 
the misconduct of Majeed and the Pakistani cricketers. It is not easy to distinguish between 
them. It is arguable that by their misconduct, the conspirators harmed the interests of the 
 
340 ibid at para 24 (Lord Judge). 
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Cricket Board of Pakistan, the interests of the ICC, and the game of cricket as a whole. 
However, upon reflection, it is submitted that the interests of the Cricket Board of Pakistan 
and the ICC are probably more pressing than the game of cricket as a whole (especially as the 
game of cricket is not a legal entity). 
 
The harm suffered by the Cricket Board of Pakistan and the ICC are interwoven. In fact, the 
harm was alluded to by the ICC Disciplinary Committee when it commented that the scandal 
had substantially damaged the interest in ICC events and cast a pall over the game.341 It is clear 
that, on any view, the scandal damaged the integrity of the game of cricket. This is of the 
utmost interest to both the Cricket Board of Pakistan and the ICC because it is the integrity of 
the game which ensures that sponsors invest in cricket and which attracts the paying public. 
By setting back this interest, the conspirators caused financial harm to both the Cricket Board 
of Pakistan and the ICC. 
 
Let us now consider the indirect harm resulting from this scandal. It is submitted that there 
are two groups whose interests were indirectly harmed by the scandal. First, those innocent 
individuals who gambled on the outcome of the Fourth Test at Lords and who were adversely 
affected by the corruption of Majeed and the Pakistani cricketers. In particular, those who 
gambled on specific incidents within the game such as the number and timing of no-balls and 
who suffered economic harm as a result. This constitutes a setback to their welfare interests 
which, as we know, is a serious harm. Second, the bookmakers who paid out as a result of the 
spot-fixing scandal also suffered economic harm and therefore a setback to their welfare 
interests. 
 
In terms of remote harms, these are easier to identify. If corruption within the game of cricket 
were to become rampant, the sport as a whole would suffer. Sponsors would be unwilling to 
fund the game and members of the public would be unwilling to pay to watch the game. If this 
happened, the professional game would most likely collapse due to a lack of funding. Proof for 
 
341  International Cricket Council (ICC) v Salman Butt, Mohammad Asif and Mohammad Amir (ICC 
Disciplinary Tribunal Determination, 5 February 2011) at para 227. 
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this proposition can be found in China where match-fixing in football is so widespread that 
sponsors and television broadcasters have turned their backs on the game.342 
 
Thus far we have discussed harming. In terms of wrongdoing, it is submitted that what made 
Majeed’s conduct wrong was that he induced the Pakistani cricketers into breaching their 
duty of loyalty to the Cricket Board of Pakistan by engaging in criminal offences. This is the 
same view that Green takes of such conduct.343 By contrast, the Pakistani cricketers not only 
breached their duty of loyalty to the Cricket Board of Pakistan, they also breached the rules of 
the game. As the Court of Appeal observed, their participation in a professional game obliged 
them to perform with honesty and to play the game to the best of their abilities.344 By 
breaching these obligations they not only violated the rights of the Cricket Board of Pakistan, 
they also violated the rights of their team mates, the opposition team, and the spectators, who 
had a legitimate right to expect that the three Pakistani cricketers would play with honesty and 
to the best of their abilities. 
 
ROBERT HOYZER 
 
Thus far, we have considered the corruption of both professional sportsmen and other outside 
actors. Let us now consider whether our conclusion would be any different if the wrongdoing 
were committed by a match official instead. 
 
In January 2005, football minnows, SC Paderborn 07, pulled off a shock victory against former 
European Cup winners, Hamburger SV, in the German Cup. The lower league team came 
from 2-0 down to beat Hamburger 4-2. Suspicions were raised during the game when the 
match referee, Robert Hoyzer, awarded Paderborn two debatable penalties and controversially 
sent off Hamburger’s star striker. 
 
Hoyzer (along with a number of co-conspirators including a Paderborn player) was later 
charged with fixing a number of football matches in Germany. He subsequently admitted 
 
342 Hannah Gardner, ‘Chinese football bosses jailed in match-fixing crackdown’ The Times (London, 14 June 
2012). 
343 Stuart P. Green, Lying, Cheating, and Stealing: A Moral Theory of White-Collar Crime (Oxford University 
Press, 2006) 208-210. 
344 R v Mohammad Amir and Salman Butt [2011] EWCA Crim 2914 at para 32 (Lord Judge). 
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accepting £46,000 and a flat screen television from a Croatian organised crime syndicate in 
return for influencing the outcome of the match. He was sentenced to two years and five 
months’ imprisonment. The trial judge described the incident as serious and said that Hoyzer 
had violated his duty of neutrality.345 
 
Part 1: The 2010 Act 
 
Recall section 2 of the 2010 Act. This states that a person (R) is guilty of being bribed if he 
requests, agrees to receive, or accepts an advantage in the circumstances set out in cases 3 to 6. 
 
The first part causes us no difficulties since Hoyzer admitted that he had received an 
advantage from the Croatian crime syndicate. The crucial question is whether his receipt was 
contrary to cases 3 to 6. 
 
Let us deal with case 3 first. In order to satisfy this, it must be shown that Hoyzer received an 
advantage with the intention of performing a relevant function or activity improperly 
(whether by himself or another person). There is no difficulty with establishing mens rea since 
Hoyzer admitted that he had accepted an inducement from the Croatian crime syndicate in 
return for influencing the outcome of the game. The question for us is whether in doing so, 
Hoyzer performed a relevant function or activity improperly. 
 
Before we can consider the question of improper performance, we must determine whether 
Hoyzer was performing a relevant function or activity. It will be recalled that a relevant 
function or activity is one which is of a public nature, connected with a business, performed in 
the course of employment, or performed on behalf of a body of persons (corporate or 
unincorporate), and the person performing it is expected to act in good faith, impartially, or 
in accordance with a position of trust. It is immediately clear that Hoyzer was not performing 
 
345 Mark Landler, ‘Germany Still Consumed by a Scandal’ The New York Times (New York, 23 March 2005) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/23/sports/soccer/23soccer.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1> accessed 25 October 
2009; BBC News, ‘Jail Sentence for German Referee’ BBC News (London, 17 November 2005) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/football/europe/4445896.stm> accessed 25 October 2009; Paul Newman, 
‘German Referee Jailed for Two Years’ The Independent on Sunday (London, 18 November 2005) 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/european/german-referee-jailed-for-two-years-515756.html> 
accessed 25 October 2009. 
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a function or activity of a public nature. Neither can it be said that he was acting on behalf of a 
body of persons (corporate or unincorporate). It might be thought that he was acting on 
behalf of the Croatian crime syndicate. However, this is a non-starter for the simple reason 
that the 2010 Act is only concerned with lawful organisations (corporate or unincorporate). 
The Croatian crime syndicate obviously does not fit this description. As with our previous 
example (the Pakistani cricketers’ scandal), it is submitted that Hoyzer was performing a 
relevant function or activity connected with a business. It will be recalled that section 3(7) of 
the 2010 Act states that the term “business” includes both a trade and profession. We know 
that Hoyzer was a professional referee who was paid to officiate football matches. That being 
so, it is submitted that Hoyzer was performing a relevant function or activity. 
 
Let us now turn to the question of improper performance. Section 5(1) of the 2010 Act tells us 
that the test of what is expected is a test of what a reasonable person in the UK would expect 
in relation to the performance of the type of function or activity concerned. It is submitted 
that a reasonable person would expect a paid referee (arguably even an unpaid referee) to 
officiate a match fairly. That is, to act impartially and to enforce the rules fairly. After all, there 
would not be much point in playing (or watching) a game if the rules are not interpreted and 
enforced fairly. As the trial judge observed, by virtue of his misconduct, Hoyzer violated this 
duty of neutrality. Let us therefore hold that Hoyzer’s misconduct is caught by section 2 (case 
3). 
 
However, the facts of this example are such that it is arguable that case 4 is also satisfied. Case 
4, which imposes strict liability, is satisfied because Hoyzer’s very acceptance of the advantage 
constituted the improper performance of a relevant function or activity. As a referee, he was 
duty bound to remain neutral. It must have been obvious to him that the mere receipt of an 
advantage in his capacity as a referee constituted an improper performance of his duties. It 
may be possible that cases 5 to 6 are also satisfied but we cannot be sure without further 
evidence as to when the advantage was received by Hoyzer. But nothing turns on this given 
that Hoyzer is, at the very least, caught by cases 3 and 4. 
 
Part 2: The law in the USA 
 
The second part of our analytical framework requires us to apply the law in the USA to see 
whether there are any differences in coverage. We need not concern ourselves with the four 
federal statutes as these are not applicable. 
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In order to analyse the present example, we must recall the California Penal Code § 641.3. The 
passive bribery provisions of section 641.3 state that an employee (R) is guilty of being bribed 
if he corruptly solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept from a person other than his employer (P) 
anything of value (other than in trust for his employer) without the consent of his employer in 
return for using his position for the benefit of P. 
 
Leaving aside the question of mens rea, we know that Hoyzer accepted an inducement from 
the Croatian crime syndicate and in return for that inducement, he used his position as a 
referee for their benefit (by influencing the outcome of the game). As to mens rea, section 
641.3 states that R must have acted corruptly in accepting the inducement. In other words, by 
his actions he must have intended to injure or defraud either his employer or a competitor of 
his employer. Whilst it is difficult to assert that Hoyzer’s primary intention was to set back the 
interests of his employer (the German Football Association), there is no doubt that he would 
have been alert to the damage that his misconduct would cause to the interests of his 
employer. When the integrity of the game is harmed, commercial sponsors are likely to be 
deterred and fans are unlikely to pay to watch matches. The result is a reduction in revenue 
for the German Football Association. 
 
We can see from this short analysis that Hoyzer’s conduct is also caught by section 641.3 of 
the California Penal Code. 
 
Part 3: Harm and wrongdoing 
 
Despite the fact that Hoyzer was a referee (as opposed to being a player or member of 
coaching staff), the harm and wrongdoing resulting from his misconduct is similar to that 
identified in our previous example (the Pakistani cricketers’ scandal). 
 
It is submitted that there are two primary victims in our example: the Hamburger team and 
the German Football Association. However, the primary harms to their respective interests are 
the same. When a referee (or player) violates the rules of a game, the very integrity of the 
game is undermined. The net result is that fans will be left wondering whether a particular 
outcome is genuine or the result of match-fixing. In order to survive as a professional sport, 
football needs to generate revenue from sponsorship and the paying public. Unless the 
integrity of the game is preserved, these sources of revenue are likely to dry up fast. In 
addition, the Hamburger team suffered an additional harm insofar as it was unfairly denied 
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the opportunity of earning prize money by competing in the German Cup. Thus, we can see 
that by virtue of his misconduct, Hoyzer set back the financial interests of both the 
Hamburger team and the German Football Association.  
 
As to the indirect harm resulting from Hoyzer’s conduct, it is arguable that there was a 
setback to those innocent individuals who gambled on the outcome of the match as well as the 
bookmakers who paid out on bets. Given that Hamburger were the superior team (and the 
favourites), it is likely that they would have attracted a large amount of wagers. Whilst we 
cannot say with certainty that Hamburger would have won the match (although the fact that 
they were leading by two goals is compelling), Hoyzer’s interference dramatically altered the 
course of the game. He awarded two dubious penalties and sent off Hamburger’s star striker 
thereby reducing the team to ten men. 
 
As a direct result, it is likely that many innocent individuals lost money and thereby suffered a 
setback to their financial interests. The same is true of bookmakers who paid out when 
Paderborn won a match that they were expected to lose. Given the superiority of the 
Hamburger team, the odds on Paderborn winning would no doubt have been very generous. 
 
In addition to the above, it is arguable that Hoyzer also indirectly harmed the interests of the 
innocent players and the paying public. Both groups had a right to expect that the rules of the 
game would be enforced fairly by the match referee. By virtue of his misconduct, Hoyzer 
violated the rights of the players and spectators to an impartial referee. Instead of officiating 
fairly, Hoyzer interfered with the match and its outcome. 
 
MacCormick describes the harm in such scenarios in terms of a breach of trust. He argues that 
a willing participant (this includes both players and match officials) in a game such as football 
enters into a relationship of trust which includes in a wide sense the principle of fair play.346 By 
virtue of his misconduct, Hoyzer breached this relationship of trust. He indirectly harmed the 
interests of the innocent players in the game by denying them a fair game. He may also have 
set back the financial interests of the Hamburger players who may have missed out on 
lucrative financial bonuses for winning the game. Of course, this is in addition to being 
unfairly denied the opportunity of competing in (and perhaps winning) the German Cup. 
 
346 Neil MacCormick, Practical Reason in Law and Morality (Oxford University Press, 2008) 80-82. 
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We have already touched upon the remote harm arising from Hoyzer’s conduct. There is no 
doubt that the integrity of the game of football was set back by the incident. If such conduct 
were to become prevalent, there would be a drastic decline in revenue as commercial sponsors 
and fans alike would be unlikely to take an interest in the game. Recall the state of football in 
China where match-fixing in football has led to a drastic decline in sponsorship and television 
coverage.347 
 
Lastly, we must consider the wrongdoing which resulted from Hoyzer’s misconduct. It is 
submitted that the Hamburger team had a moral right to be treated equally by Hoyzer. As the 
match referee, Hoyzer wronged the Hamburger team when he failed to enforce the rules of the 
game in a fair manner. However, that was not the only wrong to the Hamburger team. We 
have previously argued that a set back to the financial interests of a corporation constitutes a 
wrong. In this example, the Hamburger team had a right to non-interference with this 
important welfare interest. By his misconduct, Hoyzer invaded this interest and thereby 
wronged the Hamburger team by depriving it of valuable revenue. 
 
By contrast, the German Football Association was wronged in two ways. First, when Hoyzer 
breached his duty of loyalty to the German Football Association by violating his duty of 
neutrality. Second, by setting back the financial interests of the German Football Association. 
It will be recalled from earlier analyses that a setback to the revenue of an organisation 
constitutes a serious wrong because it can threaten the survival of an organisation. In short, 
the German Football Association cannot exist without the income it generates through 
commercial sponsorship and ticket sales to the public. Hoyzer’s misconduct indefensibly 
violated this particular interest. 
 
 
5. FACILITATION PAYMENTS 
 
A facilitation payment can be described as a payment made to a public official (domestic or 
foreign) or an employee of a private company in order to obtain some favour such as 
 
347 Hannah Gardner, ‘Chinese football bosses jailed in match-fixing crackdown’ The Times (London, 14 June 
2012). 
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expediting an administrative process, obtaining a permit, licence or service, or avoiding an 
abuse of power.348 Some commentators refer to such payments as speed or grease payments.349 
 
In England and Wales, facilitation payments have always been contrary to the criminal law. 
Under the old law, such payments were proscribed by the common law offence of bribery.350 
The 2010 Act, which abolished the old law, does not depart from this position. It contains no 
specific exemption for facilitation payments unless they are permitted or required by the 
written law applicable to a foreign public official.351 The Law Commission argues that, on 
broad social grounds, a culture in which facilitation payments are regular and accepted is 
undesirable and such payments should therefore be discouraged.352 
 
By contrast, the position in the USA is somewhat different. The FCPA excludes facilitation 
payments which are provided for the purposes of expediting or securing the performance of 
routine governmental action by a foreign public official. 353  Somewhat surprisingly, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (the OECD) makes the same 
concession in the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions (the OECD Convention).354 The guidance to the OECD 
Convention explains that the exemption is based on the premise that facilitation payments do 
not constitute payments made for the purposes of obtaining or retaining business.355 This is a 
somewhat strange view given that there is no credible explanation as to why an individual 
would make a facilitation payment if not for the purposes of obtaining or retaining business. 
 
 
348 Antonio Argandona, ‘Corruption and Companies: The Use of Facilitating Payments’ (2005) 60 (3) Journal of 
Business Ethics 251; Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010: Guidance (March 2011) 18. 
349 Law Commission, Reforming Bribery: A Consultation Paper (2007, Law Com Paper No 185) 291. 
350 Colin Nicholls and others, Corruption and Misuse of Public Office (Oxford University Press, 2006) 21. 
351 Section 5(2) of the 2010 Act. 
352 Law Commission, Reforming Bribery (2008, Law Com Report No 313) 86. 
353 Sections 78dd -1(c)(1) and (2) of the FCPA. 
354 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (signed 
by the UK on 17 December 1997, ratified on 14 December 1998, entered into force on 15 February 1999, Cm 
3994). 
355 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions and Related Documents (2011) 15. 
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There are some critics who argue that such exemptions blur the distinction between legal and 
illegal payments. Their objection is based on the fact that facilitation payments can have a 
potentially negative impact on society because they may lead to the violation of local laws and 
can actually delay, impede and distort the proper functioning of government.356 
 
Let us explore the harm and wrongdoing which results from the payment of facilitation 
payments. 
 
THE HELMERICH & PAYNE CASE 
 
In July 2009, Helmerich & Payne (H&P), a US company, agreed to pay a fine of $1 million to 
the US Treasury after it voluntarily disclosed that its subsidiaries had made improper 
payments to customs officials in Argentina and Venezuela.357 
 
Between 2003 and 2008, H&P’s subsidiaries in Argentina and Venezuela had made a number 
of payments to Argentinian and Venezuelan customs officials in connection with the 
importation and exportation of goods and equipment. H&P’s Argentinian subsidiary made a 
number of payments (most were for less than $5,000) which totalled approximately $166,000. 
In addition, its Venezuelan subsidiary also made a number of payments (less than $2,000 
each) totalling approximately $7,000. H&P made a modest saving overall as a result of making 
these payments. The evidence showed that the primary reason for making these payments was 
to expedite the importation and exportation of goods and equipment. 
 
Although the US Department of Justice treated these payments as improper so as to bring 
them within the scope of the FCPA (it could not treat them as facilitation payments otherwise 
they would have been excluded from the ambit of the FCPA), Krause and Wiygul argue that 
they were, on the face of it, facilitation payments.358 Of course, it does not follow from this that 
 
356 Rebecca Koch, ‘The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: It’s time to cut back the grease and add some guidance’ 
(2005) 28 (2) Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 380, 395. 
357 United States' Department of Justice, ‘Helmerich & Payne Agrees to Pay $1 Million Penalty to Resolve 
Allegations of Foreign Bribery in South America’ (Press Release, 30 July 2009) 
<http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/July/09-crm-741.html> accessed 9 June 2012. 
358 Cheryl A Krause and Elisa T Wiygul, ‘FCPA Compliance: The Vanishing "Facilitating Payments" Exception?’ 
(2010) 2 (8) Financial Fraud Law Report 730, 733. 
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a federal court would necessarily have agreed or arrived at the same conclusion as the US 
Department of Justice. Moreover, it is important to note that the US Department of Justice’s 
stance was not challenged by H&P. This is not surprising, however, given that H&P 
voluntarily disclosed the making of the payments (no doubt to protect itself from a criminal 
prosecution). However, for the purposes of analysis, the payments made by H&P’s 
subsidiaries will be treated as facilitation payments. Let us apply our analytical framework to 
this example. 
 
Part 1: The 2010 Act 
 
We must consider the liability of both H&P and the employees of its subsidiaries based in 
both Argentina and Venezuela. In terms of H&P’s position, we know that it was the parent of 
both subsidiaries. That being so, we must consider whether H&P is liable under section 7 of 
the 2010 Act. It will be recalled that section 7 is concerned with the failure of commercial 
organisations to prevent bribery by persons associated with it. However, for the purposes of 
analysis, we will need to overlook the fact that H&P is not a UK registered company. This is 
because section 7(6) makes it clear that the 2010 Act only applies to relevant commercial 
organisations which are either incorporated in the UK or which carry on business in any part 
of the UK.  
 
As for section 7, this states that a commercial organisation (C) is guilty of failing to prevent 
bribery if a person associated with it bribes another person (i.e. by acting in the ways set out in 
either section 1 or section 6) for the purposes of obtaining or retaining business or an 
advantage in the conduct of business for C. However, C has a defence to section 7 if it can 
show that it had in place adequate procedures designed to prevent such conduct. 
 
In the instant case, there is no difficulty with establishing that the employees of both 
subsidiaries were associated with H&P. That is, because the latter is the parent of both the 
Argentinian and the Venezuelan subsidiaries. The real question is whether the employees 
bribed the customs officials by acting in the ways set out in section 1 (offences of bribing 
another person) or section 6 (bribery of foreign public officials) for the purposes of obtaining 
or retaining business. Let us begin by looking at the provisions of section 1. 
 
The first part of this question need not trouble us for long as it will be recalled that section 1 
states that a person is guilty of bribery if he offers, promises, or gives an advantage (whether 
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by himself or through a third party) to another person with the intention of inducing that 
person (or another person) to perform a relevant function or activity improperly (case 1) or in 
the knowledge or belief that the acceptance of the advantage would itself constitute the 
improper performance of a relevant function or activity (case 2). 
 
The first part of section 1 is easily satisfied as it was common ground that the employees had 
given an advantage in the form of monetary payments to the customs officials in order to 
expedite matters. As to case 1, we know from the facts that the reason that the employees 
made these payments was to expedite the importation and exportation of goods and 
equipment. In the absence of such payments, the evidence suggests that there would have 
been significant delays to these activities. We can infer from this that the payments made by 
the employees were intended to induce the customs officials into expediting the importation 
and exportation of H&P’s goods and equipment. To this end, it is submitted that the customs 
officials were performing a relevant function or activity for the purposes of the 2010 Act given 
that they were public officials who were expected to act in good faith (i.e. they were under a 
duty to perform their duties without any additional reward). Moreover, there is no doubt that 
a reasonable person looking at the transaction would hold that the customs officials had 
performed their duties improperly. It is important to note that section 5(2) of the 2010 Act 
tells us to disregard any local practice or custom which requires the making of a payment 
unless the same is permitted or required by the written law applicable to the country 
concerned. There is no evidence that the payments in the present case were permitted or 
required by the written of either Argentina or Venezuela. Let us therefore hold that case 1 is 
satisfied. 
 
Case 2 need not trouble us for long either as it must have been obvious to the employees that 
the mere acceptance of money by the customs officials would constitute the improper 
performance of a relevant function or activity. Thus, we can see that the employees’ conduct 
also satisfies case 2. 
 
However, that is not the end of the matter because section 7 states that a commercial 
organisation is guilty if a person associated with it bribes another person for the purposes of 
obtaining or retaining business or an advantage in the conduct of business for the commercial 
organisation. It is submitted that as a result of making improper payments, H&P both 
obtained business and secured an advantage in the conduct of business. As to the former, 
although H&P only made a modest overall saving, there is no doubt that the making of 
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improper payments allowed its subsidiaries to operate in Argentina and Venezuela and 
thereby obtain business. As to the latter, we know that as a direct result of making these 
payments, H&P was able to expedite the importation and exportation of goods and 
equipment. In other words, it avoided delay; which is always advantageous in a business 
context. 
 
In short, we can see from this analysis that H&P, as a commercial organisation, would be 
caught by the provisions of section 7 (but for the jurisdictional bar which we have overlooked) 
for failing to prevent bribery by its employees. However, as we noted earlier, H&P may have a 
defence to this if it can show that it had in place adequate procedures designed to prevent such 
conduct. In the instant case, there is no evidence of any adequate procedures. In fact, the 
evidence suggests the contrary as H&P not only accepted a fine of $1 million, it also agreed to 
strengthen its compliance procedures.359 
 
Let us now consider the liability of the employees of the Argentinian and Venezuelan 
subsidiaries under section 6 of the 2010 Act. This states that a person who offers, promises or 
gives an advantage to a foreign public official (F) with the intention of influencing F in order 
to obtain or retain business or an advantage in the conduct of business, is guilty of bribery 
unless the payment of the advantage is permitted by the written law in F’s jurisdiction. 
 
In the context of the present case, there is no dispute that the employees had given an 
advantage in the form of monetary payments to foreign public officials in Argentina and 
Venezuela (i.e. the customs officials). Moreover, it is clear that by making these payments, the 
employees intended to influence the customs officials into expediting the importation and 
exportation of goods and equipment. We can infer from this that the improper payments were 
made in order to influence the customs officials in order to obtain business and avoid delays. 
These payments were contrary to the law in both Argentina and Venezuela; hence the fine by 
the US Department of Justice. Thus, we can see that the employees would be personally liable 
under section 6 of the 2010 Act. 
 
 
359 United States' Department of Justice, ‘Helmerich & Payne Agrees to Pay $1 Million Penalty to Resolve 
Allegations of Foreign Bribery in South America’ (Press Release, 30 July 2009) 
<http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/July/09-crm-741.html> accessed 9 June 2012. 
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Part 2: The law in the USA 
 
The second part of our analytical framework presents us with a conundrum. The US 
Department of Justice was unable to treat the payments made by the employees as facilitation 
payments because the FCPA (which deals with the bribery of foreign public officials) excludes 
facilitation payments made for the purposes of expediting or securing the performance of 
routine governmental action by a foreign public official. 
 
The US Department of Justice has overcome this difficulty by proceeding on the basis of a 
fiction. In order to bring facilitation payments within the remit of the FCPA, the US 
Department of Justice has adopted two approaches. The first approach is to treat facilitation 
payments as improper payments. This then allows the US Department of Justice to enter into 
non-prosecution agreements with potential defendants (as in the present case). The second 
approach is to bring prosecutions for violations of the FCPA’s accounting requirements.360 
 
If we maintain this fiction (i.e. that the payments were “improper”), it is easy to bring the 
payments made by H&P’s employees in Argentina and Venezuela within the remit of the 
FCPA. Recall that the FCPA makes it an offence for a person or an organisation to bribe a 
foreign public official (F) by corruptly giving something of value to F for the purposes of, inter 
alia, influencing any decision of F, inducing F to act in violation of his lawful duty, or securing 
any improper advantage for the purpose of obtaining business. The term “corruptly” is not 
defined in the FCPA but has been interpreted as meaning any conduct which involves a 
consciousness of wrongdoing.361 
 
Looking at the facts, there is no dispute that the employees offered something of value to 
foreign public officials (i.e. the customs officials) in the form of monetary payments. We also 
know that they did this in order expedite the importation and exportation of goods and 
equipment. If the employees had not paid the customs officials, it is clear that there would 
have been significant delays to both the importation and exportation of H&P’s goods and 
equipment. It is arguable that the payments were made in order to influence the decision 
 
360 Joseph W Yockey, ‘FCPA Settlement, Internal Strife, and the "Culture Of Compliance"’ [2012] (2) Wisconsin 
Law Review 689, 712. 
361 Arthur Andersen LLP v United States 125 S Ct 2129 (2005). 
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making of the customs officials, or to induce them into acting in violation of their duties, or to 
secure an improper advantage for the purpose of obtaining business. As to the mens rea 
element, it would have been obvious to any reasonable person let alone the employees, that 
they should not have offered bribes to the customs officials. The fact that they did therefore 
suggests a consciousness of wrongdoing on their parts; especially when we consider what their 
motives were for making the payments. 
 
We can see from this analysis that both H&P and the employees at its Argentinian and 
Venezuelan subsidiaries would be caught by the provisions of the FCPA (but for the bar 
discussed earlier). 
 
Part 3: Harm and wrongdoing 
 
Let us now look at the primary harm resulting from our example. It is submitted that the 
primary victim in our example is H&P. After all, there is no evidence to suggest that it was 
directly involved in the bribing of customs officials. Rather, it appears that a small number of 
rogue employees at its Argentinian and Venezuelan subsidiaries took matters into their hands 
by making corrupt payments to a number of customs officials. The fact that H&P is liable for 
the misconduct of these employees does not detract from the force of our argument. The $1 
million fine imposed upon H&P was intended to punish it for the fact that it did not have in 
place adequate procedures to prevent the making of corrupt payments rather than any direct 
wrongdoing on its part. 
 
As to the harm suffered by H&P, there is no doubt that the employees were under a duty of 
loyalty. It is submitted that by their misconduct, the employees set back this duty 
notwithstanding the fact that they were trying to advance the interests of H&P. However, 
rather than benefitting H&P, it is clear that as a direct result of their misconduct, H&P was 
fined $1 million. Of course, this is in addition to the damage suffered by H&P to its reputation 
(which may have impacted upon its business and therefore caused further financial loss). 
 
Let us now turn to the indirect harm. It is arguable that the indirect harm was to H&P’s 
competitors who were not able to expedite the importation and exportation of their goods and 
equipment. In other words, they were denied a level playing field. It is clear from the evidence 
that if proper procedures had been followed by the employees, not only would the 
importation and exportation have taken considerably longer, it would also have cost more. By 
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engaging in corrupt conduct, the employees were able to secure a competitive advantage over 
H&P’s innocent competitors. 
 
In terms of the remote harm stemming from our example, it is helpful to borrow from the 
general literature. This tells us that the bribery of public officials is harmful because it has an 
adverse effect on the proper functioning of government (i.e. the governments of Argentina 
and Venezuela). For example, if such conduct were to become pervasive, it would represent a 
rise in the price of administration which the public is forced to endure. But of more concern is 
the fact that such corruption, if left unchecked, has the potential to grow and spillover into 
other institutional structures until the entire machinery of the government becomes corrupt. 
This can lead to a reduction in the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the public 
(which may in turn lead to civil unrest). 
 
This view is supported by the Law Commission which argues that a culture in which 
facilitation payments are regular and accepted is undesirable. According to the Law 
Commission, if such conduct were to become pervasive, it would lead to a gradual decline in 
the proper functioning of government.362 Thus, we can see that the misconduct of the 
employees constituted a setback to the Argentinian and Venezuelan peoples’ right to a 
properly functioning government (a public interest). 
 
Finally, let us consider the wrongdoing in our example. It will be recalled that the primary 
harm suffered by H&P was to its financial interests. This occurred as a direct result of the 
employees breaching their duty of loyalty (because of which H&P was fined $1 million). As 
with any employer, H&P had a right to expect that its employees (whether its own or those of 
its subsidiaries) would promote its interests by acting in accordance with the law and not in a 
way which might render it liable to criminal sanctions. On any view, by breaching their duty 
of loyalty, the employees violated that right and thereby wronged H&P. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
362 Law Commission, Reforming Bribery (2008, Law Com Report No 313) 86. 
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THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY CASE 
 
In our previous example (the Helmerich & Payne case), we proceeded on the basis that the 
payments made by the employees were improper rather than facilitation payments. Let us 
consider an example involving facilitation payments. 
 
In 2007, the Dow Chemical Company (Dow USA), a US company with a subsidiary in India 
(Dow India), agreed to the imposition of a cease and desist order by the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (the SEC).363 In order to market its products in India, Dow India was 
required by Indian law to register its products at both federal and state level. Employees at 
Dow India found it very difficult to secure the necessary registration without making 
facilitation payments. For example, at federal level, a public official refused to register Dow 
India’s products and threatened to delay registration unless he was paid a financial 
inducement. At state level, low-level public officials made similar demands. In order to 
overcome these difficulties, employees at Dow India arranged for the payment of a number of 
facilitation payments totalling approximately $200,000. As a direct result of making these 
facilitation payments, Dow India managed to expedite the registration of its products and 
generated $435,000 from accelerated sales. 
 
The matter came to light when Dow USA conducted an internal investigation. At the close of 
the investigation, Dow USA voluntarily reported the matter to the SEC (as well as taking 
remedial steps such as disciplining its employees at Dow India). The disclosure was made with 
a view to avoiding any criminal sanctions. 
 
The SEC agreed that Dow India’s employees had made facilitation payments. Of course, this 
meant that the payments fell outside the scope of the FCPA. However, in a sign of the 
intolerance shown towards facilitation payments, the SEC alleged that Dow USA had failed to 
keep proper records of the facilitation payments contrary to the FCPA’s record keeping 
provisions. Dow USA made no admissions in respect of this alleged failure (or indeed any 
wrongdoing under the FCPA). Instead, it agreed to the imposition of a cease and desist order. 
 
363 United States' Securities and Exchange Commission, ‘SEC Files Settled Enforcement Action Against the Dow 
Chemical Company for Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations’ (Press Release, 13 February 2007) 
<http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20000.htm> accessed 10 June 2012. 
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Part 1: The 2010 Act 
 
In order to apply the first part of our analytical framework, we must overlook the fact that 
Dow USA is not a UK registered company (it will be recalled that section 7(6) of the 2010 Act 
makes it clear that the 2010 Act only applies to commercial organisations which are registered 
in the UK or which carry on business in the UK). 
 
Let us begin by looking at Dow USA’s liability. It will be recalled that section 7 of the 2010 Act, 
which is concerned with the failure of commercial organisations to prevent bribery, states that 
a commercial organisation (C) is guilty of failing to prevent bribery if a person associated with 
it bribes another person (in the ways set out in sections 1 and 6) in order to obtain or retain 
business or an advantage in the conduct of business for C. The only exception is if C can show 
that it had in place adequate procedures to prevent such conduct. 
 
There is no difficulty with showing that Dow India’s employees are associated with Dow USA 
for the purposes of section 7 given that the latter is the former’s parent company. That being 
so, the next step is to consider whether Dow India’s employees bribed the public officials by 
acting in the ways set out in section 1 (offences of bribing another person) or section 6 
(bribery of foreign public officials) for the purposes of obtaining or retaining business. 
 
Let us begin by looking at the provisions of section 1. It will be recalled that section 1 states 
that a person (P) is guilty of bribery if he offers, promises, or gives an advantage (whether by 
himself or through a third party) to another person (R) with the intention of inducing that 
person (or another person) to perform a relevant function or activity improperly (case 1) or in 
the knowledge or belief that the acceptance of the advantage would itself constitute the 
improper performance of a relevant function or activity by R (case 2). 
 
There is no problem with satisfying the first part of section 1 as it is clear from the facts that 
Dow India’s employees gave an advantage in the form of monetary payments to public 
officials in order to expedite the registration of Dow India’s products. The question is whether 
they did so with the intention of inducing the public officials to perform a relevant function or 
activity improperly (case 1) or in the knowledge or belief that the acceptance of the advantage 
would itself constitute the improper performance of a relevant function or activity (case 2). 
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Dealing with case 1, there is little doubt that the public officials were performing a relevant 
function or activity. They were performing a function of a public nature and were therefore 
expected to act in good faith. It is clear from the facts that by paying bribes, Dow India’s 
employees intended to induce the public officials into expediting the registration of Dow 
India’s products. That is, they intended for the public officials to act improperly. It is 
submitted that a reasonable person looking at the matter would hold that by accepting these 
bribes, the public officials had performed their functions improperly. Thus, we can see that 
the misconduct of Dow India’s employees is caught by section 1 (case 1). Of course, it might 
be argued that Dow India’s employees had no choice and that they only paid the public 
officials to do that which they ought to have done without any additional reward. But this 
argument is too simplistic because it fails to acknowledge the fact that Dow India’s employees 
should not have succumbed to the public officials’ demands. It may be that this aspect of the 
case is better regarded as mitigation (especially in any sentencing exercise before a court of 
law). 
 
However, even if we are wrong about case 1, it is submitted case 2 is also satisfied. In order to 
satisfy this, we must show that Dow India’s employees knew or believed that the acceptance of 
bribes by the public officials would itself constitute the improper performance of a relevant 
activity. This need not trouble us for long since it would have been obvious to any reasonable 
person that one should not offer a bribe to a public official. The fact that Dow USA disciplined 
Dow India’s employees for doing so lends support to this proposition. Let us therefore hold 
that case 2 is also satisfied. 
 
Finally, we must consider whether Dow India’s employees acted in the ways described above 
for the purposes of obtaining or retaining business or an advantage in the conduct of Dow 
India’s business. We need not dwell on this since it is clear from the facts that Dow India’s 
employees paid the bribes in order to register Dow India’s products and thereby obtain 
business. We can support this argument by reference to the fact that as a direct result of their 
corrupt conduct, Dow India generated $435,000 from accelerated sales. 
 
We can see from this analysis that, but for the jurisdictional bar discussed earlier, Dow USA 
would be caught by the provisions of section 7 of the 2010 Act. As to the adequate procedures 
defence under section 7, there is no evidence to suggest that either Dow USA or Dow India 
had in place adequate procedures to prevent their employees from engaging in corrupt 
conduct. Instead, there is evidence to the contrary given that Dow USA took remedial action 
 186
 
including giving Dow India’s employees compliance training. Let us therefore hold that Dow 
USA is caught by the prohibition in section 7. 
 
We must now consider the liability of Dow India’s employees under section 6 of the 2010 Act. 
It will be recalled that section 6 states that a person who offers, promises or gives an advantage 
to a foreign public official (F) with the intention of influencing F in order to obtain or retain 
business or an advantage in the conduct of business, is guilty of bribery unless the payment of 
the advantage is permitted by the written law in F’s jurisdiction. 
 
In the present example, we have seen that Dow India’s employees arranged for the payment of 
facilitation payments to a number of public officials. It is also clear that by their actions, they 
intended to influence these public officials into expediting the registration of Dow India’s 
products. In view of the fact that facilitation payments are not permitted by the written law of 
India, it follows that the conduct of Dow India’s employees would be caught by section 6. 
 
Part 2: The law in the USA 
 
The second part of our analytical framework need not detain us for long. The reason for the 
brevity is because the FCPA excludes facilitation payments which are made for the purposes 
of expediting or securing the performance of routine governmental action by a foreign public 
official. The phrase “routine governmental action” includes the obtaining of permits, licenses, 
or other official documents which are required for the purposes of conducting business in a 
foreign country. On the face of it, this would appear to cover the payments made by Dow 
India’s employees. 
 
However, it does not follow from this exclusion that facilitation payments are not regarded as 
a core case of corruption in the USA. Rather, it is submitted that the exclusion of facilitation 
payments is best regarded as a historical hangover. When the FCPA was enacted in 1977, the 
US Congress was concerned that facilitation payments were a routine part of doing business 
in other parts of the world and that prohibiting US companies from making such payments, 
on top of the restrictions already imposed by the FCPA, would put them at a competitive 
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disadvantage in the global marketplace.364  It was this concern which gave rise to the 
facilitation payments exception in the FCPA. 
 
The position today is very different. Most countries have some sort of anti-corruption 
legislation with no exception for facilitation payments. This is true even in the USA where 
facilitation payments paid to domestic public officials are proscribed at both federal and state 
level. The lacuna exists only in respect of payments made to foreign public officials. However, 
the fact that the US Department of Justice and the SEC have adopted a tougher stance against 
such payments supports our argument that facilitation payments are regarded as being a core 
case of corruption even in the USA. 
 
Part 3: Harm and wrongdoing 
 
Let us now analyse the harm and wrongdoing stemming from our example. As with our 
previous example (the Helmerich & Payne case), it is submitted that the primary harm is to 
the interests of Dow USA. By arranging for the payment of facilitation payments, Dow India’s 
employees must have been alert to the potential harm to Dow USA’s financial interests (and 
the adverse effect on Dow USA’s reputation if the matter came to light). Of course, it is 
arguable that they may not have considered this risk in view of the fact that facilitation 
payments are permitted by the FCPA. However, notwithstanding this, it is submitted that they 
must have been aware that such payments are, at the very least, not permitted under Indian 
law. Thus, by arranging for the payment of facilitation payments, Dow India’s employees 
risked exposing Dow India and Dow USA to criminal sanctions in India. In this way, they 
breached their duty to act in accordance with the law and not jeopardise Dow USA’s financial 
interests. It is obvious that a commercial organisation cannot function (legitimately) unless it 
can trust its employees to promote its interests in a lawful manner. 
 
Turning to the indirect harm, this too is similar to our previous example. It is submitted that 
the indirect harm resulting from the misconduct of Dow India’s employees was to Dow 
India’s competitors in India. In particular, those innocent commercial organisations which 
 
364 Jon Jordan, ‘The OECD's Call For an End to "Corrosive" Facilitation Payments and the International Focus on 
the Facilitation Payments Exception Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’ (2011) 13 (4) University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 881, 891. 
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did not resort to making corrupt facilitation payments in the way that Dow India’s employees 
did. The net result is that these innocent competitors would have been subjected to delays 
when they sought to register their products. By contrast, not only did Dow India expedite the 
registration process, it also generated a substantial sum in income (approximately $435,000) 
through accelerated sales. It is clear that, but for the making of facilitation payments, Dow 
India would not have been able to generate these sums through accelerated sales. In short, the 
harm suffered by these innocent competitors was economic in nature. For a commercial 
organisation, any setback to its financial interests constitutes a setback to its welfare interests. 
 
The remote harm arising from our example is also similar to our previous example. The 
general literature on corruption suggests that the payment of facilitation payments can lead to 
a gradual decline in the proper functioning of government. In India, where there is already a 
deep-rooted problem with bureaucratic corruption, the payment of facilitation payments by 
Dow India’s employees would simply have added to this unwanted problem. We can derive 
support for this argument from the fact that the facilitation payments were made over a 
period of five years (between 1996 and 2001).365 This suggests that, far from being one-off 
payments, the corrupt public officials were emboldened by the payment of facilitation 
payments and made repeated demands. 
 
Finally, let us consider the wrongdoing in our example. We have already observed that by 
arranging for the payment of facilitation payments, Dow India’s employees breached their 
duty of loyalty to Dow USA. By acting in this way, they wronged Dow USA insofar as they 
violated its right to expect that its employees would act in accordance with the law and not 
jeopardise its financial interests. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the payment of the 
facilitation payments resulted in a substantial number of accelerated sales, the employees’ 
conduct was nonetheless both harmful and wrongful. 
 
 
 
 
 
365 United States' Securities and Exchange Commission, ‘SEC Files Settled Enforcement Action Against the Dow 
Chemical Company for Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations’ (Press Release, 13 February 2007) 
<http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr20000.htm> accessed 10 June 2012. 
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6. EXTORTION 
 
Extortion is the practice of obtaining property (usually money) from a person through the use 
of coercion. There are two distinct forms of extortion which are connected by the presence of 
coercion: blackmail and extortion under the colour of official right.366 
 
The first of these, blackmail,367 refers to a situation where a person obtains property from 
another, with his consent, through the use of threats. It is important to qualify this statement 
by explaining that we are talking here about an invalid consent. That is, because it is not 
uncoerced, informed, and competent. The paradigm example consists of a blackmailer 
threatening to reveal an adulterous affair unless the victim pays the blackmailer a sum of 
money.368 
 
The second type of extortion is less egregious and describes a situation where a public official 
obtains property from a person under the colour of official right through the use of 
compulsion. This form of misconduct used to be an offence under the English common law 
until it was abolished.369 Extortion under the colour of official right usually manifests itself as a 
demand by a public official for performing (or not performing) a function which he is 
required to perform without any additional reward. For example, a public official may decline 
to process an application promptly unless he is paid a bribe. In the USA, it has been held that 
the difference between bribery and extortion under the colour of official right lies in the fact 
that the essence of the former is voluntariness whereas the essence of the latter is duress.370 
 
 
366 James Lindgren, ‘The Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribery-Extortion Distinction’ (1993) 141 (5) 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1695; Stuart P. Green, Lying, Cheating, and Stealing: A Moral Theory of 
White-Collar Crime (Oxford University Press, 2006) 37. 
367 Section 21 of the Theft Act 1968 makes blackmail a criminal offence. 
368 James Lindgren, ‘Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail’ (1984) 84 (3) Columbia Law Review 670; Grant 
Lamond, ‘Coercion, Threats, and the Puzzle of Blackmail’ in AP Simester and ATH Smith (eds), Harm and 
Culpability (Clarendon Press, 1996) 215, 215. 
369 The common law offence of extortion was abolished by section 32(1)(a) of the Theft Act 1968. 
370 United States v Addonzio 451 F.2d 49 (3rd Cir. 1972). 
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The dividing line between what constitutes blackmail and what constitutes extortion under 
the colour of official right is sometimes blurred, and there may be occasions when a given type 
of conduct crosses the threshold of both. 
 
Some dictionaries suggest that extortion (in the broader sense) also includes the obtaining of 
property from another through the use of force.371 However, it is submitted that this is 
technically incorrect as the use of force has the effect of transforming extortive conduct into 
robbery. Extortion differs from robbery in that the former involves the obtaining of another’s 
property with their (invalid) consent through the use of coercion. By contrast, robbery 
involves the taking (i.e. theft) of another’s property through the threat or actual use of force 
before or at the time of the theft. 
 
Our concern in this section is with extortion under the colour of official right. Such conduct is 
regarded by many as being a core type of corruption.372 There is no consideration of blackmail 
or robbery as these do not generally feature in the scholarship as being core cases of 
corruption. Robbery, as defined above, is easy to distinguish since it requires the threat or 
actual use of force which is not a feature of any type of corruption. Blackmail is rather more 
difficult to distinguish. It may be that in some cases, such conduct may also fall within the 
wider definition of corruption. 
 
Let us consider some examples of extortion under the colour of official right. 
 
SANTIAGO VALLE 
 
In 2006, Santiago Valle was tried and convicted by a jury of bribery and extortion.373 Valle was 
employed as an immigration and customs enforcement agent at an immigration holding and 
 
371 Catherine Soanes and Angus Stevenson (eds), The Oxford Dictionary of English (Oxford University Press, 
2005). 
372 Thomas L. Carson, ‘Bribery, Extortion, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’ (1985) 14 (1) Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 66; James Lindgren, ‘The Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribery-Extortion Distinction’ 
(1993) 141 (5) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1695; Jeremy Pope, TI Source Book 2000 (2nd edn, 
Transparency International, 2000) 17. 
373 Summarised from United States v Valle 538 F 3d 341 (2008). 
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processing detention facility in El Paso, Texas, USA. His duties included, inter alia, reviewing 
detainees’ detention files and gathering intelligence. 
  
During the course of his employment, Valle came into contact with Francisco Gutierrez-Avila, 
a Mexican national who had been detained at the facility. In a meeting between the pair, Valle 
informed Gutierrez-Avila that he had removed criminal charges against him and demanded 
that Gutierrez-Avila pay him $20,000 for this action. Gutierrez-Avila reported the matter to 
his attorney who in turn contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation (the FBI). In a 
subsequent meeting, an undercover agent from the FBI, posing as Gutierrez-Avila’s brother-
in-law, paid Valle $20,000 and covertly recorded Valle’s admission that the money was for 
removing criminal charges against Gutierrez-Avila. Let us apply our analytical framework to 
this example. 
 
Part 1: The 2010 Act 
 
Recall section 2 of the 2010 Act which is concerned with the receipt of bribes. This states that 
a person (R) is guilty of being bribed if he requests, agrees to receive, or accepts an advantage 
in the circumstances set out in cases 3 to 6. 
 
There is no issue with the first part of section 2 since Valle both requested and accepted 
$20,000. The key question is whether Valle acted in one of the ways prohibited by cases 3 to 6. 
Case 3, which requires proof of intention, states that R is guilty of being bribed if he accepts an 
advantage with the intention of performing a relevant function or activity improperly. On a 
literal interpretation, it might be argued that case 3 is not satisfied because Valle did not 
request or accept an advantage (i.e. the $20,000) in advance of committing an improper act 
(i.e. removing the criminal charges against Gutierrez-Avila). Rather, as can be seen from the 
facts, Valle demanded an advantage after he had committed the improper act. It is therefore 
arguable that he did not accept the advantage with the intention of performing a relevant 
function improperly. Let us therefore hold that case 3 is not satisfied. 
 
However, the same objection cannot be taken in respect of cases 4 to 6. It will be recalled that 
these are strict liability and therefore, unlike case 3, there is no need to prove mens rea. Case 4 
states that R is guilty of being bribed if his request or receipt of an advantage itself constitutes 
the improper performance of a relevant function or activity. 
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There is no difficulty with establishing that Valle was performing a relevant function or 
activity. We know from section 3 that a relevant function or activity is one which is of a public 
nature, connected with a business, performed in the course of employment, or performed on 
behalf of a body of persons (corporate or unincorporate), and the person performing it is 
expected to act in good faith, impartially, or in accordance with a position of trust. As a public 
official, it is obvious that Valle was performing a function of a public nature and that this 
necessarily imposed upon him a duty to act in good faith. That being so, it is submitted that it 
would have been obvious to Valle that he should neither have requested nor accepted any 
kind of advantage. He was required to perform his duties in good faith. Thus, we can see that 
the facts of our current example are caught by case 4. 
 
However, the circumstances of our example are such that it is arguable that cases 5 and 6 are 
also satisfied. Case 5 states that R is guilty of being bribed where the advantage is a reward for 
having improperly performed a relevant function or activity. By contrast, case 6 states R is 
guilty if, in anticipation of receiving an advantage, he performs a relevant function or activity 
improperly. We know from the facts that Valle removed the criminal charges before 
demanding payment from Gutierrez-Avila. That being so, it is arguable that Valle’s request 
and acceptance of an advantage constituted a reward (case 5). In the alternative, it might be 
argued that in anticipation of receiving an advantage, he removed the charges against 
Gutierrez-Avila (case 6). In sum, we can see that Valle’s misconduct is also caught by cases 5 
and 6. 
 
Part 2: The law in the USA 
 
Let us now turn to the second part of our analytical framework. The bribery of domestic 
public officials is dealt with by 18 USC § 201. According to section 201(b)(2), a public official 
is guilty of bribery if he corruptly seeks or accepts anything of value in return for being 
influenced in his capacity as a public official. 
 
In the present example, Valle was charged and convicted of two separate offences: bribery 
under section 201(b)(2) and extortion under section 18 USC § 872. The reason for this is that 
unlike the law in England and Wales, extortion remains a distinct offence under US federal 
law. However, notwithstanding this, it is submitted that the extortive parts of Valle’s conduct 
would, in any event, have been caught by the federal anti-bribery provisions set out in section 
201(b)(2). Let us put this idea to the test. 
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First, it is obvious that Valle was a public official for the purposes of section 201(b)(2). That is, 
because he was performing an official function on behalf of the government. Second, he 
corruptly sought a financial advantage from Gutierrez-Avila for having acted improperly in 
his capacity as a public official. It is clear from the facts that Valle’s sole reason for removing 
the criminal charges against Gutierrez-Avila was to seek a financial reward. It was the 
prospect of such a reward which influenced Valle’s conduct as a public official. Third, it also 
will be recalled that the term “corruptly” in section 201(b)(2) requires a quid pro quo. This is 
easily satisfied because Valle not only removed the criminal charges, he also received $20,000 
from an undercover FBI agent. It might be thought that there was no quid pro quo because 
the money received by Valle from the undercover FBI agent was most likely recovered 
following his arrest. However, it is submitted that this argument is illusory because, on any 
view, Valle had already committed the mischief before his arrest. The fact that the money may 
have been recovered is therefore immaterial. The quid pro quo in section 201(b)(2) does not 
require that the offender retain any advantage received. 
 
In short, we can see from this analysis that extortion is not only proscribed as a distinct 
offence in the USA. It is conduct which is also likely to be caught by the USA’s anti-corruption 
statutes; thereby lending further support to our argument that extortion is a core case of 
corruption. 
 
Part 3: Harm and wrongdoing 
 
Let us now consider the harm and wrongdoing arising from Valle’s misconduct. Starting with 
the primary harm, it might be thought that there are two potential victims: Gutierrez-Avila 
and the US government. However, it is submitted that whilst Gutierrez-Avila was no doubt 
inconvenienced, it is stretching matters somewhat to describe him as the primary victim of 
Valle’s misconduct. Rather, it is submitted that the more obvious candidate is the US 
government. As an employee of the US government, Valle was under a duty to act in its best 
interests. There is no doubt that he breached this duty when he removed Gutierrez-Avila’s 
criminal charges and demanded a payment in return. The US government was entitled to 
expect that Valle would observe his duties as an immigration and customs enforcement agent. 
 
The indirect harm arising from Valle’s conduct is of a different nature. It is submitted that the 
innocent victim of Valle’s misconduct was Gutierrez-Avila. The latter was no doubt 
inconvenienced and his application was most likely delayed as a result of Valle’s misconduct. 
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However, without further information it is difficult to state with precision which of his 
interests were set back (i.e. his welfare interests or his ulterior interests). Obviously a setback 
to a person’s welfare interests is more serious than a setback to his ulterior interests. 
Nonetheless, we can be fairly sure that Valle’s misconduct must have resulted in some form of 
indirect harm to Gutierrez-Avila’s interests. 
 
The remote harm stemming from Valle’s misconduct is easier to identify. The general 
scholarship on corruption tells us that if immigration controls were to be regularly breached 
by public officials, there would be a number of unwanted consequences. The most obvious 
and serious remote harm is the threat to national security. It is trite that the implementation 
and enforcement of immigration controls are of paramount importance to all states. The 
threat to national security demands that public officials do not erase criminal charges since 
these are an important indicator of whether an individual poses a security risk. If the charges 
are sufficiently serious, an individual may even be refused entry. It is therefore arguable that 
Valle’s misconduct resulted in a setback to the public’s interest in the maintenance of proper 
and effective immigration controls. Of course, this is not the only remote harm. Other remote 
harms include the strain on public services which would result if there were an unauthorised 
relaxation of immigration controls. 
 
Finally, we must consider the question of wrongdoing. It is submitted Valle wronged the US 
government through his disloyalty. When Valle engaged in corruption, he set aside his duty to 
act in good faith in favour of his own self-interest. The US government, like all employers, has 
an interest in a loyal workforce which acts in its best interests. This is an important welfare 
interest in that an employer cannot hope to flourish without a loyal and law abiding 
workforce. By engaging in corruption, Valle set back this important welfare interest and 
thereby wronged the US government. 
 
Let us consider another example. 
 
THE SOCHI 2014 SCANDAL 
 
In 2006, Sergei Evdokimenko, a public official with responsibility for federal property in 
Sochi, Russia, was approached by a local businessman, Viktor Babii. The city of Sochi was 
bidding to host the 2014 Olympic Winter Games and Babii wanted to tender for construction 
contracts in the event that Sochi was selected (which it subsequently was). Despite the fact that 
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Sochi had not yet been confirmed as the host city, Evdokimenko demanded a payment of 
approximately US $500,000 before he would consider Babii’s proposed tender. Babii declined 
to pay and instead reported the matter to the Russian Interior Ministry. Officials from the 
Interior Ministry devised a sting whereby they covertly filmed Evdokimenko receiving the 
money from Babii. Evdokimenko was subsequently arrested and charged with extortion.374 
 
Part 1: The 2010 Act 
 
Section 2 of the 2010 Act states that a person (R) is guilty of being bribed if he requests, agrees 
to receive, or accepts an advantage in the ways set out in cases 3 to 6. It will be recalled that 
whereas case 3 requires proof of mens rea (intention), cases 4 to 6 impose strict liability. It is 
submitted that only cases 3 and 4 are applicable to the facts of the present example. 
 
Let us begin by looking at case 3. This states that R is guilty of being bribed if he requests, 
agrees to receive, or accepts an advantage with the intention of performing a relevant function 
or activity improperly. Evdokimenko, as a public official, was obviously under a duty to act in 
good faith (i.e. because he was performing a relevant function). By requesting an advantage of 
US $500,000 it is clear that he breached this duty and that a reasonable person would hold that 
he had acted improperly. The only logical explanation as to why Evdokimenko made this 
demand is that he intended in return to perform his duties improperly. That is, upon receipt 
of US $500,000, he would have looked favourably upon Babii’s proposed tender for 
construction contracts. We can therefore see that case 3 is satisfied. 
 
Turning to case 4, it will be recalled that this states that R is guilty of being bribed if the 
request or receipt of the advantage itself constitutes an improper performance of a relevant 
function or activity. In the context of the present case, there is no doubt that Evdokimenko 
was not permitted to request an advantage before considering Babii’s proposed tender. We 
can support this by reference to the fact that the Russian Interior Ministry arrested and 
charged him after he was covertly taped accepting US $500,000 from Babii. If Evdokimenko 
had been entitled to make such a demand, he would not have been arrested and charged. In 
 
374 Alexandra Addison Wrage, Bribery and Extortion: Undermining Business, Governments, and Security 
(Praeger Security International, 2007) 91. 
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short, we can see that Evdokimenko’s demand constituted the improper performance of his 
duties. 
 
We can see from this analysis that Evdokimenko’s extortive conduct is caught by section 2 of 
the 2010 Act insofar as it satisfies the requirements of both cases 3 and 4. Let us therefore hold 
that this is an example of a core case of corruption. 
 
Part 2: The law in the USA 
 
We must now consider whether our example is regarded as a core case of corruption by the 
anti-corruption provisions in the USA. In determining this, we can immediately discount the 
FCPA on the basis that it is concerned with the bribery of foreign public officials whereas our 
example concerns the extortive conduct of a domestic public official. Likewise, we can also 
exclude from analysis the California Penal Code § 641.3 on the basis that this is concerned 
exclusively with private sector bribery whereas our example concerns an extortive demand 
made in the public sector. 
 
Rather, it is submitted that the appropriate statute under US law is 18 USC § 201. It will be 
recalled that section 201 proscribes the corruption (both active and passive) of public officials, 
jurors, and witnesses in the domestic context. In particular, section 201(b)(2) makes it an 
offence for a public official to corruptly seek or accept anything of value in return for being 
influenced in his capacity as a public official. In other words, it is an offence for a public 
official to engage in both active (seeking an inducement) and passive (accepting an 
inducement) bribery. 
 
Let us apply section 201(b)(2) to the facts of our example. We can deal with the non-
contentious matters fairly swiftly. There is no doubt that Evdokimenko was a public official. 
For the purposes of section 201(b)(2), a public official is defined as someone who acts on 
behalf of any branch of the government in any official function. This broad definition includes 
a person who occupies a position of trust with official federal responsibilities. Given that 
Evdokimenko had responsibility for making decisions about federal property in Sochi, it is 
clear that he falls within the definition of a public official for the purposes of section 201(b)(2). 
 
The next step is to consider whether Evdokimenko engaged in active or passive extortion. To 
this end, it will be recalled that Evdokimenko instigated the transaction by demanding a 
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payment of US $500,000 from Babii before he was prepared to discuss the latter’s proposed 
tender. Let us therefore hold that Evdokimenko was engaged in active extortion. 
 
That being so, the key question is whether by demanding US $500,000, Evdokimenko acted 
corruptly for the purposes of section 201(b)(2). In simple terms, was his demand for US 
$500,000 made in return for him acting improperly in the course of his duties as a public 
official? The facts, as set out, leave little room for manoeuvre. Evdokimenko was not entitled 
to demand an inducement for performing his duties. The fact that he did demand an 
inducement (and a sizeable one at that) can only lead to one inference. That is, if Babii had 
made the payment as requested, Evdokimenko would have looked favourably upon Babii’s 
proposed tender. Thus, we can see that the quid pro quo requirement in section 201(b)(2) is 
satisfied. Let us therefore hold that Evdokimenko’s extortion is caught by section 201(b)(2), 
and is therefore a core case of corruption in the USA. 
 
Part 3: Harm and wrongdoing 
 
Let us now consider the harm and wrongdoing resulting from Evdokimenko’s misconduct. As 
with our previous example, it is submitted that the primary harm in this example was not to 
Babii but to the Russian government. Evdokimenko was employed by the Russian government 
as a public official and he was therefore bound by a duty of loyalty. As an employee and public 
official, he was required to act in the interests of his employer and promote the public interest 
rather than acting in self-interest. By acting for his own benefit, Evdokimenko behaved in a 
manner which was diametrically opposed to the duty of loyalty which he owed to his 
employer. By demanding an inducement in circumstances when he should not have, 
Evdokimenko compromised not only his own integrity but also that of the Russian 
government. 
 
Turning to the indirect harm which resulted from Evdokimenko’s misconduct, it might be 
thought that the victim was Babii. However, it is submitted that this is incorrect. There is no 
doubt that Babii was inconvenienced by Evdokimenko’s demand. Having approached 
Evdokimenko in order to express an interest in tendering for constructions contracts, he was 
met with an extortive demand. But as we have seen, Babii did not give in to this demand and 
instead reported the matter to the Russian Interior Ministry with the result that Evdokimenko 
was arrested and charged for extortion. Had Babii not reported the matter, he may have been 
more than inconvenienced. The amount of the inducement demanded by Evdokimenko was 
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such that it may well have precluded Babii from participating in the tendering process. 
However, it is clear from the facts that Babii did not suffer any economic harm as the US 
$500,000 was provided by the Russian Interior Ministry as part of the sting. Moreover, Sochi 
had not yet been confirmed as the host city and Babii was simply expressing an interest in 
tendering for construction projects in the event that Sochi’s bid was successful. Following 
Evdokimenko’s arrest and charge, Babii was free to contact Evdokimenko’s successor in order 
to express his interest in tendering for construction projects. 
 
Of course, we would not be as sympathetic towards Babii if he had paid the inducement and 
not reported the matter. In this scenario, notwithstanding Evdokimenko’s extortion, we 
would regard Babii as someone who had engaged in an of criminality by bribing a public 
official. 
 
In the context of the present example, it is submitted that the indirect harm was to the 
residents of the city of Sochi. Hosting a prestigious event like the 2014 Olympic Winter Games 
(or any other major sporting event) usually brings with it many benefits for the residents of 
the host city. For example, there may be an economic benefit in the form of increased business 
driven by the visiting spectators and athletes, there may be lasting improvements made to the 
infrastructure of the city, and the worldwide media coverage may result in increased tourism. 
By engaging in an act of corruption, Evdokimenko jeopardised Sochi’s chances of hosting the 
2014 Olympic Winter Games. 
 
A sceptical reader might argue that there was no indirect harm as, notwithstanding 
Evdokimenko’s misconduct, Sochi was nonetheless selected as the host city. However, this 
does not detract from the fact that Evdokimenko unlawfully interfered with the residents’ 
interest in hosting the 2014 Olympic Winter Games. The fact that his misconduct did not 
ultimately derail Sochi’s bid is immaterial, and may have been down to luck. It does not take a 
great leap to see that Evdokimenko’s conduct could have been fatal to Sochi’s bid. In any 
event, there is no denying that Evdokimenko’s misconduct indirectly resulted in adverse 
publicity which tarnished the image of both the city of Sochi and its public officials. 
 
The remote harm resulting from Evdokimenko’s misconduct is easier to identify. The general 
literature tells us that when public officials routinely engage in extortion, they set back the 
public interest in the proper and efficient administration of government. This results in 
additional harms insofar as the public are required to pay bribes in order to access goods and 
 199
 
services from the government. Given that the public will already have been taxed once, the 
requirement to pay a bribe in order to transact business constitutes a second tax, and therefore 
a setback to financial interests. When such corruption becomes endemic, the government 
loses legitimacy in the eyes of the public; thereby paving the way for civil unrest. 
 
Finally, let us consider the wrongdoing in Evdokimenko’s conduct. We have already 
established that Evdokimenko acted in self-interest in circumstances when he was not 
permitted to do so. That is, because he owed a duty of loyalty to his employer (either the 
government or some manifestation of the public at large) to promote the public interest rather 
than his own self-interest. Evdokimenko wronged his employer when he set aside his duty of 
loyalty and sought to make an unlawful profit for himself. 
 
 
7. BID RIGGING 
 
Bid rigging is a form of collusive price-fixing whereby individuals or firms conspire to co-
ordinate their bids in order to secure procurement contracts.375 This may occur in at least four 
different ways. The first, cover bidding, occurs when the conspirators agree that one of them 
will be the lowest bidder and that the rest of them will submit inflated or unsuitable bids. The 
second, bid suppression, involves an agreement between the conspirators that one or more of 
them will refrain from bidding or withdraw a previously submitted bid so that another of 
them will be awarded the contract. The third, bid-rotation, describes a situation in which all 
the conspirators continue to submit bids for different procurement contracts but take it in 
turns to be the winning bidder (i.e. the one submitting the lowest tender). The fourth, market 
allocation, occurs when the conspirators carve up the market and agree not to compete for 
certain customers or certain geographic areas.376 
 
 
375 R. S. Khemani and D. M. Shapiro, ‘Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics and Competition Law’ 
(OECD, 1993) <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/61/2376087.pdf> accessed 8 July 2012. 
376 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Guidelines for Fighting Bid Rigging in Public 
Procurement: Helping Governments to Obtain Best Value for Money (2009) 1-2. 
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Bid-rigging (in all its guises) is regarded by many as a core type of corruption.377 For example, 
the Joint Committee on the Draft Corruption Bill criticised the draft Corruption Bill378 (not 
presented to Parliament) on the basis that it failed to proscribe the payment of an inducement 
by the principal of one firm to the principal of another firm in order to ensure that the latter 
does not tender for a particular contract (i.e. bid suppression).379 The Home Office did not 
take issue with the fact that such conduct is a core case of corruption. Instead, it sought to 
defend the draft Corruption Bill’s failure to capture bid rigging by suggesting that it was 
sufficient that such conduct is criminalised as a competition offence by section 188(2)(f) of the 
Enterprise Act 2002.380 
 
For our purposes, it is immaterial that bid rigging is also regarded as a competition offence. 
This does not alter the fact that such conduct is also a core type of corruption. One reason for 
classifying bid rigging as a competition offence may be to bring such offending within the 
remit of the Office of Fair Trading (the OFT) which has both the resources and the expertise 
to enforce and prosecute instances of bid rigging. There is no doubt that the OFT takes a dim 
view of such conduct. For example, in September 2009, it imposed fines totalling £129.2 
million on more than 100 construction companies for bid rigging after it emerged that almost 
200 procurement contracts worth in excess of £200 million had been rigged over a six-year 
period.381 
 
Let us consider some examples of bid rigging. 
 
 
377 Joint Committee on the Draft Corruption Bill, Draft Corruption Bill: Report and Evidence (2002-03, HL Paper 
157, HC Paper 705) 31; William P Olsen, The Anti-Corruption Handbook (John Wiley & Sons, 2010); Yvan 
Lengwiler and Elmar Wolfstetter, ‘Auctions and Corruption: An Analysis of Bid Rigging by a Corrupt 
Auctioneer’ (2010) 34 (10) Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 1872. 
378 Home Office, Corruption: Draft Legislation (2003, Cm 5777). 
379 Joint Committee on the Draft Corruption Bill, Draft Corruption Bill: Report and Evidence (2002-03, HL Paper 
157, HC Paper 705) 31. 
380 Home Office, Draft Corruption Bill: The Government Reply to the Report from the Joint Committee on the 
Draft Corruption Bill (2003, Cm 6086) 6. 
381 Office of Fair Trading, ‘Construction Firms Fined for Illegal Bid-Rigging’ (Press Release, 22 September 2009) 
<http://www.oft.gov.uk/news/press/2009/114-09> accessed 31 October 2009; BBC News, ‘Building Companies 
Fined £129.5m’ BBC News (London, 22 September 2009) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8268116.stm> 
accessed 31 October 2009. 
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THE NEW YORK PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL CASE 
 
In July 2012, David Porath, the owner of an insulation company, pleaded guilty to rigging bids 
in order to secure contracts for re-insulation services with the New York Presbyterian 
Hospital (the hospital). 
 
The hospital operated a competitive bidding policy in respect of high value and complex 
contracts (such as those for re-insulation services). Porath and a co-conspirator (C), an officer 
of two other companies that also provided re-insulation services, agreed to rig the bidding 
process. In order to do this, they entered into an agreement whereby C’s two companies 
would submit artificially inflated, non-competitive bids for re-insulation contracts with the 
hospital. At the same time, Porath would submit a lower bid from his own company. The 
submission of the artificially high bids created the illusion of a competitive bidding process 
and insured that the contract was awarded to Porath’s company as the lowest bidder. In return, 
Porath would subcontract a substantial proportion of the re-insulation work to C’s two 
companies. 
 
Over a five year period, Porath and C successfully rigged a number of bids with the result that 
Porath’s company was awarded numerous contracts for the provision of re-insulation services 
with the hospital.382 
 
Let us apply our analytical framework to this example. 
 
Part 1: The 2010 Act 
 
According to section 1 of the 2010 Act, a person (P) is guilty of bribing another person if he 
offers, promises, or gives an advantage to another person (R) with the intention of inducing 
that person to perform a relevant function or activity improperly (case 1) or in the knowledge 
or belief that the acceptance of the advantage would itself constitute the improper 
performance of a relevant function or activity by R (case 2). 
 
382 United States' Department of Justice, ‘Owner of Insulation Service Company Pleads Guilty to Million Dollar 
Bid-Rigging and Fraud Conspiracies at New York City Hospital’ (Press Release, 11 July 2012) 
<http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2012/285024.htm> accessed 14 July 2012. 
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In the present example, Porath offered to provide an advantage to C by subcontracting some 
of the re-insulation work to C’s two companies. It is clear from the facts that Porath not only 
adhered to this agreement, he actually provided a substantial proportion of the re-insulation 
work to C’s two companies. Equally, we know that Porath intended this to be an inducement 
in return for C’s two companies submitting artificially high bids to the hospital. There is little 
doubt about this given that both Porath and C had conspired to rig the bidding process. The 
central question is whether C performed a relevant function or activity improperly (case 1) or 
whether the acceptance by C of the advantage constituted an improper performance of a 
relevant function or activity (case 2). 
 
It will be recalled that a relevant function or activity is one which is of a public nature, 
connected with a business, performed in the course of employment, or performed on behalf of 
a body of persons (corporate or unincorporate), and the person performing it is expected to 
act in good faith, impartially, or in accordance with a position of trust. In deciding whether a 
relevant function or activity has been performed improperly, the test is what a reasonable 
person in the UK would expect in relation to the performance of the function or activity 
concerned. 
 
In the present case, it is clear from the facts that C was performing a function or activity which 
was either connected with a business (i.e. C’s two companies) or performed in the course of 
employment (C was an officer of both companies). Moreover, as an officer of both companies, 
it is submitted that C was required to act in good faith. That is, he was required to act in the 
best interests of both companies. This obviously included an obligation to act within with the 
bounds of the law and not to put the companies at risk of prosecution. It is therefore arguable 
that a reasonable person would hold that C had not acted in good faith by accepting bribes 
from Porath. If C had acted in good faith, he would have submitted competitive bids on behalf 
of one or both of his companies. Such a course of action may have resulted in the companies 
being awarded the re-insulation contracts with the hospital. 
 
In short, we can see that Porath’s misconduct is caught by the provisions of case 1. However, 
even if we are wrong about this, it is submitted that case 2 is also satisfied. That is, because it is 
arguable that C, as an officer and employee, should not have accepted a bribe from anyone. By 
accepting the bribes offered by Porath, C failed to act in the best interests of the companies. It 
might be argued that he promoted the interests of both companies insofar as they benefitted 
financially. However, this argument fails to recognise two important points. First, both 
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companies may have suffered financial loss for the simple reason that they may have secured 
the re-insulation contracts outright had they submitted competitive bids. Second, by engaging 
in criminality, C exposed both companies to the very real risk of prosecution and, if found 
guilty, the imposition of criminal sanctions (in the form of fines). It is therefore arguable that 
C’s very acceptance of the bribes constituted an improper performance for the purposes of 
case 2. 
 
It might be thought that C has escaped personal liability. Although no prosecution seems to 
have been brought against him (it may be that he entered into some form of agreement with 
the US Department of Justice), it is worth noting that C’s conduct would be caught by section 
2 (offences relating to being bribed) of the 2010 Act. For the sake of clarity, it is also worth 
mentioning that both Porath’s company and C’s two companies could also be prosecuted 
under section 7 of the 2010 Act for failing to prevent bribery. However, without further 
information as to the size and structure of these companies, and whether they had in place 
adequate procedures to prevent such conduct, it is not possible to perform any meaningful 
analysis. 
 
Part 2: The law in the USA 
 
Let us now consider the law in the USA. This discussion need not detain us for long. Recall 
the Sherman Act 1890. Section 1 states that any person who enters into a conspiracy in 
restraint of trade is guilty of an offence. Moreover, the per se approach (akin to strict liability 
in English law) tells us that anyone who enters into a bid rigging arrangement is automatically 
guilty of an offence. 
 
In the present case, there is no doubt that Porath and C entered into a bid rigging 
arrangement with one another. It is clear from the facts that they conspired to fix the outcome 
of the hospital’s tendering process. As a result of this conspiracy, the hospital awarded re-
insulation contracts to Porath’s company. Thus, we can see that our example is caught by 
section 1 of the Sherman Act 1890 as a core case of corruption. 
 
Part 3: Harm and wrongdoing 
 
The Sherman Act 1890 proscribes bid rigging on the basis that such conduct is inherently 
harmful to competition. However, it is submitted that this statement is too general. In order to 
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fully understand the harm and wrongdoing which results from bid rigging, we must consider 
both elements systematically. 
 
In terms of the primary harm resulting from our example, the most obvious victim of Porath’s 
misconduct was the hospital. By fixing the bidding process, Porath and C benefitted 
financially whilst simultaneously denying the hospital the benefits of a competitive tendering 
process. One does not need to be an economist to appreciate that genuine competition helps 
to drive down prices. By rigging the bidding process, Porath and C ensured that the price paid 
by the hospital was one which benefitted them rather than the hospital. This necessarily 
resulted in funds being improperly diverted from the hospital to Porath and C. Thus, we can 
see that the bid rigging in our example constituted a setback to the financial interests of the 
hospital. Such setbacks are very serious because they also amount to an invasion of the 
hospital’s welfare interests. 
 
As to the indirect harm resulting from our example, there are two potential victims: the 
hospital and other innocent competitors. Dealing with the hospital first, it might be argued 
that Porath and C’s misconduct indirectly set back the hospital’s interests in being well-
equipped and properly staffed. By denying the hospital the benefits of a competitive tendering 
process, it is highly likely that the hospital paid more for the re-insulation works than it would 
otherwise have done. The additional money spent on paying Porath’s company to complete 
the re-insulation work might have been put to better use (e.g. in purchasing new equipment or 
recruiting additional staff). But the hospital was not the only victim. We know that the 
bidding process was open to any commercial organisation with expertise in re-insulation 
services. By rigging the bidding process, Porath and C indirectly harmed the interests of these 
innocent competitors by denying them the opportunity of competing fairly for the contracts. 
Of course, that is not to say that a given competitor would necessarily have secured a contract 
with the hospital. Rather, the harm lies in the fact that these innocent competitors were denied 
a fair opportunity to compete. For any business, the ability to compete fairly is of paramount 
importance. Without a level playing field, no legitimate business can hope to thrive. 
 
The remote harm resulting from our example follows on from the primary harm identified 
above. Competitive tendering is used by both public and private organisations to achieve best 
value for money. This results in organisations saving money which can then be used to fund 
other projects. But such benefits are only derived when the bidding process is genuinely 
competitive. If bid rigging were to become endemic, the benefits of competitive tendering 
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would be lost and purchasers and the public alike would be required to pay more for goods 
and services. Moreover, any losses borne by public organisations would inevitably have to be 
made up by the government (leaving less to spend on other public projects). 
 
Let us now consider the wrongdoing in bid rigging. Our examination of the primary harm 
showed the main victim to be the hospital. We argued that Porath and C’s misconduct set 
back the hospital’s financial interests. The harm principle tells us that financial interests are 
welfare interests. In other words, they are so important that any invasion of a financial interest 
simultaneously constitutes a wrong. It is therefore arguable that insofar as the hospital is 
concerned, it was wronged because it was required to pay over the odds for re-insulation 
services. 
 
Let us consider another example of bid rigging. 
 
THE VIRGINIA REAL ESTATE SCAM 
 
In January 1997, Mija Romer and Khem Batra were convicted of, inter alia, conspiracy to rig 
bids at real estate foreclosure auctions in Fairfax County, Virginia, USA, contrary to the 
Sherman Act 1890.383 
 
Romer and Batra were real estate speculators who had conspired with a number of co-
conspirators to suppress the price of properties at public foreclosure auctions. The properties 
sold at these auctions were repossessed properties. The conspirators fixed the auction by 
agreeing not to bid against one another. During the auction, most of the conspirators would 
refrain from bidding thereby allowing a designated member of the conspiracy to make a low 
bid and secure the property at a significant undervalue. Following the auction, the 
conspirators would then hold a second private auction amongst themselves. At this second 
auction, they would write down and submit the maximum bid that they would each have 
made for the property. The conspirator with the highest bid would then be awarded the title to 
the property. The difference between the price paid at the foreclosure auction and the price 
paid at the private auction was then divided amongst the remaining conspirators. According 
 
383 Summarised from United States v Romer and Batra 148 F 3d 359 (1998). 
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to the evidence, the conspirators were well aware that their conduct was illegal. In order to 
avoid detection, they agreed to make payments in cash so as to avoid leaving a paper trail. 
 
Let us apply our analytical framework to this example. 
 
Part 1: The 2010 Act 
 
It might be thought that this example falls to be considered in exactly the same way as our 
previous example (the New York Presbyterian Hospital case). That is, because both Romer 
and Batra offered bribes in the form of financial inducements (i.e. a share of the proceeds). In 
the alternative, it might be thought that they are guilty of being bribed because they shared in 
the profits derived from the scam. 
 
However, it is submitted that our present example is not so straightforward. Recall section 1 of 
the 2010 Act. This states that a person is guilty of bribing another person if he offers, promises, 
or gives an advantage (whether by himself or through a third party) to another person with 
the intention of inducing that person (or another person) to perform a relevant function or 
activity improperly (case 1) or in the knowledge or belief that the acceptance of the advantage 
would itself constitute the improper performance of a relevant function or activity (case 2). 
 
The first part of section 1 causes us little difficulty. There is no denying that both Romer and 
Batra offered a financial advantage to their co-conspirators. The facts show that the 
conspirators all agreed to share in the profits of the scam. There is also no doubt that it was 
this agreement to share the profits which induced the co-conspirators to participate in the 
scam. After all, there would be little point in any of them participating otherwise. 
 
Let us consider case 1. This causes us some difficulty because it states that the advantage must 
have been provided for the purpose of inducing another to perform a relevant function or 
activity improperly. The interpretation provisions of the 2010 Act explain that a relevant 
function or activity is one which is of a public nature, connected with a business, performed in 
the course of employment, or performed on behalf of a body of persons (corporate or 
unincorporate), and the person performing it is expected to act in good faith, impartially, or 
in accordance with a position of trust. Dealing with the first part only, we can immediately 
exclude some of these categories. There is no evidence to support the contention that any of 
the co-conspirators were performing relevant function or activity of a public nature, in the 
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course of employment, or on behalf of a body of persons (so as to place them in a position of 
trust). Rather, the evidence suggests that the co-conspirators were all private individuals. 
 
We are therefore left with the question of whether the co-conspirators were performing a 
function or activity in connection with a business. It might be thought that the co-
conspirators were not acting in this way. After all, they were all private individuals acting in a 
private capacity. However, it is submitted that this view is too narrow. Although the 2010 Act 
does not tell us what is meant by an “activity connected with a business”, section 3(7) does tell 
us that the term “business” includes a trade or profession. 
 
The sceptical reader might argue that there is no evidence that any of the co-conspirators were 
exclusively involved in the business of real estate. There is some force in this argument. It is 
apparent from the evidence that some of the co-conspirators may have had alternative 
employment. However, this counter-argument takes an unnecessarily restrictive view of what 
is meant by the term “business”. In the present case, it is worth pausing to consider why the 
co-conspirators attended public foreclosure auctions if not to derive some profit. There is no 
evidence to suggest that they attended in order to purchase a property for themselves. Rather, 
it is clear that the properties were purchased with a view to reselling at a profit. In other words, 
it is clear that the co-conspirators regarded this as a business enterprise (albeit part-time). 
That being so, it is submitted that case 1 is satisfied because the co-conspirators received a 
financial advantage from Romer and Batra in the course of a business. 
 
The next question is whether the co-conspirators were expected to act in good faith, 
impartially, or in accordance with a position of trust. It might be argued that there was no 
such obligation on them. After all, they were private individuals who were also part-time real 
estate speculators. However, it is submitted that this view is faulty because it ignores the fact 
the co-conspirators were bound by the rules applicable to foreclosure auctions. In short, it is 
arguable that by virtue of their attendance and participation in foreclosure auctions, they 
impliedly agreed to abide by the rules of such auctions. This necessarily imposed on them a 
duty to act in good faith. 
 
We can derive support for this proposition from an example. Let us suppose that an 
individual bids on an item at an auction. Let us further suppose that the individual wins the 
auction but then changes his mind. In this scenario, it is well established that the individual is 
contractually bound to purchase the item. Likewise, the auction house is reciprocally bound to 
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provide the individual with that item (and if it is unable to do so, it would be liable for 
damages). In short, this contractual relationship arises because of the rules which apply to 
auctions. Given the competitive nature of auctions, it is submitted that bidders are under an 
implied duty to act in good faith. This means placing genuine bids as opposed to colluding 
with others to rig the bidding process. Let us therefore hold that the co-conspirators were 
performing a relevant function or activity when they attended the foreclosure auctions. 
 
Finally, we must consider whether Romer and Batra intended to induce the co-conspirators 
into improperly performing a relevant function or activity for the purposes of case 1. This 
need not trouble us for long since it is clear from the facts that Romer and Batra intended by 
their actions to rig the auctions. They could not have achieved this without the assistance of 
their co-conspirators. It is submitted that a reasonable person looking at the matter would 
expect a person attending an auction to abide by the rules of the auction. That is to say, that 
they would expect them to act in good faith by placing bids up to their maximum bid. This 
not only creates competition but it also ensures that the seller receives the best possible price 
as opposed to a lower price. 
 
We can see from this analysis that Romer and Batra’s misconduct is caught by case 1. 
However, even if we are wrong about this, it is submitted that case 2 is also satisfied. We can 
deal with this analysis fairly swiftly. Case 2 states that a person is guilty of bribery if he offers, 
promises, or gives an advantage (whether by himself or through a third party) to another 
person in the knowledge or belief that the acceptance of the advantage would itself constitute 
the improper performance of a relevant function or activity. 
 
We have already established that Romer and Batra offered a financial advantage to their co-
conspirators. In addition, we have also established that the co-conspirators were engaged in a 
relevant function or activity. That being so, we need only consider whether Romer and Batra 
knew or believed that the acceptance of the advantage would itself constitute the improper 
performance of a relevant function or activity by the co-conspirators. As to this, there is ample 
evidence to suggest that they both possessed the requisite mens rea. The evidence shows that 
both Romer and Batra (indeed all the conspirators) were aware that what they were doing was 
wrong. In order to avoid detection, they agreed to conduct their transactions in cash so as to 
avoid leaving a paper trail. It is also submitted that a reasonable person looking at the 
transaction would conclude the same. That is, the mere receipt of an advantage by the co-
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conspirators constituted the improper performance of a relevant activity because it violated 
the rules of the auction. 
 
Let us therefore hold that Romer and Batra’s misconduct is also caught by case 2. Of course, 
our conclusion may not have been the same if the co-conspirators had attended a one-off 
auction in order to purchase a property for themselves. In this scenario, it would be more 
difficult to argue that they were acting in the course of a business. 
 
Part 2: The law in the USA 
 
Let us now consider the second part of our analytical framework. This need not concern us for 
long for the simple reason that Romer and Batra were both charged and convicted of bid 
rigging contrary to the Sherman Act 1890. Section 1 states that any person who enters into a 
conspiracy in restraint of trade is guilty of an offence (this includes bid rigging). Moreover, it 
will be recalled that the US courts have held that bid rigging is an offence per se (similar to 
strict liability in English law). In short, some commercial agreements such as bid rigging are 
deemed to be so harmful to competition that they are prohibited outright. 
 
Part 3: Harm and wrongdoing 
 
It might be thought that the primary harm resulting from Romer and Batra’s misconduct was 
either to the innocent bidders who lost out as a result of the bid rigging, the mortgagee banks 
which may have been unable to redeem mortgages because the properties were sold at an 
undervalue, or the auction house insofar as it received reduced commissions due to the 
suppressed sale prices. However, whilst these groups have arguable claims, it is submitted that 
the primary harm must have been to the interests of the mortgagor homeowners for whom a 
sale at the best possible price was of paramount interest. For this reason, it is the mortgagor 
homeowners rather than the other groups who are the primary victims. 
 
Properties sold at real estate foreclosure auctions are repossessed properties. Repossessions 
occur when a mortgagor homeowner defaults on a mortgage because he is unable to service 
the mortgage (usually due to financial hardship). In these circumstances, the mortgagee 
(usually a bank) will repossess the property and sell it at an auction. The proceeds of the sale 
are used by the mortgagee bank to redeem the mortgage (and any other liens). Any remaining 
proceeds are then returned to the mortgagor homeowner. It follows from this that the 
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mortgagor homeowners had an obvious and legitimate interest in the best possible sale prices 
being achieved at the foreclosure auctions. 
 
By rigging the auction process and deliberately suppressing the price at which properties were 
sold, Romer and Batra invaded and set back the financial interests of these innocent 
mortgagor homeowners. In short, their misconduct meant that these mortgagor homeowners’ 
properties were not sold at the best possible price. By suppressing the purchase price, Romer 
and Batra diverted funds from the mortgagor homeowners to themselves. If the mortgagor 
homeowners’ properties had been sold at the best possible price, it may have resulted in their 
debts being settled in full and, in certain circumstances, may have resulted in some proceeds 
being returned to them. Given the precarious financial predicament of these mortgagor 
homeowners, it is clear that the violation of their financial interests constituted a violation of 
their welfare interests. Let us therefore hold that the primary harm resulting from the present 
example is to the welfare interests of the mortgagor homeowners. 
 
Let us now consider the indirect harm which resulted from Romer and Batra’s misconduct. 
We have already identified some of the likely candidates of such harm. One of the indirect 
consequences of Romer and Batra’s bid rigging was the effect on those innocent bidders who 
unsuccessfully participated in the foreclosure auctions. Their financial interests were set back 
insofar as they were unable to promote this interest because the auctions were rigged. Of 
course, the setback to their financial interests is considerably less pronounced than that 
suffered by the mortgagor homeowners. 
 
But the innocent bidders were not the only group to have suffered indirectly. We have already 
mentioned the possible setback to the financial interests of the mortgagee banks. It is well 
known that repossessed properties tend to fetch less on the market (both open and at auction) 
than non-repossessed properties. By suppressing the bidding process, Romer and Batra 
ensured that the prices at which these repossessed properties sold were even lower than they 
would otherwise have been. The net result may have been that some of the mortgagee banks 
were unable to redeem mortgages in full (thereby incurring a financial loss). Of course, it 
might be argued that there was no loss to the mortgagee banks for the simple reason that the 
mortgagor homeowners remained liable for any shortfall. Whilst this is correct in principle, it 
is unlikely that the mortgagee banks’ would have been able to recover any shortfall given the 
mortgagor homeowners’ financial difficulties. The net result may therefore have been that 
some mortgagee banks were forced to write-off shortfalls (thereby incurring a financial loss). 
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Lastly, we also noted the potential financial harm to the auction house. This is relatively 
straightforward to deal with. Most auction houses tend to charge a commission on sales. This 
is usually a percentage of the sale price. The lower the sale price, the less the auction house will 
receive. By depressing the sale price, Romer and Batra invaded the auction house’s financial 
interests as it received less in commission than it might otherwise have done. 
 
We must now consider the remote harm which resulted from Romer and Batra’s misconduct. 
This is fairly easy to identify. Auctions provide a means by which a seller can ensure that 
interested parties compete with one another thereby ensuring that the best possible sale price 
is achieved. But this can only occur when the interested parties are genuine bidders who are 
prepared to abide by the rules of the auction. However, if bid rigging became pervasive, there 
would be no incentive for private individuals and commercial organisations to use auctions. It 
might be thought that there is no further harm. However, staying with our example, it is 
submitted that property sales (repossessed or otherwise) would be adversely affected as the 
pool of competitors would be reduced. Although auctions are not the primary method of sale 
for properties, they are fairly common. Given the importance of property sales to the 
economy generally, it submitted that any significant reduction in the number of property sales 
may result in a setback to the public’s interest in the economy (and more specifically in a fluid 
and buoyant property market). 
 
Of course, we have concentrated simply on property auctions. But auctions are used to sell a 
wide array of goods ranging from low value items (e.g. on eBay) to cars and fine art (which 
often sell for vast sums of money). These activities would also be adversely set back if bid 
rigging became pervasive; thereby causing further damage to the economy. 
 
Lastly, let us consider the wrongdoing in our present example. Our discussion of primary 
harm pointed to the mortgagor homeowners as the principal victims of Romer and Batra’s bid 
rigging. The primary harm suffered by these mortgagor homeowners was financial. Their 
right to expect that any auction would be conducted fairly so as to achieve the best possible 
sale price was set back by Romer and Batra’s misconduct. The importance of this right is not 
to be underestimated. If a mortgagee bank had negligently or fraudulently sold a property at 
an undervalue, the mortgagor homeowner would be able to bring a claim for damages in 
order to recover any shortfall. The reason for this is that the mortgagee bank has a duty to 
ensure that it achieves the best possible price when selling the repossessed property. Thus, we 
can see that by rigging the auction, Romer and Batra wronged the mortgagor homeowners by 
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setting back their financial interests. We can be certain that their financial interests were set 
back because the conspirators held private auctions amongst themselves at which prices 
higher than those achieved at the public foreclosure auction were agreed upon. In the 
ordinary course of events, these higher prices would have been achieved at the public 
foreclosure auctions. Thus, we can see that Romer and Batra wronged the rights of the 
innocent mortgagor homeowners. 
 
 
8. INSIDER DEALING 
 
Insider dealing (also known as insider trading) is a type of market abuse. It can be defined as 
the misuse of non-public information (i.e. confidential information which is not in the public 
domain) in order to make a personal gain or avoid a personal loss. 
 
Strictly speaking, insider dealing is concerned with the conduct of insiders such as directors, 
officers, and shareholders. However, in both England and Wales and the USA, the law relating 
to insider dealing has sensibly been extended so as to include third parties who receive 
information from insiders (except where such information is furnished and received in good 
faith e.g. by accountants, lawyers, etc.). 
 
In England and Wales, insider dealing is proscribed by section 52 of the Criminal Justice Act 
1993 (the 1993 Act). This creates two different offences. The first makes it an offence for a 
person to deal in securities or to encourage another person to deal in securities. The second 
criminalises the passing of insider information to another (it is irrelevant whether the passing 
of information actually resulted in any insider dealing). 
 
In the USA, insider dealing is dealt with by a combination of 15 USC § 78 (the Securities 
Exchange Act 1934) and the common law. Under the powers conferred by section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act 1934, the US Securities and Exchange Commission has promulgated 
a number of rules which regulate insider dealing. The most important of these is to be found 
in 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
 
It is clear from both section 52 of the 1993 Act and the Securities and Exchange Act 1934 that 
insider dealing is regarded as a competition offence. One reason for this may be the fact that 
such conduct is generally regarded as having adverse consequences for the proper and 
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efficient operation of markets. However, labelling aside, insider dealing is also regarded by 
many scholars as a core case of corruption.384 Let us test this idea by reference to some 
examples. 
 
THE BLUE INDEX CASE 
 
In May 2012, James Sanders (the director of a brokerage firm called Blue Index), his wife 
Miranda Sanders, and James Swallow (a co-director of Blue Index), pleaded guilty to a 
number of counts of insider dealing contrary to section 52 of the 1993 Act. James Sanders was 
subsequently sentenced to four years’ imprisonment and disqualified as a director for five 
years. Miranda Sanders and Swallow were both sentenced to 10 months’ imprisonment. 
 
Miranda Sanders’s brother in law, Arnold McClellan, was a senior partner at an accounting 
firm in the USA. According to the prosecution, both Arnold McClellan and his wife Annabel 
McClellan (Miranda Sanders’s sister) furnished James and Miranda Sanders with insider 
information on a number of mergers and acquisitions. James Sanders had, in turn, disclosed 
this insider information to Swallow. 
 
The trio used this insider information to enter into a number of trades. As a direct result of 
their misconduct, they generated profits totalling approximately £1.9 million. In addition, 
both James Sanders and Swallow had used the insider information to generate profits for 
clients of Blue Index which totalled approximately £10.2 million.385 The trio used the profits to 
fund a luxury lifestyle including the purchase of multi-million pound houses and expensive 
sports cars.386 
 
 
384 Nancy Reichman, ‘Insider Trading’ (1993) 18 Crime and Justice 55; Leo V Ryan, ‘Combating Corruption: The 
21st-Century Ethical Challenge’ (2000) 10 (1) Business Ethics Quarterly 331, 334; Antonio Argandona, ‘Private-
to-Private Corruption’ (2003) 47 (3) Journal of Business Ethics 253, 256. 
385  Financial Services Authority, ‘Three Sentenced for Insider Dealing’ (Press Release, 20 June 2012) 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/2012/067.shtml> accessed 21 July 2012. 
386 Jonathan Russell, ‘Insider Dealing Trio Sentenced to Over Five Years’ The Telegraph (London, 20 Jun 2012) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financial-crime/9344446/Insider-dealing-trio-sentenced-to-over-five-
years.html#> accessed 21 July 2012. 
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Let us apply our analytical framework to this example. For simplicity’s sake, we shall only 
consider the actions of James Sanders. 
 
Part 1: The 2010 Act 
 
As noted above, cases of insider dealing, such as the Blue Index case, are criminalised by 
section 52 of the 1993 Act. In this section, we are concerned with the question of whether such 
conduct is also caught by the 2010 Act. The purpose of this enquiry is to provide support for 
the proposition that insider dealing, despite being labelled as a competition offence, is also a 
core case of corruption. 
 
In the context of our present example, it might be thought that section 1 is not engaged 
because James Sanders did not actively engage in an act of bribery. Rather, as is apparent from 
the facts, he received an advantage from his brother in law, Arnold McClellan. However, it is 
submitted that this analysis is incorrect. As will be seen, James Sanders not only engaged in 
active bribery contrary to section 1 but he also allowed himself to be bribed contrary to 
section 2 of the 2010 Act. 
 
Recall section 1 of the 2010 Act. This states that a person (P) is guilty of bribing another if he 
offers, promises, or gives an advantage (whether by P or through a third party) to another 
person (R) with the intention of inducing that person (or another person) to perform a 
relevant function or activity improperly (case 1) or in the knowledge or belief that the 
acceptance of the advantage would itself constitute the improper performance of a relevant 
function or activity by R (case 2). 
 
There is little difficulty with satisfying the first part of section 1. It is clear from the facts of the 
case that James Sanders passed insider information to his colleague, Swallow. In other words, 
he gave an advantage to Swallow. However, in order to satisfy case 1, we must also show that 
James Sanders provided that advantage with the intention of inducing Swallow to perform a 
relevant function or activity improperly. Before we consider James Sanders’s intention, it is 
helpful to first establish whether Swallow was performing a relevant function or activity. 
 
As to this, it will be recalled that a relevant function or activity is one which is of a public 
nature, connected with a business, performed in the course of employment, or performed on 
behalf of a body of persons (corporate or unincorporate), and which imposes on the person 
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performing it a duty to act in good faith, impartially, or in accordance with a position of trust. 
It is clear from the facts of our example that Swallow was performing an activity connected 
with a business or performing an activity in the course of his employment. The next question 
is whether this imposed upon him a duty to act in good faith or impartially (as he was not 
acting on trust, we can exclude this expectation). It is submitted that Swallow was under a 
duty to act in good faith in at least three ways. First, as a co-director of Blue Index he was 
required by section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 to act in a way which he considered, in 
good faith, was likely to promote the success of the company. It is difficult to see how 
engaging in criminality could qualify as acting in good faith. Second, he was under a duty to 
promote the interests of the Blue Index’s clients in a lawful manner. Third, as a market trader, 
he was under a duty to comply with the rules of the market (which necessarily meant that he 
should not have acted upon the insider information). Let us therefore hold that Swallow was 
performing a relevant function or activity which imposed upon him a duty to act in good faith. 
 
The final aspect of case 1 is to consider whether James Sanders intended to induce Swallow 
into performing a relevant function or activity improperly. This discussion need not concern 
us for long. We know from the facts that James Sanders, Miranda Sanders, and Swallow were 
all complicit in the scam. It is clear from the evidence that James Sanders’s furnished Swallow 
with insider information because he wanted the latter to act improperly. Moreover, we know 
that Swallow misused this information not only for his own benefit but also for the benefit of 
Blue Index’s clients. Let us therefore hold that case 1 is satisfied. 
 
In the alternative, it is submitted that case 2 is also satisfied. It will be recalled that case 2 states 
that P is guilty of bribery if he offers, promises, or gives an advantage to another person in the 
knowledge or belief that the acceptance of the advantage would itself constitute the improper 
performance of a relevant function or activity. In the present case, the evidence showed that 
James Sanders was the head of compliance at Blue Index. That being so, it would have been 
obvious to him that the acceptance by Swallow of insider information (irrespective of whether 
he intended to act upon it) would itself constitute an improper performance of a relevant 
function or activity. James Sanders would have known this because it was his responsibility to 
ensure that Blue Index’s employees did not engage in any illegal conduct such as insider 
dealing. Let us therefore hold that case 2 is also satisfied. 
 
We can now turn our attention to section 2 of the 2010. This is concerned with offences 
relating to being bribed. In order for a person (R) to be guilty of being bribed, he must request, 
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agree to receive, or accept an advantage and act in the ways set out in cases 3 to 6. In the 
context of the present example, it can be seen from the facts that James Sanders accepted an 
advantage in the form of insider information from either Arnold or Annabel McClellan. The 
question is whether James Sanders acted in the ways set out in cases 3 to 6. As to this, it is 
submitted that only cases 3 and 4 are applicable. The former, which requires proof of mens rea, 
is considered first. It will be remembered that the latter, case 4, is a strict liability offence. 
 
In order to satisfy case 3, R must have accepted the advantage with the intention of 
performing a relevant function or activity improperly (whether by R or another person). If we 
recall the facts of our example, we know that James Sanders, having been furnished with 
insider information, acted upon that information thereby making a substantial gain for 
himself. We know that he was performing a relevant function or activity because, like Swallow, 
he was performing an activity connected with a business or performing an activity in the 
course of his employment. Like Swallow, this imposed upon him a duty to act in good faith or 
impartially. By acting upon the insider information, James Sanders acted improperly insofar 
as his conduct breached the rules of the market. Thus, it is arguable that James Sanders is also 
guilty of being bribed contrary to case 3 of section 2 of the 2010 Act. 
 
In order to satisfy case 4, R’s receipt of an advantage must itself constitute an improper 
performance of a relevant function or activity. In the present case, we are not told whether 
James Sanders solicited the insider information or whether his receipt of the same was 
unsolicited. However, it is submitted that it is unlikely to have been unsolicited given that 
James Sanders’s wrongdoing encompassed a number of illegal trades spanning a period of 
years. In the present case, we know that James Sanders was not only furnished with insider 
information, he also acted upon this information and made a significant profit for himself. 
Given his position as a director of Blue Index, it is arguable that the mere receipt of insider 
information constituted an improper performance of a relevant function or activity for the 
purposes of case 4. 
 
Of course, if James Sanders had neither solicited the insider information nor acted upon it, 
there would be no suggestion of his having acted improperly for the purposes of the 2010 Act. 
In the specific context of case 4, which imposes strict liability, it would be absurd if a person 
who is furnished with unsolicited insider information and who does not act upon such 
information was nonetheless deemed to be acting improperly. Rather, it is submitted that to 
act improperly, Sanders must either have solicited the insider information or acted upon it. 
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We can see from this analysis that so far as James Sanders is concerned, his conduct is caught 
by both sections 1 and 2 of the 2010 Act. This lends support to the idea that insider dealing, 
notwithstanding its classification as a competition offence, is also a core case of corruption. 
 
Part 2: The law in the USA 
 
Let us now consider the position in the USA. Recall rule 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 which was 
promulgated under the powers contained in section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
1934. This makes it unlawful for a person (P) to engage in any act or omission which operates 
as a fraud upon any person in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. In 
addition, it is also unlawful for a third party to receive insider information when he knows or 
has reason to believe that P is in breach of a fiduciary duty by disclosing the insider 
information. 
 
In the present example, it is clear from the facts that James Sanders was not an insider. That is, 
because he was not employed by any of the companies in which he invested. Rather, it is clear 
that he was a third party who received insider information either from his brother in law, 
Arnold McClellan or from his sister in law, Annabel McClellan. For the purposes of rule 10b-
5, Arnold McClellan would fall to be classified as an insider given his position as a senior 
partner at the accounting firm which dealt with the mergers and acquisitions which formed 
the basis of the insider information in this case. 
 
However, in order to bring a successful prosecution against James Sanders under rule 10b-5, it 
must be established that as a third party, he knew or had reason to believe that Arnold 
McClellan was in breach of a fiduciary duty by disclosing the insider information (directly or 
indirectly via his wife Annabel McClellan). In addition, it must be established that Arnold 
McClellan received some personal benefit (either tangible or intangible). 
 
This discussion need not detain us for long. We know that James Sanders was Blue Index’s 
compliance officer. It is therefore highly likely that he knew that he was being improperly 
furnished with insider information and that this was illegal. We can derive support for this 
conclusion by reference to a telephone conversation which took place between James Sanders 
and his father, Tim Sanders. During the call, Tim Sanders asked “is this not insider dealing?”. 
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James Sanders replied “No, not really. Well…” At this point his father laughed and said “try 
proving it” to which James Sanders responded “yes, exactly!”387 
 
We can infer from this conversation that James Sanders knew that he was engaging in insider 
dealing. In short, he must therefore have been aware that Arnold McClellan was acting in 
breach of a fiduciary duty by disclosing such information to him. 
 
The final question is whether Arnold McClellan derived any benefit from this (whether 
tangible or intangible). Again, this discussion need not detain us for long either. Rule 10b-5 
has been held to include both tangible and intangible benefits. This description is so wide that 
it even captures insider information which is disclosed to a third party as a gift.388 In the 
present example, Arnold and Annabel McClelland divulged insider information to James and 
Miranda Sanders because they were family. The harm principle tells us that we all have an 
interest in our families (whether immediate or extended) and that this is therefore an 
important interest. By their actions, it could be argued that by disclosing insider information, 
the McClellands had promoted their own interests. However, even if we are wrong about that, 
it is arguable that, at the very least, the McClellands must have disclosed the insider 
information to James Sanders as a gift. That being so, it is submitted that James Sanders’s 
misconduct is caught by rule 10b-5. 
 
Part 3: Harm and wrongdoing 
 
Let us now turn to the final part of our analytical framework. It might be thought that there 
are no victims in our example and therefore no resultant harm. After all, there is nothing to 
suggest that any of the mergers and acquisitions were adversely affected by the misconduct of 
James Sanders. That being so, a sceptical reader might ask what is objectionable about James 
Sanders’s conduct? 
 
 
387 Paul Cheston and Jonathan Brown, ‘James Sanders: The Trader Who Thought He Was Untouchable’ The 
Independent (London, 21 June 2012). 
388 Dirks v Securities and Exchange Commission 463 US 646 (1983). 
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We must begin by acknowledging that insider dealing has the potential to affect a range of 
different actors: insiders, market professionals, traders, and investors.389 In the context of the 
Blue Index case, there is no doubt that Arnold McClellan’s behaviour constituted a breach of 
his fiduciary duty to his employer. In short, by disclosing insider information, he breached his 
duty of loyalty. However, as against James Sanders, it is not possible to make the same 
argument. After all, he did not owe any duty to Arnold McClellan’s employer. 
 
It might be argued that the primary harm resulting from James Sanders’s misconduct was to 
the interests of Blue Index and its shareholders. Assuming that Blue Index was owned by 
other innocent shareholders, it is fairly easy to make a case that James Sanders’s conduct set 
back their welfare interests. We can derive support for this proposition from the fact that Blue 
Index subsequently went out of business. However, the evidence seems to suggest that Blue 
Index was wholly owned by James Sanders (his co-defendant, Swallow, was a co-director but 
not a shareholder). That being so, our argument falls away. That is, because James Sanders set 
back his own interests by his misconduct (which is no different to any person who 
intentionally commits a crime). 
 
Rather, it is submitted that the primary harm resulting from our example was to those 
innocent shareholders (i.e. traders and investors) who sold their shares at a reduced price to 
James Sanders before the insider information (i.e. news of the upcoming acquisition or 
merger) became public knowledge. By his possession of insider information, James Sanders 
had an unfair advantage over these innocent shareholders. Had the latter been in possession of 
the same information, it is highly unlikely that they would have entered into any trades at 
reduced prices. By purchasing their shares in advance of a public announcement, James 
Sanders deprived them of the opportunity of making a substantial return on their shares. In 
short, James Sanders’s misconduct set back the financial interests (a welfare interest) of these 
innocent shareholders. 
 
The indirect harm resulting from our example was to other innocent actors. It might be 
argued that as a result of James Sanders’s misconduct, there was an adverse impact on the 
share prices of the companies involved in the scandal. However, without further information, 
we cannot be sure about this. A more certain indirect consequence of James Sanders’s 
 
389 Jie Hu and Thomas H. Noe, ‘The Insider Trading Debate’ (1997) 82 (4) Economic Review 34, 37. 
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misconduct is the harm to Arnold McClellan’s employer (Deloitte). There is no doubt that a 
scandal such as this must have resulted in damage to the reputation of the firm. Although 
James Sanders did not owe any duty to Deloitte, this does not detract from the fact that he 
must have known that his misconduct, if discovered, would be likely to cause such harm. 
 
The remote harm arising from the Blue Index case is fairly easy to identify. The general 
literature tells us that if insider dealing were to become prevalent, it would have an adverse 
impact on investors’ confidence in the integrity of the market. A setback to the integrity of a 
financial market is likely undermine the proper and efficient operation of that market. This 
may, in turn, lead to a slowdown in that market which is likely to be detrimental to the 
economy as a whole.390 
 
Turning to the wrongdoing in our example, we know from our discussion of primary harm 
that James Sanders set back the financial interests (a welfare interest) of those innocent 
shareholders who sold their stock at reduced values. The harm principle tells us that a setback 
to a welfare interest is so serious that it simultaneously constitutes a wrong. In this example, it 
is submitted that James Sanders’s conduct was wrong because it involved the use of deception 
to obtain stock at reduced values. In other words, he was under a duty (imposed by the rules 
of the market) not to enter into transactions when in possession of insider information. The 
simple reason for this is that a person who is unlawfully in possession of insider information 
has an unfair competitive advantage over those who are not privy to such information. By 
breaching this duty, James Sanders set back the innocent shareholders’ right to transact on a 
level playing field. 
 
The Blue Index case concerned an outsider who had been furnished with insider information. 
Let us now consider an example involving an insider. 
 
THE UBEROIS 
 
In November 2009, Matthew Uberoi and his father, Neel Uberoi, were convicted by jury of 12 
counts of insider dealing contrary to 52 of the 1993 Act. Following an adjournment for pre-
 
390 Michael Manove, ‘The Harm from Insider Trading and Informed Speculation’ (1989) 104 (4) Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 823. 
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sentence reports, Matthew Uberoi was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment whilst his 
father was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment.391 
 
According to the evidence, during the summer of 2006, Matthew Uberoi undertook a six-
month internship with Hoare Govett, the corporate broking arm of ABN-AMRO Bank. 
During his internship, Matthew Uberoi worked on a number of takeovers and other price 
sensitive deals. The prosecution alleged that he had communicated insider information on 
these transactions to his father, Neel Uberoi, before the information had been made public.392 
 
As a result of being furnished with this insider information, Neel Uberoi bought shares in 
three different companies just before favourable announcements were made to the market. 
His first and most lucrative trade concerned a small pharmaceutical company called Neutec 
Pharma. Neel Uberoi bought 18,000 shares valued at approximately £90,000. A few days later, 
Neutec Pharma announced it was to be taken over by the Swiss pharmaceutical giant Novartis 
which sent its share price soaring. Thereafter, Neel Uberoi sold his shares for almost £200,000 
which made him a profit of approximately £110,000. The same method was used in respect of 
two other companies although the investments and returns were smaller.393 
 
Let us apply our analytical framework to this example. As we are concerned with insiders, our 
analysis will focus on the conduct of Matthew Uberoi only. 
 
Part 1: The 2010 Act 
 
Section 1 of the 2010 makes it an offence for a person to offer, promise, or give an advantage 
to another person with the intention of inducing that person to perform a relevant function or 
activity improperly (case 1) or in the knowledge or belief that the acceptance of the advantage 
would itself constitute the improper performance of a relevant function or activity (case 2). 
 
 
391 Alex Spence, ‘Two-year jail sentence for insider trader’ The Times (London, 11 December 2009). 
392 Summarised from R (Matthew Uberoi and Neel Uberoi) v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2008] 
EWHC 3191 (Admin). 
393 Michael Herman, ‘Dentist Neel Uberoi ‘made £150,000 through insider trading with intern son’’ The Times 
(London, 16 October 2009); Aislinn Laing, ‘Dentist and son jailed for three years for insider trading’ The 
Telegraph (London, 11 December 2009). 
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There is no difficulty with satisfying the first part of section 1. We know from the facts of our 
example that Matthew Uberoi gave an advantage to his father, Neel Uberoi, in the form of 
valuable insider information. However, before we can consider Matthew Uberoi’s intention, 
we must first establish whether his father was engaged in a relevant function or activity. 
 
As to this, it will be recalled that a relevant function or activity is one which is of a public 
nature, connected with a business, performed in the course of employment, or performed on 
behalf of a body of persons (corporate or unincorporate), and the person performing it is 
expected to act in good faith, impartially, or in accordance with a position of trust. 
 
It is immediately apparent that Neel Uberoi was not performing a function or activity of a 
public nature or acting in the course of his employment (he was, by occupation, a dentist). We 
also know from the evidence that he was not employed by Hoare Govett or any of the 
companies in which he invested. Neither is there any evidence to suggest that he was acting on 
behalf of a body of persons. 
 
The only remaining category is therefore a function or activity which is connected with a 
business. It might be thought that this category is not engaged given our observation about 
Neel Uberoi being a dentist by profession. The 2010 Act does not tell us what is meant by a 
function or activity connected with a business. Instead, section 3(7) tells us that the term 
“business” includes (but is not limited to) a trade or profession. Beyond this, there is no 
guidance. It is arguable that Neel Uberoi’s conduct falls within the scope of the term 
“business”. The evidence showed that he frequently traded in shares (in his spare time). 
Although this was not his primary occupation, there is no doubt that he traded in shares for 
the purposes of financial reward (i.e. as a part-time business). Even if we are wrong about that, 
it is submitted that a person who trades on the stock market impliedly agrees to act in good 
faith (i.e. by complying with the rules of the market). That being so, it is arguable that Neel 
Uberoi was acting in the course of business when he received insider information from his son, 
Matthew Uberoi. 
 
We must now return to the question of Matthew Uberoi’s intention in furnishing his father 
with insider information. Having established that his father, Neel Uberoi, was acting in the 
course of a business, the obvious inference is that Matthew Uberoi disclosed insider 
information to his father in order to induce him into acting improperly. That is, to use the 
insider information to buy shares contrary to the rules of the market. It is submitted that a 
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reasonable person looking at Neel Uberoi’s conduct would hold that he had failed to act in 
good faith by virtue of his misuse of confidential insider information. On any view, he should 
not have used relied upon this information when conducting trades. 
 
In short, we can see from this analysis that Matthew Uberoi’s misconduct is caught by case 1. 
In the alternative, it is submitted that case 2 is also satisfied. Given Matthew Uberoi’s 
background as an intern at Hoare Govett and the knowledge that his father also engaged in 
trading, it must have been obvious to him that the mere acceptance by his father of insider 
information was improper (case 2). Let us therefore hold that Matthew Uberoi’s actions are 
also caught by case 2. 
 
Part 2: The law in the USA 
 
For the second part of our analytical framework let us recall 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. This makes 
it unlawful for a person (P) to engage in any act or omission which operates as a fraud upon 
any person in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. In short, this requires 
proof that P engaged in a fraudulent act (or omission) in connection with the purchase or sale 
of securities. 
 
In the context of our present example, there is little difficulty in satisfying the requirements of 
rule 10b-5. From an analytical perspective, it is clear that Matthew Uberoi was an insider. That 
is, because he was employed by Hoare Govett and worked on a number of takeovers and price 
sensitive deals. There is also no difficulty with establishing that he engaged in a positive act by 
furnishing his father with insider information. The sole issue is whether this disclosure 
operated as a fraud upon any person in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
We can deal with this point shortly. 
 
The US Supreme Court has held that a fiduciary’s undisclosed use of information belonging to 
his principal, without disclosure of such use to the principal, for personal gain constitutes 
fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a security and thus violates rule 10b-5. This 
misappropriation theory has been approved as a valid basis for insider trading liability.394 
 
 
394 United States v O’Hagan  521 US 642 (1997). 
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In the instant case, it is clear from the facts that Matthew Uberoi disclosed confidential insider 
information belonging to his employer without its consent. Moreover, we know that the 
reason for making this disclosure was financial gain (it is immaterial that the financial gain 
was obtained by his father, Neel Uberoi). Let us therefore hold that our example is caught by 
rule 10b-5. 
 
It is also worth mentioning that Neel Uberoi, despite being an outsider, would also be caught 
by rule 10b-5. In order to establish liability on his part, we would need to show that he knew 
or had reason to believe that his son, Matthew Uberoi, was in breach of a fiduciary duty by 
disclosing insider information. Of course, this is largely a question of fact. However, in the 
context of the present case we can draw an adverse inference from the fact that the Uberois 
discussed the insider information using coded messages about Chinese food. This suggests 
that they were both aware that their conduct was illegal. Of course, we would also need to 
establish that Matthew Uberoi received some personal benefit from his misconduct. As to this, 
we know from the facts that Matthew Uberoi’s father benefitted financially as a result of the 
illegal trading. It is submitted that this is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of personal 
benefit for two reasons. First, because Matthew Uberoi was a dependant at the time of the 
wrongdoing, the financial benefit to his father essentially subsidised the financial support 
which his father no doubt provided to him. Second, something which promotes the well-being 
of one’s family obviously constitutes an intangible benefit because it also promotes one’s self-
interest. 
 
Part 3: Harm and wrongdoing 
 
Unlike our previous example (the Blue Index case), the primary harm in our current example 
is far more obvious and therefore easier to identify. We know that Matthew Uberoi was 
undertaking an internship with Hoare Govett. We also know that during the course of this 
internship, he worked on a number of takeovers which meant that he became privy to 
confidential price sensitive information. This imposed upon him both a duty of loyalty and a 
duty of confidentiality. In other words, he owed a duty of loyalty to his employer not to 
disclose or misuse the insider information that he had acquired through his employment. 
 
By disclosing this information to his father, Matthew Uberoi not only breached his duty of 
confidentiality, he also breached his duty of loyalty to his employer and thereby set back its 
interests in a loyal workforce. His employer, Hoare Govett, had a right to expect that Matthew 
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Uberoi would not put his own self-interest first. In addition, no brokerage firm would want to 
be associated with insider dealing. It may be that the adverse publicity surrounding Matthew 
Uberoi’s misconduct resulted in a setback to Hoare Govett’s financial interests as some 
investors may have been deterred by the scandal. However, without further information, we 
can only speculate about this particular setback. 
 
As to the indirect harm flowing from our example, it is submitted that this was to those 
innocent shareholders who sold their shares at a reduced price to Neel Uberoi. As with the 
Blue Index case, it is submitted that this information gave Neel Uberoi an unfair advantage 
over these innocent shareholders. Had they been in possession of the same information, it is 
highly unlikely that they would have sold their shares at a reduced price. In view of the profits 
made by Neel Uberoi, we know that the financial loss was sizeable. Thus, we can see that 
Matthew Uberoi’s misconduct set back the financial interests (i.e. welfare interests) of these 
innocent shareholders. 
 
In terms of remote harm, the general literature on corruption tells us that if insider dealing 
were to become prevalent, there would be an adverse impact on the proper and efficient 
operation of markets. In order for investors to operate freely in the marketplace, they must be 
satisfied that there is a level playing field. If insider dealing became routine, there would be an 
inherent distrust amongst investors with the result that there may be a slowdown in the 
market and a knock-on effect for the economy. If the economy were to slow down, there 
would be a rise in unemployment. This would necessarily mean a reduction in revenue for the 
government which in turn would negatively impact upon public spending. Thus, we can see 
that there are a number of different remote harms which might arise if insider dealing were to 
become prevalent. 
 
Finally, let us consider the wrongdoing arising from Matthew Uberoi’s misconduct. We have 
previously argued that the primary victim of his misconduct was his employer, Hoare Govett. 
The classical explanation of the wrongdoing in agency relationships is based upon the idea of 
disloyalty. That is, Matthew Uberoi wronged Hoare Govett by breaching his duty of loyalty. 
However, it is submitted that this is a bit vague. Let us therefore try to be a bit more specific 
about what this entails. 
 
As an employer, Hoare Govett employed and paid Matthew Uberoi’s salary (albeit he was only 
retained on a six-month internship). In return, Matthew Uberoi was under a duty to promote 
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not his own interest but that of his employer. Similarly, Hoare Govett had a right to expect 
that Matthew Uberoi would act in this way. 
 
In the context of the present case, we know that Matthew Uberoi violated this duty by putting 
his own self-interest first and misusing the confidential insider information. All employers 
depend upon the hard work and honesty of their employees. It is a right that they are entitled 
to enforce given that they pay their salaries. It is arguable that this right is so important that it 
also constitutes a welfare interest because without a loyal workforce, most employers would be 
unable to function. Thus we can see that the loyalty of an employee is of paramount interest to 
employers. When Matthew Uberoi set this aside for his own benefit, he violated Hoare 
Govett’s rights and thereby wronged them. 
 
 
9. VOTE BUYING 
 
Vote buying is a very specific type of electoral fraud. It can be described as the payment of an 
advantage in order to induce a voter to vote or refrain from voting. By contrast, electoral fraud 
is far wider and encompasses any conduct which interferes with the proper administration of 
an election such as vote buying, personation, treating, and undue influence.395 
 
In England and Wales, these different types of electoral fraud are criminalised by the 
Representation of the People Act 1983 (the 1983 Act). In addition, the Electoral 
Administration Act 2006 contains offences of supplying false information and stealing 
another person’s postal vote. The 1983 Act consolidated a number of different election 
offences left over from the Victorian era and recast them as offences of corruption. Section 
113 deals specifically with the bribery of voters.396 
 
 
395  Electoral Commission, ‘Summary of Electoral Offences’ (Factsheet, July 2012) 
<http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/149729/List-of-electoral-offences.pdf> 
accessed 1 August 2012. 
396 Isobel White and Charley Coleman, ‘Postal Voting and Electoral Fraud’ (22 June 2011) House of Commons 
Library Note No. SN/PC/3667 <http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/briefings/snpc-
03667.pdf> accessed 1 August 2012. 
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In the USA, electoral fraud is illegal at federal level and in every state.397 At federal level, the 
law consists of a complex mix of overlapping statutes.398 For our purposes, we need only refer 
to 42 USC § 1973i(c). We have not previously referred to this statute but, in short, it makes it 
an offence for a person to knowingly pay or offer to pay (or accept payment) for voting. 
 
The general scholarship in this area suggests that vote buying is a core case of corruption.399 
Let us consider some examples and see how they fare against our analytical framework. 
 
THE BREATHITT COUNTY VOTE BUYING SCANDAL 
 
In May 2010, a primary election was held in Breathitt County, Kentucky, USA. One of the 
candidates standing for election was Michael Salyers. During the early stages of the election, 
an abnormally large number of absentee votes were entered. In an attempt to uncover any 
illegal voting practices, the police interviewed and offered immunity to every voter who had 
voted in the election. As a result of the investigation, Salyers and his co-defendants, Naomi 
Johnson, Earl Young and Jackie Jennings, were charged with, inter alia, vote buying contrary 
to 42 USC § 1973i(c) (they were prosecuted under federal law because the election was held in 
part to select a candidate for the US Senate). 
 
The epicentre of the vote buying scam was a grocery store owned by Salyers and run by 
Johnson. The scam worked in one of two ways. In the first instance, voters came into the 
grocery store and offered to sell their votes. In other instances, the defendants solicited votes 
for Salyers in exchange for money. Once the amount of the bribe had been agreed, Salyers 
would instruct one of his co-defendants to escort the voter to the polling station so as to 
ensure that they voted for him. Afterwards, they would return to the grocery store where 
Salyers would pay the voter for having voted for him. 
 
397 Richard L. Hasen, ‘Vote Buying’ (2000) 88 (5) California Law Review 1323.  
398  Craig C. Donsanto and Nancy L. Simmons, Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses (7th edn, US 
Government Printing, 2007). 
399 Mark E. Warren, ‘What Does Corruption Mean in a Democracy?’ (2004) 48 (2) American Journal of Political 
Science 328; Gokhan R. Karahan, R. Morris Coats and William F. Shughart II, ‘Corrupt Political Jurisdictions 
and Voter Participation’ (2006) 126 (1) Public Choice 87; Ben Holzer, ‘Political Vote Buying Statutes: Textual 
Limits, Enforcement Challenges, and the Need for Reform’ (2008) 12 (1) Journal of Legislation and Public Policy 
211. 
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Salyers and Jennings pleaded guilty and were given reduced sentences of 2 months’ 
imprisonment. Young and Johnson were convicted after trial and were sentenced to 4 months’ 
imprisonment.400 
 
Let us apply our analytical framework to this example. For the sake of clarity, we shall only 
consider the conduct of Salyers. 
 
Part 1: The 2010 Act 
 
It is clear from our example that we are dealing with two types of bribery: active and passive. 
Salyers offered a financial reward to some voters in order to induce them to vote for him 
(active bribery) whereas other voters approached him and offered to sell their votes in 
exchange for a financial reward (passive bribery). Let us consider these in turn. 
 
Section 1 of the 2010 Act is concerned with active bribery (i.e. offences of bribing another 
person). According to section 1, a person is guilty of bribery if he offers, promises, or gives an 
advantage (whether by himself or through a third party) to another person with the intention 
of inducing that person to perform a relevant function or activity improperly (case 1) or in the 
knowledge or belief that the acceptance of the advantage would itself constitute the improper 
performance of a relevant function or activity by that person (case 2). 
 
There is little difficulty with satisfying the first part of section 1. We know from the facts that 
Salyers gave an advantage in the form of money to voters who had voted for him in the 
election. In order to satisfy case 1, it is necessary to show that these payments were made by 
Salyers with the intention of inducing the voters to vote for him. This is easily satisfied on the 
facts. We know from the evidence that Salyers and his co-defendants solicited the voters and 
went to great lengths to ensure that they voted for Salyers. So far, so good. 
 
However, it is when we turn to last part of case 1 that we encounter difficulties. In short, this 
requires us to establish that Salyers induced the voters to perform a relevant function or 
activity improperly. According to section 3 of the 2010 Act, a relevant function or activity is 
one which is of a public nature, connected with a business, performed in the course of 
 
400 Summarised from United States v Naomi Johnson and Earl Young 5:11-CR-143 (ED Ky, 1 June 2012). 
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employment, or performed on behalf of a body of persons (corporate or unincorporate) in 
circumstances where the person performing it is expected to act in good faith, impartially, or 
in accordance with a position of trust. 
 
It is immediately apparent from this list that voters who vote in an election are not performing 
a function or activity of a public nature (i.e. connected with a public office), acting in the 
course of a business, employment, or on behalf of a body of persons. In short, such voters act 
in a manner which falls outside the ambit of section 3. On the basis of this analysis, we can see 
that case 1 is not satisfied. 
 
We are presented with the same problem when we turn to case 2. This requires us to establish 
that Salyers knew or believed that the acceptance of the advantage by the voters would itself 
constitute the improper performance of a relevant function or activity. However, as with case 
1, it is not possible to sustain any such argument as the voters were not engaged in a relevant 
function or activity pursuant to section 3. 
 
Let us now consider section 2 of the 2010 Act. This is concerned with passive bribery. 
According to section 2, a person is guilty of being bribed if he requests, agrees to receive, or 
accepts an advantage in one of four scenarios. First, with the intention of performing a 
relevant function or activity improperly (case 3). Second, where the request or receipt of the 
advantage itself constitutes the improper performance of a relevant function or activity (case 
4). Third, as a reward for having improperly performed a relevant function or activity (case 5). 
Fourth, in anticipation of receiving an advantage performs a relevant function or activity 
improperly (case 6). 
 
A relevant function or activity is defined by section 3 as one which is of a public nature, 
connected with a business, performed in the course of employment, or performed on behalf of 
a body of persons (corporate or unincorporate), and which imposes upon the person 
performing it a duty to act in good faith, impartially, or in accordance with a position of trust. 
 
In the context of the present case, it is submitted that Salyers was performing a function or 
activity of a public nature by virtue of the fact that he was running for public office. It might 
be said that this argument is premature because Salyers had not been elected at the time of the 
wrongdoing. However, it is submitted that this counter-argument is incorrect for the simple 
reason that it would result in a lacuna in the law. It would essentially mean that candidates 
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campaigning for election would not need to act in good faith or abide by the rules of an 
election. This cannot be correct as a matter of common sense. Rather, it is submitted that 
candidates campaigning for election, though not elected, are engaging in conduct which is 
itself an activity of a public nature. Let us therefore hold that Salyers was engaged in a relevant 
function or activity for the purposes of section 3. That being so, the question arises as to 
whether he requested, agreed to receive, or accepted an advantage in the circumstances set out 
in cases 3 to 6. 
 
To this end, it is submitted that cases 3 and 4 are applicable. Salyers is caught by case 3 
because he allowed himself to be bribed by the voters when he accepted the offer to buy their 
votes. We know that he had an improper intention when he purchased the votes because his 
co-defendants escorted the voters to the polling station in order to ensure that they voted for 
Salyers. It is submitted that this constituted the improper performance of a relevant function 
or activity because a candidate standing for election is required to abide by the rules of the 
election. This obviously means that they should refrain from certain types of conduct such as 
the buying of votes. 
 
However, even if we are wrong about this, it is submitted that case 4, which imposes strict 
liability, is also satisfied. In short, Salyers’s acceptance of the voters’ offer to buy their votes 
constituted the improper performance of a relevant function or activity (for the reasons set 
out above). We can see from this analysis that Salyers’s misconduct is caught by section 2 of 
the 2010 Act. It is submitted that this supports our assertion that vote buying is a core case of 
corruption. 
 
Before we move on, it is useful to contrast our analysis by considering the offence of vote 
buying under section 113 of the 1983 Act. It will be recalled that section 113 creates a number 
of different offences. Let us look take a look at section 113(2) which deals specifically with the 
bribery of voters. 
 
According to section 113(2), a person is guilty of bribery if he directly or indirectly offers, 
promises, or gives any money or office to any voter (or another on his behalf) in order to 
induce the voter to vote or refrain from voting. In the instant case, there is ample evidence to 
satisfy section 113(2). We know that Salyers gave money to the voters. Moreover, we know 
that his reason for doing so was to reward them for having voted for him. In fact, he was so 
keen to secure their votes that he sent his co-defendants along with them to the polling station 
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in order to ensure that they kept their end of the bargain. Thus, we can see that Salyers’s 
misconduct is also caught by section 113(2) of the 1983 Act. 
 
It is worth noting that under section 113(5) of the 1983 Act, the voters would also be guilty of 
a reciprocal offence by virtue of their either having solicited or accepted a bribe in exchange 
for voting. We can see from this discussion that vote buying is caught by both the 2010 Act as 
well as the 1983 Act. 
 
Part 2: The law in the USA 
 
In the USA, the approach is very similar to that in England and Wales in that vote buying is 
dealt with as an offence in its own right. It will be recalled that Salyers and his co-defendants 
were convicted of vote buying contrary to 42 USC § 1973i(c). This makes it an offence for a 
person to knowingly pay or offer to pay (or accept payment) for voting. 
 
In the present case, we can be certain that section 1973i(c) is satisfied because both Salyers and 
his co-defendants were convicted of vote buying contrary to section 1973i(c). The evidence 
shows that Salyers paid the voters in order to secure their votes at the election. 
 
Another similarity with the law in England and Wales is the fact that section 1973i(c) contains 
a mirror offence which makes it an offence for a voter to knowingly accept a payment in 
return for voting. In the context of the present case, this would capture the misconduct of the 
voters who either solicited or accepted a payment in exchange for voting. 
 
Part 3: Harm and wrongdoing 
 
The purpose of an election is twofold. First, it allows suitably qualified candidates to contest 
an election. Second, it allows the electorate to exercise their right to vote for the candidate who 
most appeals to them. That is, the candidate who best promotes their interests. 
 
By engaging in vote buying, Salyers and his co-defendants invaded the rights and interests of 
both these groups. It might be argued that both of these groups are the primary victims of 
Salyers’s wrongdoing. However, it is submitted that the interests of the electorate are best 
described as a community interest. That is because most, if not all people, have an interest in 
the proper administration of elections. But such interests do not belong to any one person in 
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particular. Rather, they belong to everyone. The harm is therefore not to a welfare interest but 
is more general in nature. 
 
By contrast, the candidates in an election have a very different interest in the outcome of an 
election. By standing for election, each candidate hopes that they will be elected. Each 
candidate therefore has a personal interest in the proper and fair administration of the 
election. By engaging in vote buying Salyers invaded the interests of these innocent candidates. 
It is for this reason that they are best regarded as the primary victims of Salyers’s misconduct. 
 
In terms of primary harm, it might be thought that these innocent candidates only suffered 
setbacks to their ulterior interests. After all, public office is usually an aspiration for those who 
choose to contest elections. However, it is submitted that this view is faulty and that all the 
innocent candidates suffered setbacks to their welfare interests. 
 
The innocent candidates were standing for election in the hope of being elected and securing a 
permanent position. Such an appointment would have carried with it the usual benefits of 
being employed such as remuneration and other fringe benefits. On any view, remunerative 
employment must be a welfare interest. It impacts directly on a person’s ability to provide 
both for themselves and their family. Of course, not all of the innocent candidates contesting 
the election would have been elected. However, this does not detract from the fact that they 
had an interest in the outcome of the election. In short, by denying the innocent candidates a 
fair opportunity of being elected, Salyers set back their welfare interests. 
 
Let us now consider the indirect harm arising from Salyers’s vote buying. We have already 
mentioned the setback to the interests of the electorate. It is submitted that this is the indirect 
consequence of Salyers’s misconduct. By engaging in vote buying, Salyers distorted the 
outcome of the election and set back the rights of the electorate to a democratic election. That 
is, an election in which the outcome is not manipulated through corruption. 
 
The remote harm resulting from our example is something that we have previously touched 
upon as part our literature review in chapter II. The dominant view amongst the political 
scientists is that corruption in the proper functioning of government (which also includes the 
electoral process) can result in a number of remote harms. In developing countries, such 
corruption can strengthen the dominance of the ruling elite, weaken the economy, and foster 
national disintegration. 
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Of course, given that our example is set in the USA (which is a developed country), the remote 
harm is likely to be different to that in developing countries. Nonetheless, it is arguable that if 
election fraud (such as vote buying) were to become pervasive, the general public would lose 
confidence in the integrity of elections, public officials, and the government. This is turn may 
lead to more serious consequences such as civil unrest. 
 
As for the wrongdoing stemming from Salyers’s misconduct, let us recall the primary victims 
from our example: the innocent candidates. We have already referred to the fact that their 
welfare rights were set back by Salyers’s vote buying. But what makes Salyers’s conduct wrong 
is the setback to the innocent candidates’ right to a fair election. That is, an election in which 
the result is not manipulated and in which all the candidates have an equal opportunity of 
being elected. Salyers set back this right when he paid the voters to vote for him. 
 
The fact that the innocent candidates were most likely unaware that their rights had been set 
back in this way is immaterial and does not change the fact that they were wronged. This is 
true even though the results of the election were most likely declared void after the scandal 
came to light and a fresh election called. In short, it does not alter the fact that these innocent 
candidates were wronged by Salyers’s misconduct. 
 
Let us consider another example of vote buying. 
 
THE NEWTON COUNTY VOTE BUYING CASE 
 
In November 1986, a general election was held in Newton County, Arkansas, USA. The 
election was held to elect candidates for both state and federal offices (including that of US 
Senator). The defendant, Alton Campbell, was a county judge who stood in the election in 
order to seek re-election as a judge. 
 
The prosecution alleged that shortly before the election, Campbell had approached a number 
of voters and offered to purchase their votes. As a result of this, he was charged with, inter alia, 
two counts of vote buying contrary to 42 USC § 1973i(c). The evidence in respect of the two 
counts of vote buying came from two voters called by the prosecution. According to these 
witnesses, Campbell had personally paid $30 to one and $50 to the other in exchange for their 
blank absentee ballots. 
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At his trial, Campbell raised a technical defence. He accepted that the voters had given him 
their absentee ballots in exchange for money. However, he argued that there was no evidence 
to show that he had made these payments in exchange for votes as neither voter had actually 
completed their absentee ballot before handing them to him. The prosecution alleged that 
Campbell had completed the absentee ballots himself. 
 
The jury found the prosecution’s case compelling and convicted Campbell of both counts of 
vote buying. He was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment and fined $5,000.401 Let us apply 
our analytical framework to this example. 
 
Part 1: The 2010 Act 
 
In this example, there are two instances of misconduct. First, there is Campbell’s misconduct 
in approaching the voters and offering to purchase their votes. It might be thought that this is 
a case of active bribery because Campbell approached the voters and offered to buy their 
absentee ballots. However, the fact that Campbell instigated the transaction does not absolve 
the voters of liability. The second instance of misconduct is the voters’ behaviour in selling 
their absentee ballots to Campbell. It might be thought that this is an example of passive 
bribery because the voters accepted Campbell’s offer of money in exchange for their absentee 
ballots. 
 
This analysis might lead the reader to conclude that there is some significance in which of the 
parties instigated the corrupt transaction. From a moral perspective, it might be argued that 
the voters are slightly less culpable than Campbell. However, it is submitted that this is a 
factor for a judge to consider when passing sentence. Of more interest to us is the fact that the 
2010 Act makes no distinction between which of the parties instigated the corrupt transaction. 
Instead, it treats them both equally. 
 
In fact, there is nothing in section 1 of the 2010 Act which limits its application to the person 
who instigated the corrupt transaction. We can derive some support for this proposition from 
the fact that section 2, which is concerned with offences relating to being bribed, also applies 
to those who request an advantage (i.e. instigate a corrupt transaction). Thus, it is clear that 
 
401 Summarised from United States v Alton Campbell 845 F 2d 782 (1988). 
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section 2 is not exclusively concerned with cases of passive bribery. That being so, it is 
submitted that, in appropriate cases, section 1 may also fall to be considered in the same way. 
 
In any event, any discussion about the identity of the bribe payer may be illusory. In the 
present case, it is arguable that both Campbell and the voters could be the bribe payer. It will 
be recalled that Campbell approached the voters and offered to purchase their absentee ballots. 
However, on the other hand, the voters agreed to this and offered to sell their absentee ballots 
to Campbell in exchange for money. 
 
This is significant because if we proceed on the basis that the bribe payer was Campbell, we 
run into the same problems that we experienced with our previous example (the Breathitt 
County voting scandal). That is, section 1 does not apply because the voters were not 
performing a relevant function or activity for the purposes of section 3 of the 2010 Act. 
However, if we proceed on the basis that it was the voters who instigated the transaction when 
they offered to sell their absentee ballots to Campbell in exchange for money, we arrive at an 
entirely different conclusion. 
 
It will be recalled that section 1 of the 2010 Act states that a person is guilty of bribing another 
if he offers, promises, or gives an advantage (whether by himself or through a third party) to 
another with the intention of inducing that person to perform a relevant function or activity 
improperly (case 1) or in the knowledge or belief that the acceptance of the advantage would 
itself constitute the improper performance of a relevant function or activity (case 2). Let us 
consider these in turn. 
 
The first part of case 1 requires us to show that the voters gave an advantage to Campbell. This 
is easily satisfied on the facts as the voters furnished Campbell with their absentee ballots. The 
second part of case 1 states that the voters must have provided this advantage with the 
intention of inducing Campbell into performing a relevant function or activity improperly. 
This need not detain us for long because it is clear from the facts that the voters offered their 
votes to Campbell because they wanted him to act improperly by paying for their absentee 
ballots. The third and final part of case 1 requires us to establish that Campbell was 
performing a relevant function or activity improperly. Let us consider this carefully. 
 
According to section 3, a relevant function or activity is one which is of a public nature, 
connected with a business, performed in the course of employment, or performed on behalf of 
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a body of persons (corporate or unincorporate), and which imposes upon the person 
performing it a duty to act in good faith, impartially, or in accordance with a position of trust. 
To this end, it will be recalled that Campbell was a judge who was seeking re-election. As an 
elected public official, Campbell was required to act in good faith not only when sitting in a 
judicial capacity but also when performing peripheral activities of a public nature such as 
seeking re-election in an election. It is submitted that a reasonable person looking at our 
example would hold that Campbell had acted improperly by succumbing to the voters’ offer to 
sell their absentee ballots. Let us therefore hold that case 1 is satisfied, and that the voters are 
guilty of bribing Campbell contrary to section 1 of the 2010 Act. 
 
Turning to case 2, it is submitted that the voters must have known or believed that the mere 
acceptance of a bribe by a judge would itself constitute the improper performance of a 
relevant function or activity. That being so, it is submitted that the case 2 is also satisfied.  
 
Let us now consider Campbell’s liability under section 2 of the 2010 Act. Recall section 2 
which states that a person (R) is guilty of being bribed if he requests, agrees to receive, or 
accepts an advantage in the circumstances set out in cases 3 to 6. As to these, case 3, which 
requires proof of mens rea, states that R must have intentionally performed a relevant 
function or activity improperly. By contrast, case 4, which is strict liability, simply requires 
proof that the request or receipt of the advantage itself constituted the improper performance 
of a relevant function or activity. Similarly, case 5, which is also strict liability, is concerned 
with the situation where R is rewarded for having improperly performed a relevant function 
or activity. Case 6 also imposes strict liability and deals with the scenario where, in 
anticipation of receiving an advantage, R performs a relevant function or activity improperly. 
 
There is no difficulty with establishing the first part of section 2. We know that Campbell 
requested (and accepted) an advantage from the voters when he approached them and offered 
to buy their absentee ballots. The next step is to determine whether Campbell’s conduct was 
contrary to the circumstances set out in cases 3 to 6. To this end, it is submitted that only cases 
3 and 4 are applicable to the facts of our example. 
 
As to case 3, we can infer from the facts that Campbell’s intention in requesting and accepting 
the absentee ballots must have been to manipulate the results of the election in his favour. 
There is no other logical reason for his actions. It would have been obvious to Campbell that 
such behaviour constituted the improper performance of his duties as a judge. As the holder 
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of a public office, he was required to act in good faith not only when sitting as a judge but also 
when he engaged in peripheral activities of a public nature such as standing in an election. It is 
submitted that a reasonable person looking at the facts of our example would have no 
hesitation in coming to the same conclusion. Let us hold therefore hold that case 3 is satisfied. 
 
As to case 4, it is submitted that this too is satisfied on the facts. It will be recalled that case 4, 
which imposes strict liability, is satisfied when the request or receipt of the advantage itself 
constitutes the improper performance of a relevant function or activity. This is easily satisfied 
on the facts as Campbell’s offer to buy the voters’ absentee ballots constituted the improper 
performance of his duties as the holder of a public office. Campbell was, by virtue of his 
position, required to act in good faith not only when sitting as a judge but also when he 
engaged in peripheral activities of a public nature such as standing in an election. This would 
have been obvious to Campbell as well as any reasonable person looking at the matter. Thus, 
we can see that case 4 is also satisfied. 
 
In summary, we can see from this analysis that the conduct of both the voters and Campbell is 
caught by the 2010 Act. This is in addition to their liability under the 1983 Act. It is submitted 
that the voters’ conduct is caught by section 113(5) of the 1983 Act. This makes it an offence 
for a person to either solicit or accept a bribe in exchange for either voting or for refraining 
from voting. It is submitted that the voters, by selling their absentee ballots, essentially agreed 
to refrain from voting. By contrast, Campbell’s conduct is caught by the reciprocal offence in 
section 113(2). This makes it an offence for a person to directly or indirectly offer, promise, or 
give any money or office to any voter in order to induce the voter to vote or refrain from 
voting. In the present case, it is clear that Campbell’s misconduct is caught by section 113(2) 
given that he bought the voters’ absentee ballots. In other words, Campbell induced the voters 
to refrain from voting. 
 
Part 2: The law in the USA 
 
The second part of our analytical framework need not detain us for long because the conduct 
of both the voters and Campbell is caught by 42 USC § 1973i(c). As to the voters, it is 
submitted that their conduct is caught section 1973(i)(c) because they accepted money from 
Campbell in return for their absentee ballots. By contrast, Campbell’s guilt is easy to establish 
since he was charged and convicted of vote buying contrary to section 1973i(c). 
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Part 3: Harm and wrongdoing 
 
Let us now consider the harm and wrongdoing resulting from our example. As we shall see, 
these are very similar to the harm and wrongdoing identified in our previous example (the 
Breathitt County vote buying scandal). 
 
It is submitted that the primary harm was to the other innocent candidates who contested the 
election. Campbell’s vote buying deprived these innocent candidates of their right to a fair 
election. That is, an election in which the outcome is not manipulated through the buying of 
votes. The fact that the results of the election may subsequently have been declared void does 
not detract from the fact that these innocent candidates’ interests were set back. Moreover, the 
invasion to their interests was not trivial since the elected candidate would have benefitted 
financially from their appointment (i.e. they would have received remuneration). It is arguable 
that Campbell’s misconduct therefore constituted a setback to the financial interests (a welfare 
interest) of these innocent candidates. 
 
As to the indirect harm, we have previously argued that vote buying constitutes a set back to 
the community interests of the electorate. Of course, we are referring here to those innocent 
members of the electorate whose rights to a democratic election were set back. It follows from 
this that we are excluding the voters involved in our current example. It is submitted that 
these voters cannot be regarded as victims for the simple reason that they voluntarily agreed 
to sell their votes. In terms of the indirect harm suffered by the innocent members of the 
electorate, it is submitted that both the voters and Campbell distorted the electoral process; 
thereby setting back the public interest in a properly functioning and democratic election. 
 
Now let us consider the remote harm arising from our example. The general literature on 
corruption tells us that vote buying adversely affects the proper functioning of the 
government which in turn can result in a number of undesirable remote harms. For example, 
if electoral fraud (such as vote buying) were to become pervasive, it is arguable that the public 
would lose confidence in the integrity of elections, public officials, and the government. The 
reason for this disconnection is the fact that corruption in the electoral process leads to the 
wrong people being elected and therefore subverts the democratic will. The resulting 
government is less representative and less accountable than it would otherwise be. Those who 
are elected also have less of an incentive to promote the interests of their constituents. In 
addition, it has been said that pervasive corruption in the electoral process has consequences 
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that go beyond the bounds of representation and democratic accountability such as civil 
unrest, violence, and even civil war.402 
 
Lastly, let us consider the wrongdoing resulting from our example. It is submitted that the 
primary victims in our example, the innocent candidates, were wronged when Campbell 
interfered with their right to a fair election. As a direct result of Campbell’s vote buying, these 
innocent candidates were denied an equal opportunity of being elected. The fact that the 
results of the election were most likely declared void does not alter the wrongdoing suffered 
by these innocent candidates. 
 
 
10. THE HARM IN CORRUPTION 
 
The aim of this chapter was twofold. First, to remedy the gap which we have previously 
identified as existing in the scholarship on corruption. Second, to provide a complete account 
of the harm and wrongdoing which flows from acts of corruption. Let us consider these 
overlapping aims. 
 
In chapter II, we undertook a review of the literature on the harm and wrongdoing in 
corruption. This showed us that the scholarship in this area can broadly be divided into three 
distinct strands: political harm, economic harm, and moral wrongdoing. The general 
consensus amongst both political scientists and economic theorists is that corruption is 
objectionable because it results in remote harms. The former submit that corruption is a 
threat to the proper functioning of government and the rule of law. The latter argue that 
corruption is inefficient because it stifles competition, distorts the allocation of resources, and 
retards economic development. As for moral wrongdoing, there is small but emerging body of 
philosophical literature. The most prominent of the legal philosophers suggests that the 
offering a bribe is wrong because it induces another to commit an unlawful act. By contrast, it 
is said that the receipt of a bribe is wrong because it causes the recipient to act in breach of a 
duty owed to a principal or principle. 
 
 
402 Sarah Birch, ‘Electoral Corruption’ in Todd Landman and Neil Robinson (eds), The SAGE Handbook of 
Comparative Politics (SAGE Publications, 2009) 395-409. 
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Although none of these claims have been disputed (indeed some of them were adopted as part 
of our analysis of remote harms), it is clear from our literature review that the scholarship in 
this area is incomplete because it underemphasises the harm and wrongdoing resulting from 
corruption. In particular, it fails to provide an account of the harm and wrongdoing suffered 
by those innocent actors whose interests are wrongfully set back by the corrupt acts of others. 
Instead, it focuses almost exclusively on the remote harms which result from corruption. 
 
One reason for this omission may be due to the fact that there have been no systematic 
analyses of the different types of harm that result from acts of corruption (i.e. primary harm, 
indirect harm, and remote harm). Although these harms are descriptive (rather than 
definitional) features, it is submitted that they are typically to be found in core cases of 
corruption. In addition, the literature also fails to make the connection between the primary 
harm and the wrongdoing suffered by those innocent actors whose rights are set back by 
corruption. 
 
In this chapter, we have sought to plug these gaps by systematically analysing a number of 
different case studies. Our approach has been to take the analytical framework set out in 
chapter III and to apply that framework to a range of carefully selected cases studies of core 
cases of corrupt conduct. 
 
Perhaps the first thing to note about our analyses is that the coverage between the law in 
England and Wales and the law in the USA is largely identical. We should not be surprised at 
this. After all, corruption is a transnational phenomenon. But the similarity of coverage shows 
that core cases of corruption travel well. Of course, this may not hold true for corruption in 
the wider sense. However, the fact that core cases of corruption are also proscribed in the USA 
suggests that our project has a normative value which extends beyond England and Wales. 
 
Turning to the harm and wrongdoing, our systematic analysis has allowed us to demonstrate 
that in core cases of corruption there are at least three types of harm that result: primary 
harms, indirect harms, and remote harms. By articulating all the harms which result from 
corruption, we have been able to demonstrate the direct connection between the harm and the 
wrongdoing suffered by the innocent victims of corruption. These findings confirm that the 
general literature on the harm and wrongdoing in corruption is incomplete. Contrary to the 
general literature, our project has shown that the harm in corruption is not limited to remote 
harms. 
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Interestingly, our analysis has also shown that the harm and wrongdoing which results from 
corruption differs from case study to case study (and from example to example). Moreover, so 
do the identities of the innocent actors whose interests are wrongfully set back by the corrupt 
acts of others. However, this is not surprising given that the term “corruption” describes a 
family of conduct rather than one particular type of misconduct. 
 
For example, as part of our first case study (bribery), we looked at the harm and wrongdoing 
caused by a public official, Munir Patel, who had been convicted of bribery contrary to section 
2 of the 2010 Act. We concluded that the primary harm was to those innocent insurance 
companies whose interests were wrongfully set back by the corrupt conduct of Patel. That is, 
because they had carried risks at an inappropriate cost and effectively insured bad drivers as if 
they were good drivers. Not only did this deprive these innocent insurance companies of 
valuable revenue, it also meant that they were exposed to a risk (i.e. the likelihood of the 
insured driver being at fault for a road traffic accident) which they had not fully appreciated. 
As to the indirect harm, we concluded that this was to the public’s community interest in the 
proper functioning of the administration of justice. This was fairly easy to develop as an 
argument since most people have an interest in a fair and impartial criminal justice system. 
However, in terms of the remote harm, our analysis dovetailed neatly with the general 
literature and showed that an entrenched culture of bribery amongst public officials would 
most likely lead to corruption spilling over into other areas. There was also the risk that the 
criminal justice system would lose legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Finally, when looking 
at the question of wrongdoing, we made a connection between the primary harm and the 
wrongdoing suffered by the innocent insurance companies. In short, we argued that the 
primary harm to the insurance companies consisted of a setback to their welfare interests 
(they suffered a financial setback). Given the importance of welfare interests, this setback 
simultaneously wronged the innocent insurance companies. 
 
By contrast, recall our examination of noble cause corruption. In both of our examples, Judith 
Ward and the Birmingham Six, the harm and wrongdoing were particularly striking. In both 
examples, the defendants had been wrongfully imprisoned for many years. For example, Ward 
spent nearly 18 years in prison because of the corrupt conduct of forensic scientists who had 
misled the court by concealing evidence which might have changed the course of the trial. 
 
Our analysis of Ward’s case showed that the primary harm resulting from the miscarriage of 
justice was to Ward. It was clear that she was the primary victim of the forensic scientists’ 
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misconduct. As a result of this misconduct, she had suffered the most egregious of harms by 
being wrongfully deprived her liberty for almost two decades. This deprivation of liberty set 
back almost all her interests. For example, she was unable to pursue many routine activities 
which most of us take for granted such as securing employment and starting a family. But she 
was not the only victim. Upon further analysis, it became clear that Ward’s family had also 
been indirectly harmed by the forensic scientists’ misconduct. After all, they had been 
deprived of a daughter and sister for almost 18 years. As with all our cases studies, the remote 
harm in Ward’s case aligned exactly with the remote harms described in the general literature. 
For example, we observed that if noble cause corruption were to become pervasive there 
would be a breakdown in the administration of the criminal justice system. Finally, we 
considered the wrongdoing suffered by Ward as a result of the forensic scientists’ misconduct. 
We noted how this was directly connected to the primary harm suffered by Ward. That is, 
because she had been deprived of her liberty, almost all her rights and interests (welfare and 
ulterior) had been unlawfully violated. However, of all of these rights and interests, the most 
important violations were arguably to her right to liberty and her right to a fair trial. She was 
denied both of these as a direct result of the forensic scientists’ misconduct. 
 
As we can see from these two case studies (bribery and noble cause corruption), the harm and 
wrongdoing varies from case study to case study (as does the identity of the innocent actors 
affected by the corruption of others). By contrast, the general literature falls into error by 
providing an incomplete account of the harm and wrongdoing which results from acts of 
corruption. One reason for this failure may be the fact that the literature does not 
acknowledge that the identity of the innocent victims may vary from case to case. This may be 
because in cases of corruption, unlike most (though not all) other types of crimes, the 
innocent victim is usually unaware that their rights and interests have been set back. As a 
result, there is a popular misconception that white collar offences such as corruption and 
fraud are victimless crimes. 
 
By approaching the matter systematically, we have been able to plug the gap in the literature 
by articulating a complete account of the harm and wrongdoing in a selection of case studies 
of corrupt conduct. Our account of the harm in corruption has shown that core cases of 
corrupt conduct give rise to harm in three dimensions: primary harms, indirect harms, and 
remote harms. This is in addition to the wrongdoing which also results from corruption. It is 
important to distinguish the harm in this way since the primary harm provides the basis for 
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understanding how corruption wrongs those innocent actors whose rights and interests are 
set back by the corrupt acts of others. 
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V 
CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has sought to articulate a coherent theory of the harm in corruption. It is 
submitted that we have achieved this aim. In this final chapter, we shall review our research 
question, look at our methodology, revisit our findings, and discuss our coherent theory of the 
harm in corruption. 
 
Let us begin by considering the central elements of our research question. First, our use of the 
word “coherent” is a reference to the fact that our project is concerned with articulating a 
complete account of the harm caused to those innocent actors whose interests are setback by 
the corrupt acts of others. Our research question is framed in this way because the existing 
literature in this area is incomplete as it provides only a partial account of the harm caused to 
these innocent actors. Second, the word “harm” in our research question is used in an 
extended sense. That is, it is used to describe both simple harm (i.e. a setback to interests) and 
wrongdoing (i.e. the indefensible violation of a person’s rights). In order to aid precision, we 
subdivided simple harm into primary harms, indirect harms, and remote harms. This 
systematic approach was adopted in order to aid the articulation of a complete account of the 
harm in corruption. Lastly, although the word “corruption” is used to describe a large family 
of conduct, we limited the ambit of our enquiry, for analytical reasons, to core cases of corrupt 
conduct.  
 
Turning to the question of methodology, it will be recalled that our research question was 
prompted by a critical review of the literature on the harm and wrongdoing in corruption. 
During our review of the scholarship, it became apparent that the general scholarship is 
defective insofar as it fails to provide a complete account of the harm and wrongdoing which 
results from corruption. 
 
Our literature review showed that the scholarship in this area can be broadly divided into 
three distinct but overlapping strands: political harm, economic harm, and moral wrongdoing. 
The first two strands are largely concerned with remote harms whereas the last strand is 
concerned with the question of wrongdoing. 
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The literature on political and economic harm consists of contributions from political 
scientists and economic theorists. Although a minority from both groups (the revisionists) 
argue that corruption is beneficial and efficient, these views are regarded by most observers as 
false. The fact that most countries have some form of anti-corruption legislation casts 
considerable doubt over the claims made by the revisionists. By contrast, the majority (the 
post-revisionists) argue that corruption is harmful. To this end, they submit that corruption 
may, if left unchecked, undermine the proper functioning of government and the efficient 
operation of the economy. Whilst we did not dispute these claims, it quickly became apparent 
during our literature review that the post-revisionists’ account of the harm in corruption is 
incomplete insofar as it focuses on remote harms. In short, they underestimate the primary 
and indirect harms suffered by those innocent actors whose rights and interests are set back 
by the corrupt acts of others. 
 
The third strand consists of a small but emerging body of literature which is concerned with 
the wrongdoing in corruption. The chief proponent of this emerging field is Green. According 
to Green, what makes an act wrongful is some intrinsic violation of a freestanding moral duty 
rather than the consequences of the act. To this end, he advocates an approach based upon 
everyday norms. He identifies disloyalty as the everyday norm which is breached by bribery 
(although it is not clear how Green arrived at this conclusion). Green analyses the moral 
wrongdoing in bribery in two parts: passive bribery and active bribery. According to Green, 
the receipt of a bribe (passive bribery) is wrong because it causes the duty-holder to breach his 
duty of loyalty to a principal or principle. By contrast, the offer of a bribe (active bribery) is 
wrong because it induces the recipient to commit a wrongful act. 
 
However, our literature review showed Green’s analysis to be incomplete in two important 
respects. First, his analysis fails to acknowledge that corruption may result in harm to other 
innocent actors (i.e. besides principals). Second, he fails to make any connection between the 
simple harm stemming from acts of corruption and the wrongdoing caused by such conduct. 
 
As a result of our literature review, we identified a gap in the scholarship. In short, there are 
no complete accounts of the harm (i.e. primary, indirect, and remote) and wrongdoing in 
corruption. Moreover, there is no explanation of the nexus between these two elements. It was 
this gap in the literature which prompted us to articulate a coherent theory of the harm in 
corruption. 
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In order to answer our research question, we set out a three-part analytical framework. It was 
necessary to do this for a number of reasons. The first part of our framework allowed us to 
identify core cases of corrupt conduct. It was necessary to do this because corruption consists 
of a large family of conduct and there is no agreement on which types of conduct should be 
included within any definition. For analytical reasons, we limited the ambit of our enquiry to 
core cases of corruption. We identified core cases by taking conduct which is commonly 
regarded as being a core case of corruption and applying the improper conduct offences in the 
2010 Act. 
 
As to the 2010 Act, we observed that the general offences in sections 1 (offences of bribing 
another person) and 2 (offences relating to being bribed) do not extend the old law. The same 
is true of the discrete offence in section 6 which proscribes the bribery of foreign public 
officials. What is new in the 2010 Act is section 7 which makes it an offence for a commercial 
organisation to fail to prevent bribery. However, this does not extend criminal liability beyond 
that which might be regarded as bribery in the popular sense. 
 
The second part of our framework consisted of a summary of some carefully selected anti-
corruption statutes from the USA. These federal and state level statutes allowed us to 
demonstrate that core cases of corruption are also contrary to the law in the USA. In other 
words, we were able to show that core cases of corruption travel well; thereby adding support 
to the claim that our coherent theory of the harm and wrongdoing in corruption is of 
normative value. 
 
The third and final part of our analytical framework consisted of a streamlined and 
supplemented version of Feinberg’s restatement of the harm principle. By adopting Feinberg’s 
version of the harm principle, we had a ready-made and powerful tool for identifying harm. In 
particular, we were able to explain what we meant by simple harm (a setback to interests) and 
wrongdoing (an indefensible violation of a person’s rights). We expanded Feinberg’s account 
of simple harm so as to include primary harms, indirect harms, and remote harms. As to 
wrongdoing, we supplemented the harm principle with Hohfeld’s account of the form of 
rights, and MacCormick’s theory as to the function of rights. 
 
In chapter IV, we applied our analytical framework to a range of different case studies (or core 
cases of corruption). We applied our analytical framework to each of these case studies. The 
application of the first part required us to apply the improper conduct offences in the 2010 
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Act to a given case study so as to confirm its classification as a core case of corruption. But this 
occasionally caused a real strain as we tried to shoehorn various case studies into the 2010 Act. 
For example, our examination of noble cause corruption, which is regarded by many scholars 
as a core case of corruption, required some imaginative thinking. The misconduct of the 
forensic scientists (in the Judith Ward case) and the police officers (in the Birmingham Six 
case) did not have the look of bribery. There was no meeting of minds between these actors 
and prosecution counsel. The similarity with bribery lay not only in the improper conduct of 
the forensic scientists and the police officers in conferring an advantage on prosecution 
counsel (without his knowledge), but also in the harm and wrongdoing which stemmed from 
their misconduct. However, it may be that our difficulties in trying to fit noble cause 
corruption into the 2010 Act is indicative of a more fundamental problem involving correct 
labelling. Perhaps such conduct is better categorised as an example of perverting the course of 
justice. But it is only by undertaking a systematic analysis of the kind found in this thesis that 
one can begin to challenge existing labels. 
 
The application of the second part of our framework allowed us to ascertain whether there are 
any key differences in terms of coverage with the law in the USA. Although the law in the 
USA is piecemeal in nature, it transpires that coverage is largely the same. This confirms two 
things. First, that core cases of corruption travel well. Second that our theory of the harm and 
wrongdoing in corruption has a normative value which extends beyond England and Wales.  
 
The third and final part of our analytical framework is also the most important. By applying 
our streamlined version of the harm principle to our case studies, we were able to demonstrate 
that, at the very least, core cases of corruption give rise to three types of simple harm (primary 
harms, indirect harms, and remote harms) as well as wrongdoing. These descriptive features 
were found in each and every one of our nine case studies. Moreover, our analysis of these 
case studies allowed us to demonstrate the nexus between harming (in particular primary 
harms) and wrongdoing. Feinberg’s version of the harm principle tells us that a setback to a 
person’s welfare interest is so serious that it simultaneously constitutes a wrong. Our case 
studies show that corruption sets back the welfare interests of innocent actors and thereby 
wrongs them. 
 
We concluded our analysis by drawing together our findings and articulating a coherent 
theory of the harm and wrongdoing in corruption. In short, we argued that a coherent theory 
of the harm and wrongdoing in core cases of corruption must, at the very least, be able to 
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provide an account of the primary, indirect, and remote harms which stem from core cases of 
corruption together with an account of the wrongdoing. Any theory which fails to do this is at 
serious risk of being defective. We argued that only by approaching the matter systematically 
is it possible to articulate a complete (as opposed to partial) account of the harm and 
wrongdoing in corruption. 
 
At the outset of this thesis, we sought to furnish a coherent theory of the harm in corruption. 
By rethinking the harm and wrongdoing in corruption, this thesis has plugged the gap in the 
literature and successfully articulated a complete account of the harm and wrongdoing in core 
cases of corruption. 
 
Word count: 97,863 (including footnotes). 
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